Following the signing of a Russian-brokered agreement to end the recent conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh on November 10, Armenia was thrust into a domestic turmoil. Public discontent has been rife, with many Armenians claiming that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gave up and surrendered large amounts of territory to Azerbaijan.  

Armenia’s highest officials, accused the Prime Minister of signing the agreement without prior consent. Armenian President Armen Sarkissian released a statement which explained that he “learned about the conditions for ending the war from the press as well.” “Unfortunately, there had not been any consultation or discussion on this document with me as the President of the Republic [of Armenia],” he added.

As President Sarkissian called for national unity, many of Pashinyan’s allies instead began to issue their resignations from their government posts. Press Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia Artsrun Hovhannisyan issued his resignation on November 12. Hovhannisyan has been criticized for his statements to the public in which he expressed his confidence that Armenian forces would be victorious.

On November 16, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan issued his resignation. Mnatsakanyan was a career diplomat, previously representing Armenia as Ambassador to the United Nations. He became the Foreign Minister in 2018 after Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, in which Nikol Pashinyan replaced Serzh Sargsyan.

Also within the Armenian Ministry of Defense, Defense Ministry Spokesperson Shushan Stepanyan and Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan both issued resignations on November 20. Defense Minister Tonoyan had held the position since May 2018 following Pashinyan’s rise to power. Spokesperson Stepanyan, born in Hadrut during Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory, announced via Facebook that she would be leaving her position. In her announcement, Stepanyan indicated that “at this difficult time…there is the need for officials who will not make decisions based on emotions, who will look at events professionally,” and added that “this is something I will not be able to do at this time.”

The most recent resignation came on November 24 with the announcement that Armenia’s Minister of Economy Tigran Khachatryan would be leaving his post. Appointed to the role in October 2018, Khachatryan served as Minister for only slightly more than two years. 

Immediately after signing the trilateral agreement with Russia and Azerbaijan, the Armenian public and opposition leaders began calling for Pashinyan to step down. An anti-government rally, led by opposition parties, was held on November 11 in downtown Yerevan. Eduard Sharmazanov of the Republican Party, Garnik Isagulyan of the National Security Party, and Ruben Melikyan, the former human rights ombudsman of Nagorno-Karabakh, were all detained in Liberty Square. Ishkhan Sagateluyan of Dashnaktsutyun, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, addressed protesters and called for Pashinyan’s immediate removal, referring to the Prime Minister as “the evil of the nation.” Armenia’s National Security Service also arrested several other opposition leaders, accusing them of planning a coup.

Pashinyan came under further criticism after posting a controversial statement on his Facebook account, which many interpreted as a call for civil war and violence against his opponents. This statement initiated a wave of resignations within Pashinyan’s party, beginning with parliamentary representative Gayane Abrahamyan. Following Abrahamyan’s resignation, Varak Sisserian, the Chief of Staff for the Deputy Prime Minister, announced his intent to leave his post. Deputy Minister for the Environment Irina Ghaplanyan stepped down, and parliament member Taguhi Tovmasyan left Pashinyan’s political party, but remained in parliament.

Following the shakeup, it has been announced that Ara Ayvazyan will serve as Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vagharshak Harutyunyan as the Minister of Defense, Mesrop Arakelyan as the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, and Vahram Dumanyan as the Minister of Education, Science, Culture, and Sports.

Prime Minister Pashinyan has continually affirmed that he is not considering resignation. Martial law continues to remain in effect in Armenia despite the end of warfare, which some critics believe is being used to stifle mass protests against the Prime Minister.

Pro-EU candidate Maia Sandu won the Moldovan presidential run-off elections on November 15^th with goals to end corruption, scandals, and favoritism towards the Kremlin.  

Rebranding the Pro-Western Parties 

Sandu secured 57.7 percent of the vote by positioning herself against both pro-Russian groups and unpopular pro-Western parties. Her anti-Russia stance revolves around Russian peacekeeping in Transnistria, which prevents Moldova from unifying with Romania or joining the EU. However, her disassociation from other pro-Western groups stems from 2016 when the U.S. government sponsored political parties connected to a corrupt banking tycoon, Vlad Plahotniuc. The U.S. formally ended their support for Plahotniuc in 2019 by refusing to grant him refuge after his inditement on corruption charges. In 2016 presidential and 2019 parliamentary elections, pro-Russian parties discouraged the Moldovan voter base from supporting the EU-platforms by publishing images of Plahotniuc’s meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria J. Nuland, linking Western-backing to further corruption in Moldova. Sandu’s anti-corruption campaign and her subsequent land-slide victory signify a new image for the pro-Western movement.  

