Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated, not solved Russia’s strategic aims. Moscow’s decision to recognize two separatist entities, in eastern Ukraine, will further limit other similar separatist territories’ claim for independence.

Russia has never been especially creative in its approach to the neighboring countries. Simple, standard, but ruthless position on dominating the neighborhood has been driving Moscow for decades since the end of the Soviet Union.

With Ukraine, it hits a new level. The “Putin Doctrine”, if we might assume such a thing exists, is not about cleverly-thought strategic thinking which would be gradually bringing geopolitical benefits to build upon and present Russia as a reliable and responsible power in Eurasia or globally. Rather the “doctrine” is a deeply idiosyncratic approach to the history of Russia and that of its neighbors. More dangerously, this idiosyncrasy is deeply rooted in the Russian nationalism that what the Soviet Union covered territorially is actually Russia whether it is the Caucasus, Central Asia or Ukraine – the regions which have never been historic Russia. This understanding of history serves as a cover for an offensive foreign policy. If not for the imposition of direct political control, then Moscow considers the neighborhood as a sphere of its exclusive influence. Other powers’ interests and involvement will be tolerated but only with significant limits (primarily on military and deeper economic cooperation).

On February 21^st Russia recognized the independence of separatist Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples’ Republics. Similarities with what Moscow did in Georgia are palpable. Back in 2008 Russia invaded its southern neighbor and recognized Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region (often incorrectly called South Ossetia) as independent. But similarities with Ukraine end here. While in Georgia Russia managed to shrug off the threat of Western sanctions and the collective West overall was highly hesitant to rupture ties with Russia, Moscow claimed victory both on the military front and diplomatically. Moreover, with Tbilisi remaining antagonistic toward Moscow, strategically Georgia did not pose any serious threat to Russia. The country’s small size, poor economy, and limited military capabilities plus the occupation of two separatist regions essentially stripped Tbilisi of ambitions to regain the territories and successfully complete its pro-Western drive. The hesitancy and in many cases dangerous complacency of the West also undermined Georgia’s chances.

With Ukraine, it is strikingly different. Russia essentially re-invaded the country by moving its troops into Donbas. But with this Moscow’s strategic dilemmas are not solved, but rather even exacerbated. First, with Georgia serving as an example, the West now is in no doubt as to what Russian military moves amount to. Second, in the period when the West experiences internal troubles and even divisions, the Russian threat actually helps solidify the Trans-Atlantic community. The Biden administration so far has managed to build a resilient foreign policy by closely cooperating with its European and Asian partners – the lack of which was so tangibly visible in the Trump presidency. We might be witnessing a reversal of systemic troubles in the liberal order. The decline in cooperation between the Western partners might be replaced by a re-invigorated push from Brussels, London, and Washington to confront Russia in unison. Russian actions also bolster the idea of NATO. Voices questioning the alliance will be heard less often, while the need to strengthen the eastern flank will be more evident.

Furthermore, Putin is also seeing that his military incursion does not guarantee Kyiv will be stopping acquiring necessary arms for effective defense or abstaining from cooperation with foreign militaries. Russian leaders thus face a different level of challenge from what they have seen in Georgia. Greater geographic space and a bigger, much well-equipped, and organized military allow Ukraine to withstand Russian aggression more resolutely.

With its troops now in Donbas Moscow still sees Ukraine as an unfinished business. It has either pushed forward with this initial success regardless of what grave sanctions the collective West might impose or decreased pressure to solidify its position. The latter will have to be only temporary as in the longer-term Ukraine will be drifting more forcefully to the West. And this does not necessarily mean NATO/EU granting membership. A range of different cooperation modes could be introduced between Kyiv and the West to complement NATO’s inability to extend eastward.

What Moscow’s recognition of two separatist entities mean more broadly for Russia’s sprawling “separatist empire” is a further decline of Abkhazia’s and Tskhinvali’s to garner wider international recognition. With only several states (such as Syria, Nauru, and others) recognizing Georgia’s sovereign territories as independent, Russia’s recent decision over eastern Ukraine further undermines any remnants of legitimacy it or its dependent separatist entities could argue for. Recognition of separatist lands is now firmly viewed by the world as a geopolitical tool for Moscow rather than a decision based on morality and sincere sentiments towards Ossetians and Abkhazians. Hardly likely that any state beyond perhaps Syria and possibly Belarus will be willing to recognize four separatist entities simultaneously – the decision will likely incur sanctions from US and EU.

Thus, in the longer run Moscow may have buried Abkhazia’s and Tskhinvali region’s chances for recognition— making a “separatist empire” a hollow entity indeed. Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.

