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Iran’s Military Drills Prompt New Challenges for Baku

Photo By inosmi.ru

On October 1, Iran carried out a series of large-scale military drills at an unprecedented scale in the north-eastern part of the country, near the border with Azerbaijan. In response, on October 3, Azerbaijan, along with its ally Turkey, made an announcement on launching joint military exercises in Nakhchivan, the Azerbaijani exclave bordering Iran from the north. The developments of recent weeks have strained relations between Baku and Tehran. While the most recent reason for the escalation could be the increased pressure on Iranian truck drivers by Azerbaijani security forces, tense relations between Baku and Tehran have been building up for years. Today, even though Azerbaijan has been victorious in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War, it may be confronted by a new threat from the south.

Iran’s fears

The most recent cause of the escalation between Baku and Tehran appears to be the detention of two Iranian truck drivers by Azerbaijani security forces. The drivers were delivering goods to Armenia through a land route passing through small slices of Azerbaijani territory. The route is the main artery between Armenia and Iran, and Iranian trucks use it to supply Armenia and the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh as well. 

The land where the drivers were detained has been internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but was taken over by Armenian forces in the aftermath of the first Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Baku regained control over the region in the last year’s war. Since then, Baku has taken control of the territory with a tough policy on entries into the territory via Armenia. According to Armenian media reports, Azerbaijani police checked Iranian vehicles “transporting cement to Yerevan and Stepanakert” and charged them with substantial fees. In September, Azerbaijan officially confirmed that drivers were being checked by police posts situated on “Azerbaijan’s liberated territories”.

After last year’s war, restoring transport connections, specifically a route connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and Turkey via Armenia was one of the key parts of the Russia-brokered 2020 ceasefire agreement. Since then, however, no tangible results have been achieved mainly due to never-ending tensions between Yerevan and Baku.

As Baku has attempted to ratchet up the execution of the construction of the Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan transport link, there have been some statements in Azerbaijan, suggesting that Syunik, the southern region of Armenia (known as Zangezur in Azerbaijan), which is envisioned to host the route, was an “ancestorial land of Azerbaijanis” and that they have the right to “return” there. Such comments, especially from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, have alarmed not only Armenia but Iran as well.

Although Iran is a supporter of Armenia’s territorial integrity and has friendly relations with Yerevan, the route connecting the two countries is essential for Tehran’s economy. Iran does not have a lot of trading partners in its neighborhood, largely owing to geopolitical ostracization from US-aligned states in the region. The land route crossing Armenia and Georgia to the further north remains the main transport gateway for Iran to the Black Sea and Europe and at the same time plays a vital role in the functioning of the North-South Corridor between Russia and Iran. The restoration of control over some parts of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding districts, which were also under the occupation of Armenia, by Azerbaijan has led to Iran’s transport insecurity. To solve this issue, Tehran has been pushing the idea of building a new route to Armenia that would bypass Azerbaijan proper.

“Zionist presence”

The outcome of the second Karabakh war had a significant impact on the balance of power in the South Caucasus. The victory in the war has come as an opening for both Azerbaijan and Turkey, allied countries often referred to as “one nation with two states”. Since then, Turkey and Azerbaijan have been trying to assert their regional power through military drills, which has been the worst nightmare for Tehran. Particularly painful were the Turkish-Azerbaijani naval exercises in the Caspian Sea.

One of the major factors that have aggravated the situation is the alleged Israeli presence in Azerbaijan and Israel’s support for the country. Since its independence, Azerbaijan has developed strong strategic and economic ties with Israel, and being a secular state, it developed closer linkage with Israel, than its regional rival, Iran.

Israel views Iran as the biggest threat in the region, as it supports anti-Israeli armed groups such as Hezbollah, as well as hostile governments such as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Azerbaijan has been purchasing military hardware from Israel, which played a pivotal role in Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenian forces last year. While Israeli-produced drones were actively involved in the Second Karabakh War, Iran has alleged that Israeli militants have been stationed in Azerbaijan. According to one leaked U.S. diplomatic document from 2009, Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel is “like an iceberg, nine-tenths … below the surface”.

This has been one of the main reasons for Iran’s security concerns. On September 30, a day before Iran began its military manoeuvres, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian had announced that Tehran would not “tolerate the presence and activities of the Zionist regime against its national security” and would opt for doing “whatever necessary in this regard”. Strikingly, the title of the Iranian military drills held on October 1 was ‘Conquerors of Khaybar’ referring to the Arabic city where Muhammad defeated the Jews in 628.

Another element of this escalation might have been the opening of a new airport in the town of Fizuli, which is located only 30 kilometres away from the Iranian border. The Fizuli airport is capable of hosting heavy transport and modern fighter jets. Given the relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel, there is some possibility that the airport may have a strategic role in the future. If Israel were to benefit from this development, it would certainly prompt concern for Iran.

By Soso Dzamukashvili

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Soso Dzamukashvili October 26, 2021 0
Articles

The Limits of Russia’s “Separatist Empire”

Photo By 123.ru

An important part of Russia’s grand strategy since the 1990s has been the use of separatist conflicts across the post-Soviet space for geopolitical aims. Moscow’s competition with the West over the borderlands – i.e., the regions that adjoin Russia from the west and south – has involved keeping Moldova, Ukraine and the South Caucasus from joining the West through deliberate stoking of separatist conflicts. This policy has been successful so far, as the EU and NATO have refrained from extending membership to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, over the past several years Russia has started to face long-term problems: financing the separatist territories; attaining wider recognition for the separatist regions; inability to reverse the pro-Western course of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; and the failure to produce a long-term political or economic development vision for the unrecognized territories.

Russia’s policy towards the conflicts in the post-Soviet space has been conditioned by various factors ranging from Moscow’s relations with the West, Turkey and Iran, pure military calculations, as well as ups and downs in bilateral ties with specific neighboring countries. Though it has been hard to see the emergence of a veritable Russian strategy in the 1990s and early 2000s towards the territorial conflicts, by 2020 (as evidenced by the second Nagorno-Karabakh war results) it could be argued with some certainty that a purposeful use and subsequent management of separatist conflict zones across the post-Soviet space has turned into an important part of Russia’s grand strategy toward the Eurasian landmass.

The emergence of the strategy is also closely related to the ongoing geopolitical competitition Russia has with the West over the borderlands – i.e., the regions that border on Russia from the west and south. The rivalry is manifested in the expansion of Western institutions such as the Eastern Partnership and NATO into Eastern Europe and as a countermeasure, Russian efforts to build the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with the aim to engulf what once constituted the Soviet territory. Therefore, maintaining the buffer states around Russia has been a cornerstone of the Kremlin’s foreign policy against the West’s eastward projection of military and economic influence. The emergence of the Russian strategy toward the separatist conflicts has also been conditioned by the arising constraints as an effective countermeasure against the neighboring states’ westward geopolitical inclinations. The Russian political elite knew that because of the countries’ low economic attractiveness, the South Caucasus states would inevitably turn to Europe and the US. The same was likely to occur with Moldova and Ukraine on Russia’s western frontier, as their geographical proximity to and historical interconnections with the West render them especially willing to pursue pro-Western foreign policy.

To prevent Western economic and military penetration and the pro-Western foreign policy vector in the neighboring states, the Kremlin has on many cases deliberately fomented various separatist conflicts. This policy has proved successful so far. The EU and NATO refrained from extending membership to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova because Russian military presence in those countries serves as the biggest obstacle for the West’s institutional expansion.

However, Russia now faces a major problem: it has so far failed to produce a long-term vision for the separatist regions. Creating a unified economic space with the separatist territories is not an option as usually little economic benefit is expected. Even if in some cases benefits still could be harnessed, the territories’ poor infrastructure prevents active Russian involvement. Additionally, local political elites are often sensitive to Russian domination. For instance, Abkhazia has for decades resisted Russian businesses from buying the local lands. Moscow understands that more financing has to be dedicated to the regions, whose populations could otherwise turn increasingly disenchanted with hopes they pinned on Russia. Indeed, the system is difficult to navigate for Russia since while in the first years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had to manage breakaway conflicts only in small and poor Georgia and Moldova, Moscow’s responsibilities increased significantly by late 2020 with separatist Donbas and now Nagorno-Karabakh conflict added to its strategy. One could also add Syria to the list. The latter’s inclusion might be surprising, but considering the level of Russian influence there and the stripping away of many of Damascus’s international contacts, the war-torn country is essentially now fully dependent on Russia security-wise.

This means that at a time when economic problems resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, Western sanctions, and the lack of reforms are looming large on the Russian home front, Moscow has to pour yet more money into multiple separatist actors spread across the former Soviet space, as well as Syria. Moscow’s broader strategy of managing separatist conflicts is therefore under increasing financial stress. For instance, recently it was announed that Russia plans to spend a whopping $12 billion in the next 3 years for separatist territories in Ukraine.

It is more and more difficult for the Kremlin to maneuver across so many diverse conflicts simultaneously. At times, actors in the conflict zones try to play their own game independently from Moscow and the latter has to closely monitor any deviations lest it harms the Kremlin’s strategic calculus. This often happened in Abkhazia when, for instance, in early 2020 Raul Khadjimba resigned not without Russian interference or in Donbas, where occasional infighting as in 2015 and 2018 among rebel groups takes place.

Apart from internal differences, the geographic dispersal of those conflicts also creates difficulties for Russia’s projection of power. Geopolitical trends indicate that Russia’s long-term strategy to stop Western expansion in the former Soviet space is losing its rigor. While it is true that Moscow for the moment stopped its neighbors from joining the EU and NATO, its gamble that those separatist regions would undermine the pro-Western resolve of Georgia and Ukraine has largely failed.