Potential New Parliamentary Elections 

President-elect Sandu proposed snap parliamentary elections stating, “Parliament has proven that it doesn’t work for people.” Previous Moldovan officials such as 2018 appointed President Pavel Filip dissolved the parliament and called for snap elections after the Constitutional Court suspended pro-Russian President Igor Dodon from his presidency. Moldovan parliament is often torn between association with the West and Russia. 

Day of the Election and After 

On November 15^th, Moldovan veterans blocked the Transnistrian border to prevent voter fraud stemming from Transnistria. In the 2016 and 2019 elections, 70,000 Transnistrian voters were bribed and bussed to Moldova, giving a lead to pro-Russian incumbent President Igor Dodon and his party. Veterans enforced Moldova’s ban on vehicles carrying more than eight people entering from the breakaway state by monitoring how many people cross the border and registering cars. Approximately 14,000 Moldovan citizens from Transnistria voted and police recorded 173 voter violations in the first round of the elections on November 1^st. Although Transnistrians can vote in the Moldovan elections, they do not have access to non-Russian mass media. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) said the run-off elections were well-managed but were full of unfair campaigning involving personal attacks and lack of impartiality in available information. 

After losing with 42.2% of the votes, Dodon congratulated Sandu on winning the election. However, Dodon alleged that there were several electoral violations involving Western participation. A record-breaking 1.2 million members of the Moldovan diaspora voted in consulates across Russia and EU countries. The incumbent discouraged any street riots and protests regarding his loss. Dodon also criticized Sandu’s statement regarding withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping mission from Transnistria. In an interview with a Russian broadcaster NTV Moldova, he said the Transnistrian conflict has not been resolved and thus needs peacekeeping to protect the interests of an alleged 35 to 50 percent Russian population. In conversations with Ukrainian publications, Sandu announced a departure from the Russian alliance, focusing on improving relations with neighboring Ukraine. The President-elect said she believes Moldova and Ukraine both aim to achieve rapprochement with the EU and share a “bilateral agenda” due to Russian influence. Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and Romania congratulated Sandu on her landslide victory, stating their hopes for cooperation with the new administration. 

Sources: New York Times, 112 International, TASS, Euronews, OSCE, France 24 

Amidst the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, self-proclaimed authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions block openings of new border crossing points complicating humanitarian relief efforts.

As of November 7^th, there are 13,907 recorded COVID-19 cases in the Donetsk region and 177 deaths. Luhansk reported 4,539 active cases and 109 deaths. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates the infection rates in the region to be one confirmed case for every 14 tests, compared to the world average of one case for every 20 tests. Since the start of the pandemic, government officials recorded 4,540 cases in the Ukrainian army. COVID-19 presents a severe threat to the significant ageing population, and patients suffering from multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, hearth disease, and diabetes in Ukraine. Both regions are separated between government-controlled territories in the west and non-government-controlled areas, which include the densely populated cities of Donetsk and Luhansk bordering the Russian Federation. 

Since Kyiv does not control the entire region, the official count by the World Health Organization and Johns Hopkins University does not include the separatist-held territories. The Russian local media servicing Donetsk and Luhansk has been accused of misreporting pandemic statistics. Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Lyudmyla Denisova stated human rights activists can provide only approximate infection data. Denisova urged the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), responsible for ceasefire-monitoring in the region, to investigate the real number of COVID-19 patients. 