Since late October, Russia’s armed forces have been conducting movements and hardware transfers close to the border of Ukraine. At the beginning of November, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced that some 90,000 Russian troops equipped with thousands of tanks and armored vehicles had been deployed 160 miles (260km) away from the country’s northern border, which increased the ‘high probability’ of military escalation. By January, Russia had reportedly amassed more than 120,000 troops and significant amounts of military equipment within striking distance from the Ukrainian border. This has triggered transatlantic society to believe that Russia has been looking for a pretext for another incursion, which could put European security as well as the future of NATO at stake. Although officials in Moscow have denied allegations about the possible invasion of Ukraine, the systematic military mobilization on the Ukrainian border in various places counters these claims. While a large-scale war may be brewing in Eastern Europe, it is unclear what is behind the Kremlin’s decision to undertake this campaign now.

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine may stem from the shifts that have taken place in Ukrainian domestic politics beginning in 2019 when a newly elected President Volodymyr Zelensky started taking a hard turn away from pursuing compromises with Moscow. Since Zelensky took office, the Ukrainian government not only continued its push toward integration in the EU and NATO, but it started to systematically counter  Russian influence in the country. Since 2019, the US and NATO military cooperation with Ukraine grew substantially through arms provisions and aid packages under the framework of the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. At the same time, Kyiv declared Ukrainian as the only official language in the country, which diminished the status of Russian. Additionally, public attitudes in Ukraine toward the West have shown an upward trend, despite Russia’s active anti-West disinformation campaigns. In 2021 IRI polls, only 20 percent of Ukrainians supported Ukraine’s membership in the Russia-led Customs Union, while around 60 percent of respondents positively assessed Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU.

In 2021, Zelensky launched a campaign against alleged pro-Russian individuals. As a result, pro-Kremlin Ukrainian individuals, such as opposition MP Viktor Medvedchuk were sanctioned. Kyiv also banned several media companies that were suspected of spreading ‘pro-Russian propaganda.’ The tough anti-Kremlin measures shattered the Kremlin’s hopes of ‘turning’ the country back into the Kremlin orbit. Russian President Putin penned an article – On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians – where he acknowledges his concerns about the presence of “malign, West-linked, anti-Russian forces” in Ukraine that have “exploited the image of the victim of external aggression and Russophobia.”

The Kremlin’s interest to control Ukraine always has been an important piece in its bigger interests, which was formed in the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the US and its allies designed a new Euro-Atlantic order in which Russia was somewhat absent. On the contrary, former Soviet republics along with former members of the Warsaw Pact in Russia’s neighborhood soon became part of this structure by gradually joining the EU and NATO. The Kremlin interpreted these developments as Western encroachment into its sphere of “special interests” aimed at undermining Russia’s sovereignty. This was combined with a wave of the so-called “color revolutions” in several former Soviet republics, which now threatened Putin’s authoritarian regime as well. Putin’s major goal soon became changing the existing European security order and restoring Russia’s control over the former-Soviet space, which would at the same time safeguard Russia from democratizing upheaval.

Moscow’s major objective has been accruing the status of great power that is superior over its neighbors’ strategic aspirations and following the logic of Realpolitik, meaning that any decision concerning Russia’s neighboring countries should be approved by the Kremlin. Nonetheless, Moscow’s attempts to maintain control over post-Soviet states has ended in failure. Russia already ‘lost’ Baltic states to the EU and NATO after the fall of the Soviet Union, while Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia started to seek membership in Western institutions. In order to reverse the process of ‘losing’ the countries from its sphere of influence, Moscow needed to coerce Ukraine and Belarus, whose membership in NATO would mean the loss of buffer zones that still “secure” Russia from the “Western encroachment.” Thus, conceding Ukraine to the West would be a grave strategic error for the Kremlin. While Moscow manages to keep Belarus in the Kremlin’s political orbit through securing its regime, its attempt to keep Ukraine close has been failing for almost a decade. Moreover, the more Kremlin tried to coerce Ukraine, the further Kyiv positioned itself from Russia. Moscow’s ambitions to shift European order has long been on the Kremlin’s agenda. Yet Kyiv’s unprecedented drift from Russia could have played a decisive role in Putin’s sudden campaign against Ukraine. By further invading the country or changing its government – the British Defense Ministry has made a statement which suggests that Moscow is “looking to install a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv” – the Kremlin will not only put back the missing pieces of the former Soviet Union together but will manage to leave European security exposed, allowing it to impose its own security order at least in its neighborhood. The timing is perfect. Western allies remain divided largely due to Germany’s reluctance to take a harsh stance against Moscow and support Kyiv. In the meantime, some EU countries remain highly dependent on Russian energy sources, which gives the Kremlin another advantage. As a leader of a declining economy whose influence is destined to diminish in the near future, Putin might have become enticed to take this opportunity and act now.