Apart from a failure to preclude pro-Western sentiments among the neighboring states, economic components also indicate Moscow has been less successful. Western economic expansion via the Eastern Partnership and other programs is proving to be more efficient.

Nor can the Russian leadership entice states around the world to recognize the independence of breakaway entities. For instance, in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, only Syria, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru have extended recognition.

Russia lacks any long-term economic vision for the breakaway territories. Dire economic straits have inevitably caused populations to flee toward abundant medical, trade, and educational possibilities other countries provide. Usually these are territories from which the separatist forces initially tried to break away. Abkhazians try to use benefits provided by Tbilisi, so do the Ossetians, which once again highlights the fact that the Kremlin has failed to transform those entities into secure and economically stable lands. Crime levels as well as high-level corruption and active black markets have been on an upward trajectory, which undermines the effectiveness of financial largesse Moscow has to provide on a regular basis.

Thus a long term perspective for Russia’s “separatist empire” is not promising. Moscow is outspending the benefits it potentially can reap from poor and insecure separatist regions. Its military presence in those lands with the latest example of the dispatch of peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh highlights weaknesses in Moscow’s foreign policy – dependence on the military element in formulating the foreign policy is becoming palpable.

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Emil Avdaliani October 26, 2021 0
Articles

Karabakh and Georgia’s Regional Positioning

Photo by ICR Center

Victor Kipiani

Victor Kipiani is Chairman of Geocase, a Georgian think-tank, as well as Co-founder and Senior Partner of the Tbilisi-based law firm of MKD Law.

Some Karabakh‑related Aspects of Georgia’s Regional Positioning

One of the geopolitical consequences of the COVID‑19 pandemic is the acceleration of a trend that predated its onset, namely the transformation of old centers of power and the appearance of new ones. This emerging new world is characterized by greater complexity, as regionalism becomes an even more important prism through which contemporary international relations can be examined. In a growing number of places across the globe, we seem to be ending up with overlapping or conflicting interests defined by the specific characteristics of different countries and how they each approach international affairs from the standpoint of their respective national agendas. In many corners of the globe, states that were formerly mere objects of world affairs are taking steps to be taken seriously as bona fide subjects of the international order, itself in the midst of a makeover—the result of which none of us can as yet reasonably predict with any degree of certainty. The South Caucasus—one of the world’s most historically and culturally diverse regions—is one of the regional nodes of the Eurasian strategic space, defined by its proximity to Russia, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The editors of Baku Dialogues have identified the South Caucasus as an integral part of the Silk Road region, an intriguing term that at the very least serves as a reminder of the fact that our part of the world belongs to a geographic continuum that has influenced and been influenced in turn by a plethora of actors located at all points of the compass, but also that we stand at the confluence of an untold number of historical processes that go back millennia. 

Certainly, the South Caucasus is not simply a geographical expanse, but a critical crossroads over which the regional policies of the West, Russia, and China are at loggerheads. This is not even close to the entire picture, however. Iran and Turkey are immediate neighbors. Ukraine, Iraq and the Levantine states are quite close, as are Turkmenistan, and other Central Asian states. But so too are Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, as are Afghanistan and Pakistan. And on it goes. All pursue their own interests, as do their respective allies, and in many cases there interests are not free of incompatibility. Indeed, it would be difficult to deny that the South Caucasus is a front or a theatre in the meta‑conflict that contraposes several normative worlds of international relations, only one of which is democratic in character. Of the three South Caucasus states, one overtly aspires to NATO and EU membership as a matter of strategic priority, by all accounts the second is almost entirely dominated by Russian priorities and interests, and the third has opted to navigate the geopolitical shoals we share as a region by pursuing what is termed a multi‑vector foreign policy.

It would be difficult to deny that the South Caucasus is a front or a theatre in the meta conflict that contraposes several normative worlds of international relations, only one of which is democratic in character.

The modern structure of relationships between the countries of the South Caucasus also has evolved over the past few years, progressing from mere bilateral relations to a more complex multi‑layered system. In this diversity, many researchers and politicians see certain historic parallels as well as the new contours of a post‑pandemic international order. For now, the Caucasian puzzle raises more questions than it provides answers. The question of the two so‑called “frozen conflicts” on Georgian territory, the unresolved complexities arising out of the Second Karabakh War’s outcome (including the quest to establish a formal peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan), and neighboring confrontations over the rearrangement of the South Caucasus model of power and the correct redistribution of interests therein are on the list of foreign policy priorities in many capitals around the world. What makes this complex regional order even more complicated is the equal lack among interested parties of sufficient interest in the resolution of these issues, the inadequate expression of such interests, and in some cases even the total absence of such interests.

The modern structure of relationships between the countries of the South Caucasus also has evolved over the past few years, progressing from mere bilateral relations to a more complex multilayered system.

Noteworthy is that even prior to the outbreak of the Second Karabakh War, the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, extended an offer for Tbilisi to serve as a peace platform for all parties to convene and meet. That offer was reiterated by our National Security Council during the war, and it still stands in its wake. In the meantime, we have continued to play our part, demonstrating the constructive relevance of Georgian soft power to the best of our ability. Here we can reproduce the 12 June 2021 words of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken: “the U.S. welcomes the release by Azerbaijan of 15 Armenian detainees. We’re grateful to the Government of Georgia for its vital role facilitating discussions between the sides. Such steps will bring the people of the region closer to the peaceful future they deserve.” The statement did not add that the prisoners were exchanged for maps of 97,000 anti‑tank and antipersonnel mines buried in Azerbaijan’s newly‑liberated Aghdam district, although the corresponding Azerbaijani one did, of course, while also underscoring the role played by Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. Armenia also thanked us for our successful mediation, as did various European and OSCE officials. In a significant way, Georgia’s important role in this postwar humanitarian endeavor serves to frame how we see the axis of the issue and our contemporary standing in the region more broadly.

Axis of the Issue

Georgia’s main political vectors in the South Caucasus are cooperation for peace and stability as well as maintaining good neighborly relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan—an approach that became even more prominent during the Second Karabakh War and one that has continued in its wake. 

More precisely, I refer to the statement that Georgia’s National Security Council issued near the beginning of the war—on 3 October 2020, to be precise—in which the Georgian side convincingly underlined the need to “take all necessary measures” to “stop the violence and resume dialogue” and concluded by underlining that “it is in our common interests to stop the armed confrontation and restore peace in the region as soon as possible.”

Tbilisi acted according to the conditions defined by the current reality in the region and was using the maximum of its abilities due to this reality.

On the same occasion, the National Security Council also announced that the Government of Georgia was taking specific measures in this regard: the “temporary suspension of the issuance of permits for transiting military cargo through its territory in the direction of both said countries, be it by air or land.” It also offered up Tbilisi as a neutral location for negotiations between Yerevan and Baku.

Regarding the National Security Council’s statement, one can distinguish between two principal issues. First, Georgia not only demonstrated its attitude towards the conflict but also expressed the country’s readiness to participate in the process of normalizing the situation in the region. Second, in this statement, Georgia’s government distinctly explained the importance to the country’s two largest ethnic minorities (i.e., ethnic‑Armenians and ethnic‑Azerbaijanis) of maintaining stability and order. Thus, the National Security Council’s statement and Georgia’s policy towards conflicts in general could be summed up as: Tbilisi acted according to the conditions defined by the current reality in the region and was using the maximum of its abilities due to this reality.

When talking about a possible Georgian component in various efforts to normalize the new situation in Karabakh resulting from the outcome of the Second Karabakh War, it is noteworthy that in different mass media outlets the question of the quality of Tbilisi’s coordination with Western partners has been considered more than once. On this topic, I should like to mention that any similar kind of coordination or communication undertaken by Georgia could only be defined by the reality of the current situation in the region and by Georgia’s possibilities.

However, when discussing this specific topic, it is important to clearly reiterate that Georgia’s coordination with the West over issues linked to the South Caucasus should not depend solely upon the dynamics associated with the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the wake of the Second Karabakh War. It is important to remember that the partnership between Georgia and the West originally began as early as during the second half of the 1990s when large hydrocarbon transport projects——e.g., the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC), various South Caucasus gas pipelines—were initiated.

Aside from this aspect, which contributes strategically to the West’s energy diversification strategy (and will do so for decades to come), another relevant issue for further discussion is the objective evaluation of how strong Western interests and influence truly are in the South Caucasus. Accordingly, when one speaks of Tbilisi’s efforts to strengthen these interests, one should deliberately underline the fact that the efforts of our Western partners are just as (if not even more) vitally important for any kind of Western‑led cooperation or coordination in the South Caucasus.

There have been some pessimistic evaluations regarding the aforementioned new transport corridors. But when it comes to the potential weakening of existing Georgian corridors, this pessimism is to some extent exaggerated.

Transport Component

The 10 November 2020 tripartite agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that brought the Second Karabakh War to an end— coupled with subsequent documents signed by the same three parties derived therefrom—call for new transport corridors on the territory of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Without going into too much detail regarding these projects, next I want to discuss whether or not they pose any kind of risk to Georgia’s potential for transport and transit before proceeding to the other points I wish to make. Now, it’s true that there have been some pessimistic evaluations regarding the aforementioned new transport corridors. But when it comes to the potential weakening of existing Georgian corridors, I believe that this pessimism is to some extent exaggerated. Here are five basic points that can be made.