In an assessment of 824 households in Luhansk and Donetsk published by UN-affiliated organizations, four out of 10 residents said there is little to no compliance with social distancing. Approximately 25% of respondents were not aware that COVID-19 is a contagious disease, and eight out of 10 did not believe they had a high risk of contracting the virus. Although 63% reported using masks and 68% noted handwashing, six percent of responders cited that they were unable to obtain hand sanitizers and masks. Most residents were concerned about problems with transportation, inability to see family or blocked crossing at Entry-Exit Checkpoints (EECPs). People living on the eastern side of the border often rely on pension payments, social work, and hospital care on the Ukrainian side, resulting in 10% stating that they have no access to healthcare. Ukrainian humanitarian organizations and media approximate an occupancy of over 70% in non-government-controlled hospitals.

As of November 10, EECPs of Zolote, Stanytsia, Luhanska, and Schastia in Luhansk and Hnutove, Novotroitske, Maryinka, and Mayorske in Donetsk would open for daily transit of passengers. The crossing points would operate from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. with COVID-19 restrictions such as temperature screening, enforcement of masks, and social distancing. Although TCG negotiated the opening of checkpoints, militants refused to open EECPs in Schastia and Zolote, accusing Ukraine of changing their negotiating position. Self-proclaimed officials in Luhansk allege that Ukraine refused to equip one of the checkpoints with a vehicle crossing point. The Foreign Ministries of France and Germany issued a joint statement condemning the separatists’ breach of agreement and called on Russia to influence the opening of crossings. The international community also welcomed the creation of two new EECPs by the Ukrainian side, which abides by the December 9, 2019 resolutions of the Normandy-format Summit between Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany.

The Special Representative of the OSCE, Ambassador Heidi Grau, raised concern about repeated ceasefire violations near water infrastructure in Donetsk. Grau said the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission observed that 44% of all violations took place near the Donetsk Filtering Station (DFS), which supplies water to 380,000 people. Destruction or damage of the water supply endangers the civilian population and prevents them from following COVID-19 precautions. Other concerns included economic devastation of the region due to the pandemic. Roughly 40% of families said that at least one member lost a job during the pandemic, according to a UN humanitarian report. The Norwegian Refugee Council concluded that food prices in the region have increased by 30% and only one third reported receiving humanitarian assistance. Restricted movement impedes the free flow of commerce and transportation business in the region.

Composing 32% of the Ukrainian population, the Donetsk and Luhansk conflicts are one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. On October 29^th, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) hosted the first-ever discussion between Ukrainian donor community and the local “authorities” in Luhansk. Several international humanitarian organizations expressed their concerns for the COVID-19 situation in the region, which was previously exacerbated by a series of wildfires. Donors also supplied Luhansk with personal protective equipment.

Sources: Getty Images, OSCE Press Release, 112 International, COVID-19 Humanitarian Report, NRC, UN Ukraine, Statista, Interfax Ukraine

Early on Tuesday, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced an agreement to halt the fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh in a deal brokered by Russia. 

On September 27, fighting once again erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to six weeks of the worst bloodshed since the 1994 ceasefire. During the course of the renewed fighting, ceasefires were negotiated first by Russia, then France, and then the United States, and each of those ceasefires were violated almost immediately. 

On Sunday November 8, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev claimed that his forces had captured the key city of Shusha/Shushi, effectively cutting off Armenian access to the region’s capital city and crippling the ethnic Armenian forces in the Region. On Monday November 9, Azerbaijan apologized for the downing of a Russian military helicopter over Armenia. The crash killed two Russian crew members and injured one.

Early on Tuesday November 10, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced that they had agreed to a Russian-brokered ceasefire.

Terms of the ceasefire Agreement

The ceasefire agreement establishes the immediate cessation of hostilities.  It allows for each party to maintain the positions which they currently occupy in the region, though Armenia will return the Agdam district, the Kalbajar district, and the Lachin district to Azerbaijan.  Russian will deploy nearly 2,000 peacekeeping forces to Nagorno-Karabakh for at least five years along the conflict line and the Lachin corridor.  Russia will also establish a peacekeeping command post in the region.

The agreement also provides for the construction of a new route along the Lachin corridor to connect Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.  Armenia must also guarantee safe passage in a transportation corridor which would connect Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will oversee the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions.  Armenia and Azerbaijan will exchange prisoners of war, hostages and other detainees, and the remains of casualties.