Russia is content to cause anxiety and misdirection around Ukraine. It does so to obfuscate its more silent and, in a way, more successful foreign policy moves in Belarus and Central Asia. Under particular focus is the South Caucasus, where Moscow eagerly pushes for a new order.

Russia has been building up its forces of nearly 100,000 servicemembers along its border with Ukraine for the third consecutive month. This follows a previous similar, albeit less threatening, concentration in the first half of 2021. The pattern is now firmly established. Exerting pressure on Ukraine is a part of a broader strategic thinking driving Moscow’s foreign policy toward the West: change the existing security architecture in the wider Black Sea region and force the recognition of Moscow’s exclusive sphere of influence and the emergence of the so-called Russian, more chaotic, hierarchical order.

This has generated a spree of analyses and discussion on whether Russia plans to attack Ukraine to a greater degree than its current occupation of the Donbas region. Arguments on both sides are powerful, but the reality could be that Moscow has not decided yet which course to follow. In fact, Moscow might even have been peddling the “invasion idea” to create chaos, disruption and divisions among the Western allies. It succeeded in a way. Fractures within the trans-Atlantic community are palpable, though it should also be mentioned they could have been much bigger. Moreover, Ukraine and the new security arrangement proposed by Russia could be of a far bigger scope. China watches closely. It might not use Russia’s potential military moves around Ukraine to resolve its Taiwan problem, but Beijing will at least be happy seeing the West squabbling with Moscow over the lands far away from the Indo-Pacific and the South-China Sea in particular. America’s distraction is China’s win.

But again, this grand strategic thinking from Russia’s side might be more about blurring what the Kremlin is realistically aiming at. First, while all are paying attention to Ukraine, Russia has essentially transformed Belarus into launching pad for its future military operations. Moscow thus concluded the long-drawn process of finally and unequivocally attaching its western neighbor into its orbit. Military activities around Ukraine also conceal how Russia has effectively strengthened its position in Central Asia following the unrest in Kazakhstan. These two countries’ leaderships are now extremely beholden to Moscow, a reality which will have tremendous ramifications for their respective foreign policies.

Moreover, less attention is paid to advances Russia has made in the South Caucasus, another flashpoint between Moscow and the West. The 3+3 platform has been inaugurated. The initiative involving all the South Caucasus states and the region’s three larger neighboring players – Iran, Russia, and Turkey – aims at producing a different geopolitical order. Diminution of the West or even its total exclusion is what is being pursued by Moscow and Tehran. Ankara’s position is more nuanced as it needs the West to balance Russia, but not as much as to cause troubles to its position in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus.

Georgia is notably against participation in the platform because of Moscow’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And this makes Tbilisi even more vulnerable to Russian moves. Many forget that Russia’s demands addressed at the US and NATO talks involve Georgia too. Its pursuit of NATO membership, though unrealistic at the moment, is a cause for concern in Moscow. In more congenial times this “unrealistic” policy might actually evolve into something serious, and this is what bothers the Kremlin. Counter measures should be taken. Involving Tbilisi in the web of 3+3 platform is one way.

Another component is military pressure. Indeed, acting under the guise of growing tensions around Ukraine, it is easier to make moves in Georgia’s separatist territories. For instance, in South Ossetia, Russian guards are advancing fences deeper into the Georgian territory. The so-called “borderization” process is in full swing. Villages and cemeteries are being carved out, and the population has to leave or face physical troubles.

Perhaps this explains a careful foreign policy pursued by Georgia in relation to the tensions around Ukraine. For many this is (rightfully) an abandonment of principles of true friendship with Ukraine, and for others, it is more about realpolitik and the fear of potential Russian repercussions. Either way the attention which should be paid to the South Caucasus and Georgia as the West’s most trusted partner in the region is lacking.

This is where Moscow wins big. Managed chaos is what Russia feeds on. Perhaps other large powers act in the same manner. Perhaps not. But the trend is that Moscow has perfected these tools over the past couple of decades. Its responses to the challenges vary and range from hard military interventions to softer operations as the one in Kazakhstan.

In the end, the drama around Ukraine might end peacefully, but it is Russia’s moves on other fronts which are more portentous and that require proper analysis. This makes Georgia all the more vulnerable.

On January 4, the European Union’s top diplomat Josep Borrell started his trip to Ukraine amidst elevated tensions prompted by a Russian military build-up near Ukraine’s eastern border. The next day, Borrell flew to the frontline of the conflict in the east of the Luhansk, becoming the first E.U. high representative for foreign policy to have visited the Donbas region since the war broke out in 2014. The European Union’s top diplomat promised “massive consequences and severe costs” for Russia if it launched a new military offensive against its neighbor. Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, who accompanied Borrell on a helicopter trip to the Luhansk region, hailed it as a “sign of Ukraine-E.U. unity in the face of elevated Russian threats.”