One, the decision to go ahead with a large transport project cannot be merely the subject of geopolitical discussions at the level of “I want this and I don’t want that”—to put it in colloquial language. It is also important to remember that any project or initiative must be carried out according to a specific investment model. In other words, if a project is not based on clear and self‑sufficient financial resources, then it will be impossible to carry it out, for it might well turn into a dubious deal or a half‑completed enterprise. Without a genuine readiness to provide serious financial support, managing projects such as BTC, the various South Caucasus gas pipelines, or the Baku‑Tbilisi- Kars railway line solely according to geopolitical calculations would not have been sufficient.

Two, one must also mention the need for trust in the stability of the future operation of these corridors or projects. As a general rule of thumb, it takes several years to generate such trust, and through a series of complicated processes the project acquires its characteristic geopolitical and geo‑economic image. Nowadays, one could easily say that the so‑called “Georgian transport corridors” have already obtained the signatures they need.

Three, certain paragraphs of the tripartite agreement on the creation of new transport corridors with the participation of Azerbaijan and Armenia are quite ambiguous and unclear. For example, no considered interpretation of these paragraphs gives a clear feeling that the implementation of a specific transport project is once and for all predefined by the signatory parties of the agreement. Guaranteeing the safety of these transport links is equally important, as is the extent to which the Russian Federation can play the role of impartial guarantor in this context.

Four, we will continue to pay attention to certain aspects, including those related to transport corridors going through Georgia’s active maritime ports, which ensure the passage of goods to the Black Sea region. An intermodal system such as this, in terms of investments, is no less important since it has a direct impact on the economic component of freight transportation.

Five, one must also mention the two most important elements of the attractiveness of transit corridors passing through Georgia. The first of these is Georgia’s political system itself, which, although far from ideal, possesses indisputable advantages in terms of doing business thanks to the transparency, simplicity, and legibility of Georgian legislation.

In addition to this, what should also be taken into consideration in the big picture is the high level of Georgia’s integration with Western markets compared to its South Caucasian neighbors. And it could even be asserted that such a steady political and economic integration with Western partners is an important question not only for Georgia but would also be in the respective interest of Baku and Yerevan.

Neither of the parties to the Karabakh conflict was “hostile” towards Russia, and therefore Moscow’s actions needed to be more weighed and complex compared to other conflicts and wars in the post‑Soviet space.

A Factor of Regional Power

The next interesting question to examine is the respective roles of Russia and Turkey in the Second Karabakh War and subsequently— the Russian factor, in this case, is a very specific one. Since Russia and Armenia maintain close relations through various agreements— whereas Moscow’s links to Azerbaijan follow a more cooperation format— Russia was obliged to maintain a very delicate balance between the two warring parties. 

Basically, neither of the parties to the Karabakh conflict was “hostile” towards Russia, and therefore Moscow’s actions needed to be more weighed and complex compared to other conflicts and wars in the post‑Soviet space. It was this specific factor that supposedly defined a certain number of “flexible” formulations that were included in the ceasefire agreement, as noted above.

Another defining and extremely important aspect should also be mentioned: the dinophyte or perhaps even triphylite factor of Moscow’s involvement in the conflict. What is implied here is the general background of Russia‑Turkey relations that intersect not only in the South Caucasus but in other parts around the world as well.

Despite Moscow’s tactical interests in cooperating with Ankara, Russia did its best to limit Turkey’s role in the post‑conflict period. For example, the agreement is tripartite in nature, not quadrilateral. Russia also tried hard to neutralize Turkey’s attempts to widen its role in the OSCE Minsk Group format (as well as those of Azerbaijan).

And let me now use Georgia’s point of view in order to briefly discuss what attitude Turkey can have towards this issue. Firstly, Turkey is one of Georgia’s main partners. Secondly, Ankara plays a significant role in issues of regional safety and consistently and openly supports Georgia’s NATO membership ambitions.

What is also defined in the context of this issue is the presumed specificity of Georgia‑Turkey relations with regards to limiting the spread of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. Here I should also mention Ankara’s desire to further deepen the country’s close partnership with Azerbaijan as well as Turkey’s practical interests in stabilizing relations with Yerevan. The subsequent treatment of Turkey as an equal to Russia in observing the terms of the tripartite agreement (to which, I reiterate, Turkey was not a signatory) at the Joint Center for Monitoring the Ceasefire in Karabakh, located in the Qiyameddinli village near Agdam, speaks to this point. On the other hand, so does the fact that Turkish troops play no operational role on the ground in what is now understood to be the Russian peacekeeping zone in Karabakh (the area not under the direct military control of Azerbaijan in the wake of the Second Karabakh War, as defined in the aforementioned trilateral agreement).

It is almost not even worth asking what benefits any format of trilateral cooperation between Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan would bring to the three countries of the South Caucasus.

Trilateral Format?

It is almost not even worth asking what benefits any format of trilateral cooperation between Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan would bring to the three countries of the South Caucasus. Besides questions of peace and safety, some sort of trilateral partnership within the framework of the emerging new world order would give the South Caucasus qualitatively different characteristics and would make the region more interesting and appealing to foreign, especially Western, investors.

Unfortunately, the reality of the current situation in the short and medium term does not give much cause for optimism. Overall, the geopolitical paradigm of the South Caucasus is mostly limited to bilateral relations between Georgia and Armenia and Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Based on that, the quality of cooperation among the South Caucasus triangle of states for the foreseeable future will be defined by the quality of cooperation between Tbilisi and Yerevan, on the one hand, and Tbilisi and Baku, on the other. At this stage, one must repeat that this is the current state of the region’s geopolitical reality—its Realpolitik, if a region can be said to have one—and that there seems to be little chance of this reality changing any time soon. These conditions underline Georgia’s most important role as a potential pillar of the South Caucasus’s overall economic space. Consequently, the results of the country’s internal reforms are becoming as important as the quality of Georgia’s integration with international civilized society.

No one can exclude that in what can be termed the “arrangement of priorities,” the South Caucasus might turn into an essential component of modern mutual compromises between Ankara and Moscow.

Issues in Perspective

Many key issues are being accumulated in the context of discussions regarding regional processes in the short to medium term. The answers to some questions are slowly taking shape with more or less focus and clarity, and some might be made the subject of hypothetical modeling—at this stage, at any rate— whilst taking existing conditions into consideration.

For example, the quality and durability of the current geopolitical cohabitation enjoyed by Russia and Turkey in the South Caucasus is questionable, particularly as the two states come into contact in other parts of the world as well. No one can exclude that in what can be termed the “arrangement of priorities,” the South Caucasus might turn into an essential component of modern mutual compromises between Ankara and Moscow.

The basic challenge of the overall task remains the role of the West in the South Caucasus and the projection of Western interests onto the regional fabric. An unequivocal answer must be found to this question at this stage, especially given the noticeable deficit of clear geopolitical Western lines with regard to the Black Sea region—one of whose natural components I believe the South Caucasus to be. The most compelling factor of the overall Western vector is the United States, whereas globally Washington’s recent zig‑zag geopolitical signature unintentionally helps to create the aforementioned problem.

Another very important issue is the overall framework of the new world order that is currently being formed. Many of us Georgians believe that there are two fundamental trends that define its basic nature: the first of these is the counterweight parameter between the United States and China as well as how this is reflected on different geopolitical geographies. Here I can refer to President Joe Biden’s recent statement effectively rejecting nation‑building (the context was Afghanistan, with the rejected concept defined as “trying to create a democratic, cohesive, and unified” country, something that has never been done over the many centuries of [its] history”), which is of course not the same as the rejection of the use of force there or anywhere else when a “vital national interest” is at stake. A few days later, at an event held at MGIMO in Moscow, the Russian foreign minister interpreted this statement, as well as one made by French president Emmanuel Macron around the same time, as being tantamount to saying “that it was time to give up on interfering in other countries’ internal affairs in order to impose Western‑style democracy on them.” He noted that if these statements “are a true reflection of their hard‑won understanding of the matter,” then “our planet will be a safer place in the future.” In my view, this interpretation is not exactly persuasive, to put it diplomatically.

The second fundamental trend that defines the basic nature of the framework of the new order that is currently being formed is, in my opinion, the novel understanding of this new world order’s multilateral characteristics as well as bringing regionalism to the fore. From this point of view, the geopolitical geography of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea—along with the South Caucasus lying in between—is being established as an important regional center of this new world order.

To complete this analysis I can indicate that the South Caucasus and the Middle East are closely linked issues, as Svante Cornell writing in a previous edition of Baku Dialogues has elaborated. Despite differences on the surface, it is a fact that a number of measurable factors are leading these two regions’ geopolitics to increasingly merge.

It is relatively simple to opt for international or overseas reliance, but much harder and trickier to define a right balance without tilting towards either complete dependency or absurd self‑determination: both options promise nothing but self‑inflicted wounds and much suffering.

Of course, the above‑mentioned questions imply several subsidiary questions and a certain depth of inquiry. I have only mentioned those basic lines of thought that will become fields for endless research by analysts over the coming years and will become routine responses for policymakers.

The Caucasian Puzzle

The fact is that the South Caucasus is once again at the center of global attention, while the modern structure of relationships between the countries of the region has evolved over the past few years from a bilateral model to a more complex multilayered system. In any case, the collapse of the Soviet Union left a legacy that the three countries of the region are still trying to overcome. Also, it is important to note that the so‑called “ethnic conflicts” of the South Caucasus are primarily related to the shifting sands of geopolitics in the region. The latter point is especially true when speaking about the conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan, whose reduction to the category of “ethnicity” reflects either a lack of knowledge or an attempt to distort their essence. At bottom, each is ultimately about territory and international law.