Armenian Protests and Azeri Celebrations

After the announcement of the ceasefire on Tuesday, thousands of people swarmed into the main square in the Armenian capital of Yerevan to protest the agreement. Protesters called for Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign and they stormed the parliament building. They damaged the building and beat the president of the Armenian Speaker of Parliament Ararat Mirzoyan to the point that he needed surgery.  Protests have continued in Yerevan since Tuesday and there is no sign that they will stop soon.

In Azerbaijan’s capital of Baku and other Azerbaijani cities celebrations broke out on the streets over the ceasefire agreement on Tuesday. People waved the Azeri national flag, honked car and bus horns, and lauded what they consider to be a victory.

International Implication

Although the international community has displayed grave concern over the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, its efforts have done little to resolve the current conflict.  Each of the Minsk group co-chair states of Russia, France, and the United States negotiated ceasefires which were violated almost as soon as they were signed.  Russia was finally able to negotiate a lasting ceasefire after Azerbaijan took Shusha/Shushi and the ethnic Armenian forces recognized their dire condition.  The ceasefire was a matter of necessity and not a triumph of diplomacy.

The international community has yet to forcefully repudiate Turkey for the role it played in stoking the flames of conflict.  The Russian-Turkish ceasefire monitoring center sets a troubling precedent of Turkish and Russian influence in the region.

Sources: AP, CNN, Reuters, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, NPR, BBC, Al Jazeera, The Kremlin, France 24, TASS, OHCHR report

The first round of Moldovan elections took place on November 1st, with the pro-Russian incumbent, Igor Dodon winning 32.6% of the vote versus European Union-backed former Prime Minister Maia Sandu’s 36.1%. The runoff election on November 15th will determine whether Moldova pivots towards Russia or the West.  

A Narrow Election  

Dodon and Sandu were unable to secure a majority vote in an election with a historically low voter turnout of 42.7%. Although exit polls predicted an easy win for Dodon, who secured 52.11% of votes in 2016, Sandu gained 11% of votes from the diaspora, which put her ahead. The incumbent Dodon, the former economy minister under the 2006 and 2009 Communist governments, campaigned with promises of improved infrastructure and social care, balanced foreign policy, traditional Christian values, and mandatory Russian-language instruction in schools. Throughout his term, Dodon favored relationships with Russia rather than ties with Romania, Ukraine, and the EU, making over 35 visits to Russia. A former World Bank economist and prime minister in 2019, Sandu promised to secure funding from Brussels. 

Transnistria Can Swing the Election Towards Russia 

Opposition leaders in Chisinau fear a repetition of the rampant Transnistrian voter fraud that occurred during the 2016 presidential and 2019 parliamentary elections. Transnistria is an unrecognized state that broke away from Moldova in 1992 with significant assistance from Russia. The authorities in Tiraspol, the region’s self-proclaimed capital, heavily align themselves with the Kremlin. They receive free gas for over 15 years and get high pension and salary payments from Russian, and even mandate the teaching of Russian language and the Cyrillic alphabet in schools. For the past two elections, tens of thousands of Transnistrians were transported to bordering Moldovan regions where they cast their votes for pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon. In particular, Dodon received an extra 16,788 votes in 2016 and the Party of Socialists (PSRM) got 37,177 Transnistrian ballots.  

President Dodon argues that Transnistrian votes are equivalent to Moldovan votes cast abroad. However, local NGOs and humanitarian watch groups say allowing unrecognized states to vote in elections is a form of coercion against Moldovan sovereignty. First, the lack of government supervision allows for involuntary voting, where Transnistrians are paid to cross the Dniester river and vote in favor of a set candidate. Secondly, while living as a separate state, Transnistrians will skew Moldovan votes to elect a president or parliament that will be beneficial for Tiraspol. Following the election of President Dodon, he recognized Transnistria’s self-declared leader Vadim Krasnoselsky as the president during their meeting in Chisinau and delayed the assessment of taxes on cigarettes and alcohol exported by Transnistria.  

Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission has banned bussing practices to election polls, but the opposition worries about the ruling’s implementation. Transnistria lifted all COVID-19 movement restrictions to Moldova effective November 1st, the day of the election. Unlike Moldova, Ukrainian non-government-controlled regions of Donetsk and Luhansk were not allowed to vote in recent local elections on October 25th. Similarly, the breakaway states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not participate in the Georgian parliamentary elections on October 31st.  