To this I wish to add that the late twentieth and early twenty‑first centuries have reverberated with major shifts to what used to be commonly referred as the liberal international order—the culmination of the development of a Modern World Order, one could say—and have borne us ever more swiftly towards an even more contemporaneous term I can call “World 2.0.” When it comes to the destiny of small nations like Georgia, the question is one of two worlds: beyond simply maintaining oneself on the map, one must become a distinctive and unique contributor to the global community, acting as a sui generis participant in world affairs on an equal and non‑discriminatory basis.

It is also worth emphasizing that it is relatively simple to opt for international or overseas reliance, but much harder and trickier to define a right balance without tilting towards either complete dependency or absurd self‑determination: both options promise nothing but self‑inflicted wounds and much suffering. Various historical examples of such blunders can illustrate the depth and complexity of the choice. Besides, it is even more worth remembering that abiding by strategic values while rationalizing reality is the hardest mission a small nation must face. Doing so is reminiscent of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 1936 statement: “the test of a first‑rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” But it is precisely that first‑rate intelligence that we need—and we Georgians, as a small nation, certainly do need to retain the ability to function. The remainder of Fitzgerald’s statement is worth reproducing: “One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise. This philosophy fitted on to my early adult life, when I saw the improbable, the implausible, often the ‘impossible’ come true.

As a result of all of this, the Caucasian puzzle raises more questions than it provides answers— which is hardly surprising since the region’s importance is felt far beyond its boundaries and since the diversity of the Caucasus is truly a contributor to the grand design of Eurasian security. In addition to a general toolkit, ours is a region that also requires a very tailor‑made approach.

This article was reprinted with the explicit permission of ADA University.

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ICR Center October 4, 2021 0
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Passportization Ensures Role of Russia in Societies of Occupied Territories

Photo By 112.international

Introduction

From September 17 to 19, the Russian Federation held elections for the 450 seats of the State Duma. While the focus of many media outlets and research organizations is on election fraud, with claims of up to 14 million fraudulent votes for the ruling United Russia party, or suppression of protests following the election, the International Conflict Resolution Center is instead turning its focus towards occupied the occupied territories of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

As a result of passportization initiatives, large portions of the populations living in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, Abkhazia, South Ossetia/Tskhinvali, and Transnistria participated in these legislative elections. United Russia’s popularity has declined due to poor domestic economic conditions, prompting the government to issue passports to those residing in occupied territories in the hope of gaining votes in exchange for ‘recognition’ of occupying regimes.

Voting in the Occupied Territories of Ukraine

On April 24, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to simplify the process of granting citizenship to residents of “certain areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.” Through this process, residents of these regions of Ukraine were able to receive Russian passports in less than three months from the time of application, notably granting them the right to vote in Russian elections.

Beginning in June 2021, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) noted that “the forcible naturalization of Ukrainians has been accelerating as the invaders seek to have residents of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions cast their ballots in September.” According to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rostov region of Russia Oleg Agarkov, nearly 640,000 Russian passports were issued to residents of Donetsk and Luhansk, indicating a mass effort for the ruling United Russia party to win additional votes to maintain their majority.

In order to ensure the participation of the more than 640,000 passport holders in the election, the authorities of the regime occupying the Donetsk region organized 825 busses and 12 trains, free of charge, to provide transportation for Russian citizens to polling stations in the neighboring Rostov region of Russia.

Regarding the elections, several international powers came to support Ukraine in its statements that the elections violated international law. Turkey, the first country to join Ukraine’s ‘Crimea Platform’ event, has voiced its opposition to Russia’s occupation, in part due to the actions that have been taken against Crimean Tatars, a Turkic group native to the Crimean Peninsula that has been discriminated by Russian authorities. According to Tanju Bilgiç, spokesperson for the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the State Duma elections have “no legal validity for Turkey.”

U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price echoed Turkey’s remarks, noting that the United States “[does] not recognize holding elections for the Russian Duma on sovereign Ukrainian territory.” The European Union issued a similar statement, stating that the E.U. “does not recognize the so-called elections held in the occupied Crimean peninsula.”

Voting in the Occupied Territories of Georgia

Passportization in Georgia’s occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali began several years before the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and in fact, contributed to some residents’ willingness to participate in separatist activity. For example, in 2002 before the Russian Federation changed its regulations on citizenship, 150,000 residents in Abkhazia applied for Russian passports, bringing the total number of residents of the region holding Russian passports to 200,000. Following the 2008 war, Russia stopped issuing passports to residents of occupied Abkhazia as the Russian Federation recognized Abkhazia as a separate ‘state.’

On September 20, the Russian Embassy in Abkhazia reported that 13,000 residents of Abkhazia holding Russian passports participated in the elections. The Russian Embassy in Tskhinvali reported that 3,500 votes had been cast in an early voting period in the territory. More than 90% of the population of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali, which is estimated to be around 50,000 people, hold Russian passports and are therefore eligible to vote. By the end of the regular election dates, South Ossetia/Tskhinvali had an estimated turnout of over 11,000.

In response to holding elections on occupied territory, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement condemning the elections, referring to them as “another destructive step against Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity that grossly violates the fundamental norms of international law and fully disregards the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act.”

Voting in Transnistria, Moldova’s Occupied Territory

Moldova’s occupied territory of Transnistria has an estimated population of 469,000 (as of 2018), and as of 2019, more than 220,000 of these residents hold Russian passports.

Between September 17 and 19, 27 polling stations were opened in the occupied region for the Russian Duma elections, and according to the Supreme Council of the PMR (the government in control of the territory), 59,233 Pridnestrovians (the term Transnistria uses for residents of the territory) with Russian citizenship cast their ballots.

Prior to the election, the leader of the government in control of Transnistria, Vadim Krasnoselski, issued a statement urging the public to vote “because despite all the difficulties, Russia does not forget Transnistria and helps it as much as possible.”

In comparison to the 59,000 votes cast in the most recent State Duma elections, it was reported that just under 29,000 residents of Transnistria voted in Moldova’s recent parliamentary elections.

Unlike Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova’s pushback to foreign elections on its territory have been weak. Moldova’s reaction was made in a comment issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Office. As noted by Vladimir Socor of Jamestown Foundation, this “is the lowest level at which the Foreign Ministry can express a reaction.” He also noted that “it was not a diplomatic note” and “the Russian ambassador was not summoned to Chisinau to give an explanation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”

Conclusion

The total number of votes counted in the 2021 Russian legislative elections equaled 109,204,662. Thus, the number of votes coming from residents occupied territories is not significant in terms of swaying the national results, however, the inclusion of these votes with districts of Russia proper can contribute to the victory of United Russia, as this was the party that offered these occupied territories ‘recognition.’

What is perhaps more troubling is the continued development of social ties between the people of Russia and those residing in the occupied territories. Allowing participation in elections, distributing pensions, and issuing travel documents only contributes to the integration of occupied territories within the Russian Federation. Resolving these frozen conflicts will only become more difficult with time as the societies and their occupied territories diverge further.

The international community has condemned these elections and has issued statements supporting territorial integrity, but additional action is needed. Russia must be pressured into compliance with agreements signed with international organizations, beginning with the withdrawal of its military from Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Georgian territory.

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Austin Clayton September 27, 2021 0
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Moldova Celebrates Independence While Transnistria Braces for Change

Photo By republika.md

Despite emphasizing pragmatism and openness to negotiate, newly elected Moldovan President Maia Sandu has again called for Russia to withdraw the up to 2,000 troops stationed in the Russian-backed breakaway region of Transnistria.

A pro-Western technocrat and former World Bank analyst, Sandu had avoided discussing the conflict in the run up to her July 2021 election. But in an August 23 interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on the 30th anniversary of Moldova’s independence from the Soviet Union, President Sandu affirmed her commitment to negotiating the “frozen conflict on our territory” while avoiding “a destabilization of the situation.”

Estimates of the number of Russian troops in Transnistria – which has not been recognized by the United Nations or the international community – vary between 1,400 and more than 2,000. Whether tasked as peacekeepers or security for Soviet-era arms depots, the imposition of Russian troops has incited a domino effect of regional anxiety. When the Russian Federation annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2014, it also initiated military exercises between the Operational Group of Russian Troops in Transnistria (OGTR) and Russian Federation troops, as reported by Al Jazeera. A repeat of these exercises in Transnistria in April increased regional tension once again, leading Ukraine to bolster its State Border Guard along its border with Moldova. This represented the largest buildup of troops since Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

This saber rattling coincides with border conflicts throughout the region due to waves of new immigrants and refugees throughout Eastern Europe. Newly elected Peace And Solidarity Party deputy Rosian Vasiloi – whose Sandu-led party swept to power on an anti-corruption mandate – told EuroNews that stopping human trafficking and smuggling across the Transnistrian border will require nothing short of Moldovan authorities taking over the rebel state’s border management.

As Russia has been firmly entrenched since the 1990s, any new movements from the Moldovan side will likely be viewed as provocations threatening to upset the existing status quo. To avoid destabilization, the most effective confidence building measures would involve people-to-people communications in order to reestablish trust amongst the general population. However, due to the division between the respective societies, the conflict will likely remain ‘frozen’ until confidence building measures induce a gradual ‘thaw.’

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ICR Center September 16, 2021 0
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Opening of Fuzuli Airport Marks Important Step in Reconstruction Efforts, But Problems Remain

Photo By AyshanASLAN

During a videoconference with Azerbaijani Minister of Culture Anar Karimov on January 5, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that after demining the Fuzuli district, which was returned to Azerbaijan following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, an international airport would be constructed. Nine months later, on September 5, 2021, Azerbaijan Airlines’ ‘Karabakh’ aircraft conducted the first flight, landing at the Fuzuli International Airport after a 35-minute journey from the Baku airport.

Although the airport is only approximately 95% complete, the construction of an international airport in less than a year represents how restoring the cities damaged during thirty years of occupation is a top priority on the domestic policy agenda.

Authorities have ambitious plans for reconstruction efforts in the territories brought back under the country’s control through the 2020 war. Through the construction of transportation infrastructure, including the Fuzuli airport, the Azerbaijani government is seeking to transform these territories into centers of industry and tourism. There are plans to construct an industrial center in Aghdam, a logistics and trade center in Jabrayil, a culture and tourism center in Shusha, and an additional tourism center in Kalbajar. There is also a particular interest in constructing ‘smart cities’ that are powered by renewable energy, harvesting the hydroelectric, solar, and wind energy potential of the region.  

Although an airport was constructed in less than a year, not all restoration efforts can be completed with alacrity. Many challenges to Azerbaijan’s reconstruction efforts persist, leaving many displaced individuals still wondering when they can return to their homes.

One of the most pressing issues for the Azerbaijani government in the post-war environment has been the issue of landmines. After months of denying the existence of maps showing the location of landmines, Armenia handed over maps showing the location of approximately 100,000 landmines in the Aghdam region in exchange for 15 Armenian prisoners of war. In an interview after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the head of the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) Idris Ismayilov stated that it would take ten years to fully demine the territories reclaimed by Azerbaijan, and three to five years for displaced individuals to safely return to their homelands.

It is also important to consider the cost of these restoration efforts. According to data released by Azerbaijan’s State Statistical Committee, 74,901,200 AZN (approximately 44 million USD) was spent on construction work in Fuzuli, with nearly 200 million AZN (approximately 118 million USD) spent on projects in Zangilan, Kalbajar, Jabrayil, Aghdam, Lachin, and Shusha. Following the signing of the ceasefire agreement in November 2020, President Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan would file lawsuits through a variety of international channels demanding compensation from Armenia for damages to its territories. The Azerbaijani government estimates the damage to exceed 50 billion USD, but so far, the pursuit of reparations has been unsuccessful.

The emphasis that the Azerbaijani government is putting on reconstruction efforts is a positive signal for those displaced from their homes in these regions. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Azerbaijan is home to more than 600,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). Unfortunately, while IDPs have been waiting to return to their homes, numerous civilian deaths and injuries have been reported as displaced individuals have attempted to return to the areas they fled from during the first Karabakh war before the completion of demining activities. Despite some early successes, many of the issues in the territories regained in the 2020 war are far from being resolved. It should also be noted that the investments in these regions should not just benefit Azerbaijan, but the entire region. Further dialogue is necessary for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but pairing improved relations with infrastructure investments could lead to economic benefits for both countries, benefitting both populations and contributing to greater regional stability.

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Austin Clayton September 14, 2021 0
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Despite Protests, Iran Continues to Facilitate Illegal Shipments into Nagorno-Karabakh

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One month ago, Iran’s ambassador to Azerbaijan Abbas Mousavi was summoned by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and presented with a diplomatic note demonstrating the country’s concern over Iran’s shipments of cargo into the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Leading up to this confrontation, between July 11 and August 8, it was documented that 35 Iranian vehicles entered and exited the region via the Lachin corridor.

Raising this issue with Iran was fruitless. Between August 11 and September 10, not only did Iranian vehicles continue to travel to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, but the total number of vehicles entering the region increased. In this one-month period, 58 trucks entered the region. As Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding territories are internationally-recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan, these vehicles should, in theory, require permission from Azerbaijani authorities for entry.

Despite being formally addressed by Azerbaijan, this problem of illegal shipments of cargo persists, presenting several problems for conflict resolution. Iran insists that it seeks to maintain friendly relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the country’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict follows that of international law: that Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories are an internationally-recognized part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Iran has encouraged negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Continued support for illegal transportation of products and demonstrating partiality by aiding one side of the conflict undermines any credibility of the Iranian government when it calls for conflict resolution.

The fact that this issue has continued despite diplomatic communications once again calls into question the role and effectiveness of Russian peacekeepers. As Azerbaijani member of parliament Elman Mammadov recently noted, the Russian peacekeeping mission does not seem to be interested in ending the conflict. Instead, “the contingent of Russian military personnel stations on the territory of Azerbaijan cooperates with the separatist regime,” according to Mammadov. 

The delivery of goods by Iranian vehicles into the occupied territories of Azerbaijan relies on the Lachin corridor. According to the third article of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, facilitated and mediated by Russia, Russian peacekeepers were to be deployed along the line of contact as well as along the Lachin corridor. Despite their supposed presence in this region, peacekeepers have failed to uphold the principles of the agreement, before and after Azerbaijan raised this issue with Iran. If the peacekeepers were properly carrying out their duties, these Iranian vehicles would not be allowed to enter the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In reality, the complacency of the Russian government in upholding its own agreement will only elevate the risk of future conflict. With documentation of Iran blatantly ignoring international law, many in Azerbaijan are beginning to share the same view as MP Mammadov: that Russia is not interested in resolving the conflict or enforcing the rule of law. If the Azerbaijani side loses confidence in the ceasefire agreement, progress on critical issues will be brought to a standstill.

For example, the issue of border demarcation is by no means a new issue, but it has become an even more important topic in the post-war environment. After November 10, 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan have routinely accused each other of violating each other’s state borders, leading to flare ups that have claimed lives and injured others. As described by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “a prerequisite for [demarcations] is the existence of normal bilateral relations, including diplomatic relations, between the neighboring states.”  

Iran’s continued illegal shipments of cargo into Nagorno-Karabakh and the Russian peacekeepers’ failure to respond is undermining the prospects of conflict resolution. As these actions continue, Azerbaijan will only become more skeptical of the Russia’s role as a ‘mediator’ and will be less likely to engage with a power that is deemed impartial.

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Austin Clayton September 13, 2021 0
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Iranian Shipments into Nagorno-Karabakh Highlight Unreliability of Russian Peacekeepers

Photo by Azeritimes

On August 11, Iran’s ambassador to Azerbaijan was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was presented with a diplomatic note informing the ambassador of illegal visits of Iranian cargo trucks to the Karabakh region. Although Iran has long facilitated the transportation of military equipment into Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenian forces, the recent increase in the frequency of deliveries has caused concern for Azerbaijani officials.

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s official stance regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict follows the position supported by international law, which states that the territory is an internationally-recognized part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Iran also officially recognizes United Nations resolutions that recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and call for the removal of Armenian forces from the region.

Iran’s actions suggest otherwise. In June 2020, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister accused Iran of allowing Russian military cargo to be transported through the country into Nagorno-Karabakh. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, videos and images circulated on social media, depicting military equipment being transported through Iran towards the Nordooz-Agarak border crossing point.

Despite the many documented examples of cargo and military equipment being transported from Iran into the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Iran vehemently denies facilitating any shipments. According to Saeed Khatibzadeh, the Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, “Iran carefully monitors and controls the route of transportation and transit of commodities to other countries…and does not allow [the] country’s soil to be used for the transfer of arms and ammunition whatsoever.”

The recent increase in the number of cargo transfers through Iran to Nagorno-Karabakh highlights several troubling issues, including a possible increase in militarization against a backdrop of increased tensions and recent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as doubts over the role of Russian peacekeeping forces.  

In recent months, there have been a series of flare-ups between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On July 19, Armenia and Azerbaijan accused each other of starting a shootout along the border between Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and the area near Yeraskh, Armenia. On July 28, three Armenian soldiers were killed and two Azerbaijani soldiers were wounded in another escalation between the two countries. Following this incident, Armenia and Azerbaijan both agreed to a Russian proposal for enforcing the ceasefire in the region of the flare up.

Considering the number of outbreaks of conflict in recent months, the increase in cargo shipments from Iran is concerning. Whether Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh are positioning themselves to be on the offense or defense, indications of further militarization of the region are concerning for regional security and development as well as the security of civilians on both sides of the conflict.

Iran’s role in facilitating the transportation of goods into Armenian-held parts of Nagorno-Karabakh represents another instance that calls into question the role of Russian peacekeepers. The Russian peacekeeping force, consisting of nearly 2,000 soldiers, has been notably absent in mediating conflict and complacent in enforcing the terms of the ceasefire agreement.

For example, on May 12, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced during an emergency Security Council meeting that Azerbaijani forces had advanced more than three kilometers into Armenian territory. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry responded by saying that troops were present in the region to enforce Azerbaijan’s border. In this instance, Russia remained silent and did not take any action.

Additionally, Russia and its peacekeeping forces were clearly disinterested in contributing to the resolution of one of Azerbaijan’s greatest post-war challenges: obtaining the maps of landmines in territories recovered through the 2020 war. In the months following the war, Armenian officials denied the existence of maps of landmines and referred to the requests as a ‘fake agenda’ pushed by Baku. Finally, in June 2021, the Armenian government provided maps of nearly 100,000 mines in the Aghdam district in exchange for 15 Armenian soldiers. In this case, the Russian government and Russian peacekeepers certainly could have facilitated the exchange of maps and prisoners of war much earlier, which would have reduced casualties and injuries caused by landmines and returned soldiers to their homeland and to their families.

Most recently, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense issued a press release calling for the ‘complete withdrawal of the remnants of the Armenian armed forces from the territory of Azerbaijan.’ Azerbaijan states that Armenian armed forces have been setting up new outposts in the territories east of the administrative boundaries of Kelbajar and Lachin, which is in direct violation of the November ceasefire agreement. Russian peacekeepers are currently deployed in the areas where militarization is taking place, and no action has been taken to enforce the principles of the trilateral agreement.   