Russian Presence in the Media and Its Implications 

Under the leadership of President Dodon and the PSRM, the Russian media underwent a revival. The pro-Russian government reestablished major Russian state-sponsored networks such as “Perviy Kanal”, or “Channel One,” previously banned by the pro-Western Democratic Party. Two-thirds of network owners are politicians with ties to Moscow. For example, Igor Chaica the owner of “Primul în Moldova” (“Channel One in Moldova”) is a son of a former Prosecutor General in Russia, Yuri Chaica, who is tightly connected to President Dodon’s brother. Moldovans also read Russian-language newspapers and internet publications. The Russian media has heavily opposed western integration and pro-Romanian sentiments. “Primul în Moldova ” often criticizes friendly relations with the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), LGBTQ+ rights, and western rise of atheism. Media is crucial in the reelection of the incumbent president, as much of his party owns Russian-speaking channels and approximately 31% of Moldovans choose Russian over Moldovan programming. 

No Violations Recorded So Far 

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) supervised the first round of Moldovan elections. OSCE and ODIHR concluded that both candidates received equitable treatment despite minor problems of the overall organization of the election, media environment, and allegations of buying and transporting voters. The EU expressed satisfaction with the overall electoral process and will continue to observe the execution of the second round.  

Sources: Euronews, European Union External Action, Aljazeera, Voice of America, Politico 

The Georgian governing party claims victory and the opposition party calls for protests following the October 31 parliamentary elections.

November 3, 2020

Election Results

Tbilisi, Georgia – Georgian Dream, the governing party of Georgia, won the highly contested October 31 parliamentary election, according to preliminary results announced on Sunday. The opposition party, the United National Movement (UNM) party, claims that the results were manipulated and refuses to recognize them as valid.

According to the Central Election Commission of Georgia, Georgian Dream won 48.3% of the vote, the United National Movement won 27.16%, and several other parties met the 1% threshold to win seats in parliament. In accordance with a constitutional amendment passed earlier this year, Georgian Dream has surpassed the 40.54% threshold needed to form a government.

The UNM has demanded new elections and has called for their supporters to protest until the election results have been invalidated. Thousands of protesters have gathered outside the parliament building in Tbilisi in response to the election results announced on Sunday.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) election monitoring mission declared Georgia’s election “competitive” and “overall, fundamental freedoms were respected”, however they also said “pervasive allegations of pressure on voters and blurring of the line between the ruling party and the state” have diminished voters’ trust in the electoral process. The separatist states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia also cannot vote in Georgian elections.

Georgian Dream

The Georgian Dream party was established by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili and has been in power since 2012 when it unseated the United National Movement (UNM). Originally founded as an opposition party to UNM, the Georgian Dream lacks clear ideology, though it leans center-left. The party is made of a broad coalition of pro-market, pro-Western liberals and radical, xenophobic nationals. It has passed both progressive and conservative legislations.

UNM has accused Georgian Dream of pursuing pro-Russian policies while declaring itself pro-European. They have also accused Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia, of controlling the government without holding elected office. In June 2019, about 10,000 protesters took to the streets after a Russian MP delivered a speech from the Georgian parliament’s speaker seat. The protesters argued that Russia was trying to occupy Georgia, and they were met by the government with tear gas and rubber bullets.

Since they won the 2012 election with 54.97% of the vote, Georgian Dream has been losing the public’s support. Opponents accuse it of mishandling the economy, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Georgian economy is expected to shrink by five percent this year and the currency is falling sharply.

United National Movement

The United National Movement party was founded in 2001 by Mikheil Saakashvili. UNM and the United Democrats together won 67% of the vote in the 2004 parliamentary election and formed a government. In the 2008 parliamentary election, they secured 59% of the vote. UNM lost the 2012 election to the Georgian Dream party. 

In 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili led the bloodless “Rose Revolution” against President Eduard Shevardnadze and won the presidency after Shevardnadze’s resignation in 2004. Saakashvili served as president from 2004 to 2013. Saakashvili oversaw the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, which caused Georgia to lose control over the separatist states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During his second term as president, opposition parties protested his presidency until he admitted defeat in 2012. After his defeat, he fled Georgia to Ukraine. His stay in Ukraine was tumultuous as he was facing prosecution in Georgia for various criminal charges, and Ukraine briefly revoked his Ukrainian citizenship. Saakashvili has led UNM during the 2020 parliamentary elections.