In these cases, as well as with the recent reports of equipment being transported illegally from Iran, Russian peacekeepers are not actively contributing to improving relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As demonstrated with other conflicts in the post-Soviet space, Russia thrives on instability. Despite being the negotiator of the ceasefire agreement and being one of the largest players in the region, it is in Russia’s interest to prevent the conflict from being resolved. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war provided Russia with an additional opportunity to physically insert itself in the South Caucasus region. Allowing for violations of the ceasefire, whether through border provocations or illegal cargo transfers, ensures delays in the long-term resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and ensures that Russia can maintain a military presence beyond the five-year term indicated in the November 10th agreement.

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Austin Clayton August 12, 2021 0
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Great Power Competition Defines the Ukrainian Question, and Only Great Power Diplomacy can Provide an Answer

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Starting on June 28, Ukraine and the United States launched the Sea Breeze 2021 exercise. This annual exercise, which ended on July 10, consists of 32 countries and is the largest Sea Breeze exercise since its start in 1997. Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, has already described the exercises as a “provocative muscle-flexing game,” with the Kremlin testing advanced air-defense systems (including S-400 and Pantsir surface-to-air missiles) in the occupied Crimean Peninsula while deploying 20 warplanes and helicopters.

Moscow’s protestations against Sea Breeze hotly follows Russian harassment of the British Royal Navy’s destroyer HMS Defender on June 23 and the Dutch guided-missile frigate HNLMS Evertsen on June 24 off the Crimean coast. The HMS Defender deliberately sailed within 12 miles of Crimea’s Cape Fiolent, on its way to the Georgian port of Batumi, supporting the internationally recognized sovereignty of Ukraine over Crimea and its territorial waters. Russia responded by harrying the Defender with coastal ships and dropping bombs in its path, while staging mock aerial attacks against the Evertsen.

This comes amidst a general confrontational period in Western-Russian relations that began with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, drastically deteriorated following revelations of Russian disinformation campaigns and meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and came to a head during Moscow’s buildup of 110,000 troops along the Ukrainian border in April 2021. The troop buildup itself represented another step Russia has taken to establish hegemony over the Black Sea. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Moscow has worked to supplement its Black Sea Fleet with coastal defense and area-denial systems stretching from occupied Crimea to Abkhazia, an territory internationally recognized as part of Georgia but operated by government supported by Moscow.

In Crimea, the Kremlin has deployed missile batteries that allow Russia to strike at vessels as far away as the Dardanelles Strait. Although Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia would withdraw the 110,000 troops it deployed in Crimea and along Ukraine’s eastern border by May 1, Moscow has only withdrawn 10,000. The Kremlin has also secured control over the Sea of Azov by building its naval presence and constructing a bridge across the Kerch Strait which separates the Azov and Black Seas. Meanwhile, Russian-led forces in Ukraine’s Donbas break the ceasefire daily in a conflict that has taken over 14,000 Ukrainian lives.

Ukraine’s undeclared war with Russia over the Donbas and Crimea is, unfortunately, tied directly to the geopolitical environment of the Black Sea; the sea itself is a battlefield in a new era of great power competition. It is important to understand this because Russia’s President Vladimir Putin does not have the luxury of deriving legitimacy from the pursuit of Communism like his Soviet predecessors. By stealing Russia’s national wealth for himself and his cronies, he has tied his regime’s legitimacy to Russia’s success in great power competition. Thus, for Putin, regime survival is maintained geopolitical victories such as establishing Russia once more as a Black Sea hegemon, implanting Russia into distant conflicts like Burma, Libya, and Syria, and preserving his authoritarian ally, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

At the center is Ukraine. Waiting for the implosion of the Putin regime, which is by no means certain, is not a responsible course of action. The best path to recover Ukraine’s territory and preserve its sovereignty is through negotiation, but through strength. A first step to demonstrate the seriousness of the West would be to step up freedom of navigation operations through Ukraine’s Crimean waters and expand them to include voyages into Ukraine’s waters in the Sea of Azov.

Any further negotiations for Ukraine must account for its interests; such requirements at minimum would involve a track dedicated to the restoration of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine. The ineffective Normandy Format dedicated to a negotiated resolution to the Donbas conflict, and is chaired by Berlin, Kyiv, Moscow, and Paris must be dissolved and remade to include Ankara, London, and Washington, with Bucharest, Tbilisi, and Warsaw as observers. Further, Moscow will need to officially recognize Kyiv’s legitimacy in the occupied Donbas territories. Russia will also need to rein in the domestic hacker groups that have targeted Western infrastructure, such as the Colonial Pipeline ransomware hack.

Until such a diplomatic restructuring occurs, the West must continue to help Ukraine develop resilience against incremental Russian interference with Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, even if this help is likewise incremental in the defense and economic sectors


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Jacob Levitan July 15, 2021 0
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Turkey Solidifies Role in South Caucasus with ‘Shusha Declaration’

Photo by Aztv

On June 15, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a new agreement during an official visit to Shusha, a city reclaimed by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Erdoğan and Aliyev first visited the city of Fuzuli before proceeding to Shusha. While in Shusha, Erdoğan and Aliyev signed a monumental defense and economic agreement, officially called the ‘Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations.’ According to Aliyev, Azerbaijan and Turkey “have established a qualitatively new relationship, and all provisions of the declaration are a guarantee of our future cooperation.”

The Shusha Declaration builds on previous agreements signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey, including the ‘Agreement on the Development of Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation’ – signed in 1994 – and the ‘Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance Between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey’ – signed in 2010. The latter, ratified in 2010 by Azerbaijan and in 2011 by Turkey, proved crucial for the Second Karabakh war, as the agreement states that Turkey and Azerbaijan will provide unconditional support for each other ‘in case of a military attack or aggression against either of the countries.’

While the Shusha Declaration includes ‘Shusha’ in the title, the contents of the declaration go beyond military support and support for Azerbaijan’s efforts in the territories gained in last year’s war. The agreement also states that Azerbaijan and Turkey will ‘increase their efforts to diversify national economies and exports in trade and economic relations…to develop more favorable conditions for the mutually beneficial development of investment cooperation.’ Additionally, various clauses refer to energy security, including the continued development of the Southern Gas Corridor and efforts to strengthen electricity supplies in the region.

Turkey will continue to contribute to construction efforts in the reclaimed territories. In order to improve the coordination of reconstruction efforts, Erdoğan announced that Turkey would open a consulate in Shusha, the first diplomatic mission to open in the region. Erdoğan added that the opening of a consulate would help Azerbaijani internally displaced persons (IDPs) return home. An opening date has not been announced, but Erdoğan noted that the consulate will be opened in Shusha ‘as soon as possible.’

Increasing Turkey’s role in the region also led to talks about the ‘Zangezur corridor’ – a transit corridor intended to connect Nagorno-Karabakh to Nakhchivan and the Kars province of Turkey by rail. Erdoğan noted that the opening of this transit route will allow Turkey to access Central Asia through the Caspian Sea and that Russia would benefit from the passage as well.

The announcement of Turkey’s greater engagement in the region was welcomed by many Azerbaijanis, but not received well by Armenia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia released a statement on June 15 condemning the visit of Erdoğan and Aliyev to the region and the signing of the Shusha Declaration, referring to these actions as an ‘outright provocation against regional peace and security.’ The Ministry also added that these actions represent the ‘false and misleading nature’ coming from Ankara and Baku about normalizing relations with Armenia.

The strengthening of the already-strong relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey causes concern for Russia. While Russia describes the joint Russia-Turkish Monitoring Center as a positive development, Russia’s presence far outweighs Turkey’s, with nearly 2,000 peacekeepers on the ground. Russia is particularly concerned about a statement made by Erdoğan, in which the Turkish President noted that he would explore the possibility of a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded to this statement, stating that, “the deployment of military infrastructure by [NATO] alliance countries near our borders is a cause for our special attention.”

Whether or not a military base materializes, the Shusha Declaration indicates that Turkey intends to take a serious role in the South Caucasus and seeks to counterbalance the role and influence of Russia in the region, disrupting the previous status quo.  

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Austin Clayton June 22, 2021 0
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The Implications of Russia’s Creeping Takeover of Belarus

Photo by rambler.ru

Belarus has had a busy year. A stolen presidential election in August 2020, sustained nationwide protests met with mass arrests and illegal in-detention abuse and torture, Western sanctions, and joint military exercises with Russia. And now Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko gave the green light for state piracy against a Ryanair flight to kidnap the dissident Roman Protasevich. In an unusual display of ire and alacrity, the European Union (EU) took swift action, imposing further sanctions against Belarus, advising against EU flights utilizing Belarusian airspace and banning the Belarusian national airline Belavia from either using EU airports or airspace. Ukraine and the United Kingdom have also denied Belarus access to their airspace.

For most of his 26-year tenure as president, Mr. Lukashenko maintained his rule through an autocratic grip on Belarussian society and by balancing Belarus’ relationship with Moscow and Brussels. Minsk joined Moscow in creating the Union State of Russia and Belarus but has resisted total integration of key sectors of Belarus’ military, security, military, and economy with Russia. Belarus had also maintained a neutral position in the Ukrainian conflict so that the Belarusian capital, Minsk, could serve as the host city for talks aimed at resolving the conflict in the Ukrainian Donbas.