UNM started out as a center-left party but shifted to center-right after the Rose Revolution. They favor restoring Tbilisi’s control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. UNM also advocates for stronger ties with NATO and the European Union.

Foreign Policy Implications

There is very little difference between Georgian Dream and UNM’s stated foreign policy goals. Both parties have claimed to be pro-Western and hope to eventually join NATO and the European Union. UNM has accused Georgian Dream of enacting pro-Russian policies. Both parties are generally centrist. 

Despite the fact that the international community has agreed that the October 31 election was free and fair, UNM refuses to accept the results and has brought thousands of people to protest outside of parliament. The following weeks will show how the Georgian government and people will respond to the October 31 parliamentary election. 

Sources: Associated Press, Deutsche Welle, Aljazeera, Atlantic Council, Washington Post, OSCE, Central Election Commission of Georgia,

The Russian Federation actively prevents international organizations from observing the humanitarian situation in Crimea, in stark contrast to the international monitoring allowed in Donetsk and Lugansk. Having restricted access to Crimea for over six years, Russia masks violations of human rights and international law. 

Russia’s disregard for international law 

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol remain unreachable by the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). A permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has blocked two resolutions on Ukraine and issued vetoes 19 times since 2011. In comparison, the U.S. has issued only three vetoes in the same period. Since March 2014, Russia has been the only member of 57 states to deny an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Crimea. The OSCE is unable to send international observers until all member states reach a unanimous consensus. The nearest OSCE mission stationed in Kherson Oblast, which borders the Crimean Peninsula, cannot supervise and refute Russia’s claims of Ukrainian abuse towards Russian speakers. OHCHR and other human rights agencies conduct limited human rights monitoring of indigenous Tatar populations, violations of freedom of press and assembly, and imposition of automatic Russian citizenship through interviewing victims who fled Crimea. 

Violations of Tatar minority rights 

Crimean Tatars, a Muslim ethnic minority, have been the targets of 422 human rights abuses including discrimination, unlawful imprisonment, and the disappearances of 17 Tatar leaders. The UN 74th General Assembly reinforced concern regarding forcible deportation, frequent police raids of Muslim religious schools, and mass detentions of Tatar civil society on the grounds of terrorism. The UN urged Russia to respect the “UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Prisoners”, allow international health organizations to investigate all deaths in detention, and comply with the orders of the International Court of Justice obligating Russia to follow international law as an occupying power. Despite numerous orders and international resolutions, Russia actively continues to violate mandates on minority rights with no international reinforcement. 

Establishment of a Crimean military base 

The European Union’s European External Action Service (EEAS) stated that the Russian Federation illegally conscripts residents of annexed Crimea and Sevastopol. The Kremlin violates the international humanitarian law of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying power from drafting or encouraging voluntary enlistment from annexed lands. Additionally, Russia continued to hold Caucasus-2020 military drills, involving 150,000 personnel deployed over the Black and Caspian Sea regions throughout the summer, and prompting Ukraine to launch joint military exercises with NATO. The absence of international supervision permits the Kremlin to establish an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone over the Black Sea necessary to restrict freedom of the seas and monitor NATO ships in the Mediterranean. Similar disregard for UN convention occurred during the Kerch Strait military blockade in 2018, when Russia inhibited entrance to the Sea of Azov for Ukrainian vessels. Restraints on international observation missions limit available information on Russian military expansion and the preservation of nuclear-free status on the peninsula.  

Lack of accurate reporting  

The situation in Crimea is exacerbated by the absence of international supervision, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The peninsula experienced one of the driest winters followed by an equally rain-less summer. In February, the de facto government in Crimea announced a potential humanitarian crisis, developing plans for water rationing in the north and eastern parts of the peninsula. In 2014, Ukraine cut off all water supply to Crimea via the North Crimean Canal, which had provided 85% of its fresh water. The Ukrainian foreign ministry remains skeptical of Russian media reports on water shortages, claiming it is Russia’s way of obtaining international support for the supply of water to its military bases and industry in Crimea. As a result, there is lack of accurate reporting on access to water in the region.  

  The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People called for the OSCE SMM and the UN Human Right Monitoring Mission to visit Crimea due to rapidly increasing COVID-19 cases and refusal of treatment. The Mejlis said Russian authorities in Crimea had severely underreported the mortality rates by misreporting in medical documents. The Presidium of Mejlis reports that Russian authorities provide no COVID-19 information relating to detained political prisoners. Tatars urge the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Red Cross to expand their missions to Crimea. Crimean state media suppresses COVID-19 information from international organizations with over 90% of articles dealing exclusively with Russian authorities responding to the pandemic. Currently, the Russian Federation has the fourth largest statistic on confirmed cases totaling at 1,531,224 people. 

  Sources: Beyond the Horizon, EEAS, Aljazeera, Human Rights Watch, Security Council Report, undocs.org, RFE/RL, UA: Ukrainian Radio, Ukrinform, WHO, The Crimean Human Rights Group, Crimea SOS, ECFR 

In August of 2020, Belarus’ President, Aleksandr Lukashenko, ran for presidency for the fifth straight time. Twenty-six years ago, Lukashenko was elected as the first President of Belarus and has continued throughout his rule to stand in the way of democracy, human rights, and economic freedom. He has changed the Constitution numerous times, jailed political opponents, and tried to the remnants Soviet Union under his rule. Lukashenko has often been referred to as “the last dictator of Europe” by the West. The Belarusian people stood by and watched this take place and did not have much say in what they see as the future of Belarus. COVID-19 was the last straw for the people of Belarus. Since Lukashenko decided that the virus was not real and that if people continue to drink vodka and go to saunas, they will be okay, people were reminded that they were not protected by their government and were not safe. With no quarantine in place, the Belarusian people are now at their boiling point.

Opposition to Lukashenko was always present, but it was not always vocal, as people usually feared for their lives. As the elections were approaching, the two candidates that were running against Lukashenko, Viktor Babariko and Valery Tsepkalo were both unfoundedly jailed. Sergei Tikhanovsky, an anti-government video blogger, wanted to put forth his candidacy after these incidents but was not allowed by the election committee and was also jailed for his outspoken criticism of the regime in Belarus. His wife, Svetlana decided to assume his role and signed up to run for the president of Belarus working with Babariko’s and Tsepkalo’s campaign managers to create a united opposition majority in the country. The unity party included leadership from Tsepkalo’s wife, Veronika, and Babariko’s campaign manager, Maria Kolesnikova. It is noteworthy that the reason why the Belarusian election committee let Svetlana register was because she was a proclaimed housewife and nobody in the regime thought she would be a threat. As the elections were approaching, the opposition put a self-counting system in place to make sure

that there was an election monitor called Golos that tracked the number of votes for each candidate and how many people voted to have proof if the elections were falsified.

On August 9th, 2020, Aleksandr Lukashenko was declared as the President of Belarus, once again for his sixth term. Anticipating what was to come, the police placed a blockade around the city of Minsk to keep people from protesting in the capital. The internet access was shut down on mobile and home devices to prevent people from using the Golos app and coordinating protests in the city’s center. The government clarified that there was a denial-of-service attack that originated outside of Belarus, but IT specialists claimed that it was regime-based, and Lukashenko had cost the economy $170 million for the three days that the internet was shut down.

In the aftermath, Belarus has been in chaos for the last two months. Protests and marches are occur every day on the streets of major cities, with the biggest in Minsk. The protests have gained international recognition due to OMON, Belarus’ riot police, ill-treating protestors by beating and torturing them and taking them to the detention center, Okrestina, which is known for the brutal torturing of the people who have been jailed for mostly peaceful protests. Women have been raped and beaten. Tikhanovskaya was ordered to give a message after the elections, that people could tell that it was scripted.