But as the Belarusian strongman’s rule faces growing pressure, his resilience against Kremlin pressure has correspondingly cratered. To preserve his regime, Lukashenko has allowed the Russian FSB to widely infiltrate the Belarusian KGB. President Lukashenko also agreed to joint Belarusian-Russian military training centers with one in Belarus’ EU border region of Grodno, and proceeded to integrate the Russian and Belarusian air defense systems. Meanwhile, Russian oligarchs are pushing ahead to buy Belarusian potash company Belaruskali and fertilizer company Hrodno Azot.

Meanwhile, President Lukashenko also invited ‘Donbas’ investigators to interrogate Roman Protasevich. This followed a two-day summit in Sochi swimming with Russian President Putin where he left with a $500 million loan Ukraine has already lobbied to have the negotiation process moved from Minsk, since such de facto recognition of the rebel territories as independent states negates supposed Belarusian neutrality in the matter.

What we are seeing is the transformation of Belarus from a sovereign state into a Russian protectorate. Michael Kofman, a senior research scientist at the CNA Corporation, noted that Russia has increased its joint exercises with Belarus to essentially keep Russian troops stationed in Belarus at all times, in a parallel to NATO’s rotation of forces in Poland and the Baltic States through its Enhanced Forward Presence. Such deployments allow Russia to threaten the security of Ukraine and Europe.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has called the Union State a threat Ukraine, allowing Russia to directly threaten Ukraine’s northern border. This comes two months following the border crisis where Russia massed 110,000 troops along Ukraine’s eastern border and in the occupied Crimean Peninsula. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that most of the troops would be withdrawn from the border by May 1. However, Ukrainian sources have revealed that Russia has maintained a force of 100,000 servicemen with 1,300 tanks, 37,00 armored vehicles, and over 1,600 artillery and rocket systems on the Ukrainian border.

At this point, it is unclear whether Belarus can be extracted from the Kremlin’s embrace. In the West, Lukashenko may be the most hated man after Syrian President Bashar al-Asaad. Should he remain in power, then Belarus will be entangled in Moscow’s web. But challenges will remain even should the exiled Belarusian opposition manage to oust Lukashenko so that Belarussian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya can become Belarusian president. Under Russian pressure, Lukashenko has been strengthening the Belarusian parliament so that pro-Kremlin Belarusian parties can maintain Belarus’ eastward orientation regardless of who sits in the presidential palace.

Whether or not Lukashenko remains in power, the West faces no good options. For now, U.S. President Joseph Biden should make clear that the United States and its allies will not passively allow Russia to threaten states important to Western security. The United States and its European and NATO allies should take meaningful and visible steps to fortify NATO’s eastern flank in the Baltic states and Black Sea region, with particular emphasis on the defense of Ukraine and Georgia.

The European Union already has a large, if controversial, arms industry whose clients are mostly authoritarians in the Sahel. The EU should expand the regional scope of its European Peace Facility, the $6 billion fund dedicated to arming those governments, and arm democratizing states important to European security such as Ukraine and Georgia. Similarly, the United States needs to continue arming Ukraine and Georgia and foster connections between Ukraine’s established and Turkey’s burgeoning defense industries. NATO should also rotate its forces not just in the Baltics, but in Ukraine and Georgia on a regular basis so there is a constant NATO presence in these countries. As Putin threatens “uncomfortable signals” ahead of his summit with President Biden in Geneva this June, he must learn that his policy of developing and sustaining protracted conflicts will not deter his adversaries.

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Jacob Levitan June 15, 2021 0
Articles

Armenia and Azerbaijan Make Breakthrough Deal on Mines and Prisoners

Photo by report.az

After several weeks of escalating tensions between the two countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan recently agreed to a deal that addressed some of the most pressing issues for each side. The deal led Azerbaijan to release 15 Armenian prisoners in exchange for maps indicating the sites of clusters of landmines in parts of the territory reclaimed by Azerbaijan during last year’s war.

On June 12, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan announced the details of the arrangement. Azerbaijan released 15 Armenian, who were detained after the signing of the ceasefire agreement in November 2020, via the Georgia-Azerbaijan border, and Armenia provided Azerbaijani authorities with maps of 97,000 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in Aghdam and nearby areas.

The deal was made possible with the assistance of several parties. Georgia not only allowed prisoners of war to be returned through its territory, but its government actively contributed to the agreement as well, with Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili directly involved in the negotiations. Also involved were U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Reeker, President of the European Council Charles Michel, and the Swedish Chairmanship of the OSCE. Following the announcement of the agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed his gratitude for Georgia’s involvement, and Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili stated that, “Georgia is back [in] its historic mediator role…[and] building confidence is the path to lasting peace.”

With Georgia, the U.S., the European Union, and OSCE Chairmanship all having a stake in the negotiations, one glaring omission was the role of Russia. Although Russia has utilized its ceasefire agreement to insert itself into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to achieve an additional presence in the South Caucasus region, the country has had little involvement in the peace process beyond its force of peacekeepers on the ground. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have shown dismay towards some of the actions of Russia in the post-war environment, and Moscow has seemed indifferent in extinguishing smoldering elements of the conflict. Russia has done little, if anything, to pressure the Armenian government to hand over landmine maps and has put minimal pressure on Azerbaijan to address the issue of prisoners.

While this deal should be considered a significant step, especially considering the backdrop of the series of escalations last month between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it only addresses a small fraction of the issues plaguing the domestic political arena of each country. In Azerbaijan, one of the hinderances to reconstruction and development of the territories reclaimed during the 2020 war has been the extensive mining operations of Armenian forces. According to Idris Ismayilov, the Head of Operations for the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), approximately 10 years will be needed to fully demine the territories. The greatest challenge in the demining process has been identifying the locations of mine clusters; until now, the Armenian government has refused to provide Azerbaijan with maps of landmines, at one point even claiming that no such maps existed.     

As part of this deal, Armenia secured the return of 15 Armenian nationals that had been held in detention in Azerbaijan. In the aftermath of the 2020 war, securing the safe return of Armenians held by Azerbaijani forces has been a priority on the domestic agenda. On March 15, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Ceyhun Bayramov announced that Azerbaijan had released all prisoners of war. Despite this, many Armenians still remained in captivity, as Azerbaijan states these individuals were captured after the signing of the ceasefire, therefore not meeting the definition of ‘prisoner of war.’ Regardless of the technicalities, it is a priority for the Armenian people to see their compatriots return home safely, as recently stated by Mané Gevorgyan, the spokesperson for Armenian acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Looking forward, several steps should be taken. Neither side should hold the interests of the other side hostage for leverage, as returning prisoners to their home country and providing maps for demining efforts both increase trust and cooperation. Historically, Armenia has denied the existence of landmine maps, but as visible through this latest agreement, the maps do exist. At the least, Armenia should offer information about which regions it holds maps for so that Azerbaijan can formulate an agenda for negotiation. Azerbaijan should, in exchange, provide information about its prisoners, giving clear information about their status, conditions, and wellbeing, as well as engaging in conversation with Armenia about securing their return.

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Austin Clayton June 15, 2021 0
Articles

New Challenges to Political Stability in Run-up to Armenian Elections

Photo by Turan.az

In recent years, Armenia’s domestic political situation has experienced a high level of volatility. Many Armenians came together in April and May 2018 during the country’s ‘Velvet Revolution’ in which Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan and members of his Republican Party controlled government were forced to step down in favor of Nikol Pashinyan.

During the first two years of Pashinyan’s leadership, there were a small number of political flare-ups and controversies, but the country was lauded internationally for its improvements in democracy ranking systems. In 2018, The Economist praised Armenia for its gains in government accountability and transparency following the revolution, naming Armenia the annual Country of the Year.

The country has entered a new political reality following the signing of the ceasefire agreement ending the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. In Armenian society, many considered Pashinyan to have ‘sold out’ the people of Armenia by capitulating to Azerbaijan without discussing the decision with other officials. Armenian President Armen Sarkissian notably stated that he was not involved in the signing of an agreement learned about the signing of a peace deal through the news.

By February 2021, Pashinyan faced expanded protests. After Pashinyan stated that Russian-supplied Iskander missiles used during the war ‘underperformed’ he came into conflict with the country’s military officials. Pashinyan fired Armenian Chief of General Staff Onik Gasparyan, a decision which was previously blocked by President Armen Sarkissian, which led to dozens of top military officials to demand Pashinyan’s resignation.

With civilians and opposition parties questioning his authorities, opposition parties signed off on Pashinyan’s announcement that the country would hold early elections. On April 25, Pashinyan announced his resignation as Prime Minister, remaining in the position in a ‘caretaker capacity’ until the June elections.

Considering a backdrop of a series of recent escalations of border tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, several high-ranking officials have exited Armenia’s government with elections only weeks away. As of the time of writing, Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Ministry’s Press Secretary have all issued their resignations.

The resignations were kicked off by a meeting in which acting Prime Minister Pashinyan proposed a plan for de-escalating the tensions that have emerged on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, part of which have been caused by the lack of a border.

Pashinyan’s proposal, which called for the withdrawal of Armenian and Azerbaijani troops from areas near the countries’ borders and the deployment of international observers from Russia, France, or the United States, was welcomes by Western nations, European Union member countries, and the OSCE. Many Armenians, however, expressed disapproval of this proposal. In recent weeks, the Armenian public has experienced reports of Azerbaijani soldiers entering Armenian territory and most recently, reports of the arrest of 6 Armenian soldiers by Azerbaijani forces. The conflict is very much active in the minds of civilians, and Pashinyan’s proposals for mediation seem unattractive at the least.


Foreign Minister Ara Ayvazyan announced his resignation on May 27 following a National Security Council meeting. On May 31, he provided additional details, stating that he resigned to ‘ensure [that] there is never any question that our ministry can take steps or agree to any ideas or initiatives that go against our…national and state interests.”

Following Ayvazyan’s resignation, Deputy Minister Gagik Galachyan and Press Secretary Anna Naghdalyan both issued their resignations. In her resignation announcement, Naghdalyan noted that it was an honor for her to work with Ayvazyan and his predecessor, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan. Mnatsakanyan resigned over disagreements with Pashinyan, and it has been reported that this is the same reason for Ayvazyan’s resignation.

Ayvazyan’s resignation was likely triggered by another case of Pashinyan’s decision to go rogue and make national decisions independently. Mikael Minasyan, the son-in-law of Serzh Sargsyan, leaked a ‘secret document’ on social networks in which Armenia would sign over a number of villages to Azerbaijan. Pashinyan acknowledged the authenticity of the document on May 20, and Minasyan added that Foreign Minister Ayvazyan is ‘categorically against’ the signing the agreement.

With these issues simmering in Armenia, caretaker Prime Minister Pashinyan began a diplomatic tour to France and Belgium on June 1. According to Armenian news outlet Armenpress, Pashinyan will meet with members of the French National Assembly, French President Emmanuel Macron, and representatives of the Armenian community of France. Pashinyan’s agenda includes discussions on Armenian-French bilateral relations, opportunities for resolving the current border situation, and a long-term settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Parliamentary elections are scheduled for Sunday, June 20, leaving Pashinyan with less than three weeks to shore up domestic support to maintain his party’s majority or risk losing to opposition candidates that have blamed Pashinyan for Armenia’s 2020 defeat.

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Austin Clayton June 2, 2021 0
Articles

Armenian Soldiers Detained by Azerbaijan in Latest Escalation of Border Tensions

Photo by Azertac.

In recent weeks, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan have once again flared up despite clear stipulations outlined in the trilateral peace agreement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia in November 2020. On May 12, the government of Armenia announced that the Azerbaijani military had advanced into its territory in the southern Syunik province of the country. By May 20, the country also reported a series of clashes with Azerbaijani troops that left several Armenian soldiers injured. On May 25, Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that an Armenian serviceman was fatally wounded by Azerbaijani armed forces, a claim that Azerbaijan denies.

The latest development highlights the multiple challenges in the post-conflict reality of the region. On May 27, Azerbaijani officials reported that six Armenian soldiers had been captured in the Kelbajar region. According to Armenian news outlet NEWS.am, the six Armenian soldiers were captured by Azerbaijani troops while carrying out engineering work near their military facility in the Gegharkunik Province.

Azerbaijani officials, on the other hand, have stated that the Armenians were sappers involved in scouting defenses and laying landmines. According to Lieutenant Colonel Anar Eyvazov, the Spokesperson for the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry, the soldiers were part of a ‘sabotage group’ operating in the Yukhary Ayrim village. Eyvazov also stated that Armenia assembled its forces, including tank formations, at the front line.

In the post-war setting, the issue of landmines has become a hot topic. Landmines have caused military and civilian casualties on both sides of the conflict, and following the end of the second Karabakh war, assessments have shown that it will take at least five to six years to clear unexploded ordinance and a minimum of ten years to clear landmines. Azerbaijan’s National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) is working to clean the reclaimed territories with a force of more than 15,000 personnel. Russian military personnel and personnel from Turkey’s Special Mine Detection and Clearance Teams are contributing to demining efforts.

The Armenian government has also asserted that its soldiers had not crossed into Azerbaijani territory, highlighting another challenge of stabilizing the situation in the region. With the first Karabakh war erupting in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan never officially demarcated a border. During the second Karabakh war, Azerbaijan presented itself as a force simply restoring its territorial integrity under its internationally recognized borders. With the latest move, however, Azerbaijan has literally pushed past this boundary into uncharted territory, highlighting the need for negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in establishing official boundaries.

Following the announcement of the arrests, members of the international community jumped to voice their concerns. The U.S. Department of State released a statement calling for Armenia and Azerbaijan to ‘urgently and peacefully resolve this incident’ and for Azerbaijan to release the six prisoners, as well as any prisoners of war. The U.S. government also demonstrated awareness for the problems caused by the lack of border demarcation, noting that both Armenia and Azerbaijan should return to their positions that they held on May 11.

France’s Foreign Ministry issued a similar announcement, calling on both sides to ‘show the utmost restraint and to refrain from any provocation.’

Noticeably silent in the recent developments of this month is Russia. Russia, which maintains a presence of nearly 2,000 peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, has not issued a firm warning on the detention of the soldiers. On May 27, it was reported that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had requested international observers from ‘Russia or other countries’ to be deployed to the Armenian border where the latest incidents have occurred. Sergey Kopirkin, Russia’s Ambassador to Armenia, only issued a generic response during a recent press conference, claiming that Russia is making efforts to resolve the situation in Syunik without providing any further details. Prime Minister Pashinyan has also made numerous appeals to the CSTO, which he claims ‘has not expressed a clear position’ and ‘has not declared that Azerbaijan should withdraw its forces.’

For now, the situation remains unresolved, but highlights the need for border demarcation as well as acknowledgement for the danger of the extensive mining in the region. Rather than simply issuing statements, the international community and international organizations should lead on-the-ground missions in Armenia and Azerbaijan to establish solutions to the smoldering components of the conflict, in order to prevent further escalation of conflict.

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Austin Clayton May 31, 2021 0
Articles

Fractious Karabakh Peace Provides Washington With Opportunity in the Caucasus

Photo by Rufat Abas.

The Russian-mediated peace deal [AC1] that ended the Second Karabakh War in November between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not a calm one. It came only after three ceasefires failed, with the longest lasting one day, the second [AC2] lasting hours, the shortest barely minutes.

The peace recognized Azerbaijan’s wartime territorial gains. Azerbaijan retook half of Nagorno-Karabakh (including the strategic and cultural city of Shusha) and the territories Armenia occupied since 1994. Russia achieved its long-standing goal of deploying troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, even if it shares an observation post with a Turkish mission. But Putin’s ceasefire focused on getting those Russian troops into Karabakh, and left a host of other pressing issues untouched. These issues present opportunities for the United States to bolster its presence in a region that has emerged as a linchpin for global geopolitical security.

A major problem effecting the peace is the contamination of Nagorno-Karabakh and the recovered territories of landmines and other unexploded ordinance that are the legacies of decades of ongoing conflict. Azerbaijan has estimated mine clearance operations will take upwards of a decade, and Baku has asked Yerevan to turn over maps of minefields to assist with clearing the land. Believing the minefields[AC3]  are necessary to the defense of Armenia and what remains of Armenian-held Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian government has so far refused to turn over these maps.

Then there are the Armenian prisoners of war (POWs) held by Azerbaijan. So far Baku has returned 61 Armenian POWs (58 in February, three in May), though the European Court of Human Rights says that Azerbaijan continues to hold 188 Armenian POWs. Baku has only confirmed detaining 72 Armenians, 62 of whom were captured in the Azerbaijani province of Hadrut in December, a month after the official end of hostilities. Because of the time of their capture, Azerbaijan calls them terrorists, not POWs, and is refusing to return them.

And culture is another sticking point to peace. For Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, referred to as the Republic of Artsakh by Armenians, is the birthplace of the Armenian nation. For Azerbaijan, the city of Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh is the cultural heart of the Azerbaijani people. Following Armenia’s conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh 1994, over 800,000 Azerbaijanis fled Armenia and Karabakh (while over 250,000 Armenians fled Azerbaijan[AC4] ). Armenia destroyed several mosques in Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh following the Azerbaijani exodus in 1994; the surviving mosques have been renovated[AC5]  in a ‘Persian style’ to erase Azerbaijan’s connection to Karabakh.

But Azerbaijan is not free of sin. In May, photos emerged of the removal of the Armenian Ghazanchetsots Cathedral’s dome in Shusha, though Baku said this was to repair damage caused by falling shells. The creation of a ‘Military Trophies Park’ in Baku following the Second Karabakh War is another example of the inflammatory rhetoric (coming from both sides) sustaining the conflict. Opening with a display of Armenian helmets taken from the bodies of Armenian soldiers, the park shows visitors wax models of Armenian soldiers bearing strange and frightening countenances. In an interview, the statues’ creators confirmed their goal was to “create the most freakish depictions” of Armenians possible. Such displays are inimical to peace between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Washington should take advantage of these unresolved issues and set up a trilateral working group between Baku, Washington, and Yerevan; should Baku and Yerevan make meaningful steps towards peace and reconciliation, then Washington would invite the sides to Camp David to formalize the peace. The first step could be accomplished by having Azerbaijan release all Armenian detainees listed by the ECHR, while Yerevan would exchange the relevant minefield maps to all parties involved in mine clearance operations.

Regarding the cultural issues, the United States should offer the services of the Smithsonian Institution in the preservation and renovation of religious and cultural landmarks in the region. The Smithsonian has extensive experience in such work and has operated in hazardous areas, having sent teams to restore artifacts in Iraq and Syria destroyed by Islamic State and is notably impartial. Washington should also condition future aid to both Baku and Yerevan on efforts to clamp down on anti-Armenian and anti-Azerbaijani/Turkish rhetoric coming from official channels. A first step would be at least taking down the offensive statues in the Military Trophies Park, if not the dismantling of the Park itself, which is hardly conducive to establishing peaceful relations.

Moscow has no intention of resolving these issues, which provides space in the region for Washington. If President Biden wants to combat Russian aggression and show that the United States remains a credible international force, then he should start in Karabakh.

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ICR Center May 21, 2021 0
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