The international community of the West, including the European Union and the United States, has stopped recognizing Aleksandr Lukashneko as the legitimate president of Belarus and has placed much of his government under sanctions. Poland and the Baltic States have also started to accept political refugees from Belarus. Russia, on the other hand has congratulated Lukashenko on his win in the elections and Vladimir Putin has continued to meet with Lukashenko throughout the last three months of protests. In these meetings, the situation in Minsk has not been discussed. Putin did approve of the changes in the constitution that Lukashenko once again touched in September. Lukashenko keeps claiming that the protests are orchestrated by the West, which include the U.S. and EU. He has also told Mike Pompeo that Russia is, and will continue to be, his closest ally.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia reignited on September 27 after being frozen for decades.

War in the 1990s

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region located within Azerbaijan’s sovereign borders with a majority ethnic Armenian population.The Soviet Union established Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous oblast within Azerbaijan in the 1920s. Tensions in the region simmered under Soviet rule and in 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh legislature passed a resolution to join Armenia. During the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the region formally declared its independence from Azerbaijan. Armenia supported the separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh, and war broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region. The war left nearly 30,000 casualties and hundreds of thousands of Azeri and Armenian refugees.

The international community responded to the conflict by creating the Minsk Group, an institution within the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is co-chaired by the United States, France, and Russia. The Minsk Group is responsible for negotiations toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

United Nations Response to War

From April to November 1993, the UN Security Council passed four resolutions in response to the conflict: Resolution 822, 853, 874, and 884. Each resolution expressed concern about the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and called for the immediate cessation of fighting. The UN-supported the Minsk Group’s ongoing efforts to negotiate a cease-fire. The UN condemned the Armenian seizure of the Kelbadjar district, the Agdam district, the Zangelan district, and the city of Goradiz in Azerbaijan.

The resolutions urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to allow humanitarian efforts to help displaced peoples to securely return to their homes. The UN confirmed their support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and urged all actors to refrain from supplying weapons, which might inflame the conflict. The UN Security Council also expressed a hope that a cease-fire negotiated by Russia, per the will of the Minsk Group, would hold and become permanent.

Cease-Fire

In 1994, Russia brokered a cease-fire, and afterward fighting largely ceased and the region stabilized into a frozen conflict. Armenia and ethnic Armenians still control Nagorno-Karabakh and much of the surrounding area, resulting in the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of Azeris. Minor shelling and skirmishes between the Armenian and Azerbaijani militaries resulted in hundreds of deaths since the cease-fire. In April 2016, intense fighting flared up, and over four days, an estimated 50 people died until both sides agreed upon a new cease-fire. Since 2016 there have been several violations of the cease-fire and tensions have remained high.

Current Crisis

On September 27, 2020, fighting once again erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since the fighting started, there have been several cease-fires negotiated by Minsk Group co-chair countries. However, almost as soon as they are agreed upon, Armenia and Azerbaijan have accused each other of violating the cease-fire, and the fighting has started anew.

United Nations Response to Current Crisis

The UN Secretary-General has issued several statements about the continued conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. He has expressed his concern over the situation and has called for the immediate end to the fighting in the region. On October 18, he condemned the Armenian strike on Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, Ganja.

“The Secretary-General condemns all attacks on populated areas impacted by the conflict. The tragic loss of civilian lives, including children, from the latest reported strike on 16 October on the city of Ganja is totally unacceptable, as are indiscriminate attacks on populated areas anywhere, including in Stepanakert/Khankendi and other localities in and around the immediate Nagorno-Karabakh zone of conflict.”  

He called on both Armenia and Azerbaijan to honor a humanitarian truce negotiated on October 18 and to resume negotiations with the Minsk Group.

A “frozen” conflict?

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has long been considered a “frozen” conflict, meaning there has never been a suitable resolution negotiated between Armenia and Azerbaijan, though they agreed upon a cease-fire. Without a resolution, there is little hope of lasting peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. From the 1994 cease-fire to the four-day conflict in 2016, hundreds of casualties were reported from minor shelling and skirmishes. These are significant numbers of casualties and do not represent stable peace in the region.

This conflict has been far from frozen, it has simply been contained enough to avoid the condemnation of the international community. To realize a lasting peace, the UN and Minsk Group must do more than implement a cease-fire, they must help negotiate a legitimate resolution to the conflict.

Sources: CFR, UNSC Resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884, Vox, BBC, UN Statements by Secretary- General, AP News