An Attempt to Catch Up

Over a month ago, Kyiv and its allies sounded the alarm about the build-up of military equipment and an estimated 100,000 Russian troops near Ukraine’s eastern border, raising fears that Moscow was establishing a pretext for an invasion. The Kremlin denied this and instead put forward a list of conditions, demanding NATO to rule out Ukraine’s possibility of obtaining membership of the alliance, limiting troop and arms deployments on its eastern flank, and returning its forces to the position of 1997, prior to any efforts for eastward enlargement. While the Kremlin’s proposals were handed to the U.S. and NATO, the E.U. has been regarded as part of the west’s coordinated response to Russia’s military maneuvers on the border with Ukraine.

During his visit, Josep Borrell reiterated that the security of Ukraine largely affects the security of Europe as a whole and highlighted that Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its actions in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, as well as its support for the Belarusian dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, had led to a “severe deterioration of the security situation in Europe.” The E.U.’s top diplomat for foreign and security policy also highlighted that the E.U. should be included in discussions on the security of Europe and Ukraine. He claimed that the European Union has been “the most reliable partner of Ukraine” and could not be regarded merely as “a spectator.”

Borrell’s visit and statements largely suggest that the E.U. has been searching for a bigger role in conflict resolution. His trip to Ukraine also preceded the Geneva talks held on January 10 between Russian and U.S. officials as well as the NATO-Russia meeting in Brussels on January 12. Even though US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken has vowed repeatedly that no decisions will be made about Ukraine without the Europeans, E.U. representatives have not been present in any meetings. Hence, the E.U.’s role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict seems to have somewhat diminished. 

Divided E.U. Foreign Policy

Although Borrell’s visit signaled the E.U.’s desire to be a significant player in the region’s security, E.U. member states have long been divided over the issue of neighboring Russia, one of the region’s of the major gas and oil suppliers. There has always been too much inter-state division in the E.U. regarding its common foreign policy toward Russia. The unclear stance has been largely driven by the largest member states, such as Germany and France, for which the lowest common denominator in relations with Moscow has mainly been driven by the engagement for the sake of economic benefits. This has constantly led to the lack of a consensus within the E.U. Despite the ambitions of E.U. leadership to boost the “E.U.’s geopolitical role on the world stage,” the organization’s foreign policy still largely remains dependent on intergovernmental bargaining that is more like a “melting pot” of different opinions on Russia rather than a united stance.

Individual E.U. member states prioritize their own foreign and security policies, and they have been reluctant to hand over much responsibility to Brussels. These states, such as Germany and France, have even favored the so-called selectively engagement policy with the Kremlin, whereas Central and Eastern European members have regarded it as unacceptable. That is why the latter trust Washington and NATO more rather than Brussels to ensure their security and deter Russia.

The West needs to introduce potentially harsh sanctions targeting the North Stream 2 Pipeline, financial sanctions against Russian state-owned banks, and the exclusion of Russia from the international financial communication systems should Russian troops be inserted farther into Ukraine. If Washington decides to impose harsh sanctions on Russia, it will need the support of the E.U., which up to now remains divided on how to best deal with Moscow.

Image Source: Kyiv Post

On January 2, U.S. President Biden and Ukrainian President Zelensky met by phone, representing the second conversation in less than one month between the two leaders. The most recent meeting comes a week before American and Russian officials plan to meet in Geneva, Switzerland on January 10 and ahead of a meeting between Russian and NATO officials on January 12.

Before the most recent meeting, Biden and Zelensky held a call on December 9. Two days earlier, Biden and leaders of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom discussed the status of the escalation of tensions in Ukraine. On the same day, Biden held a one-on-one conversation with Russian President Putin. In the December 7 conversation with Putin, Biden warned the Russian President of “strong economic and other measures.” Aside from threats of generic economic sanctions and actions that could disrupt the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, Biden notably did not agree to any of Putin’s demands for limitations on the eastward expansion of NATO.

With this as the foundation for talks with Ukrainian President Zelensky, many questioned whether or not Biden would make any guarantees to Ukraine during his December 9 call with Zelensky. The highlight of the call, which lasted over an hour, was that Biden said that any negotiations or decisions concerning Ukraine must have the participation of Ukraine. Additionally, according to Zelensky’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, “Biden said very clearly that the decision on Ukraine’s accession to NATO is the decision of the Ukrainian people only.” Zelensky, on the other hand, reportedly provided Biden with proposals on how to “unblock the peace process” and expressed willingness to participate in negotiations in multiple formats.

Following the call with Zelensky on December 9, Biden held conversations with the ‘Bucharest Nine’ – an organization founded after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 consisting of NATO allies in Eastern Europe. Bulgarian President Radev, Czech Prime Minister Babis, Estonian President Karis, Hungarian President Ader, Latvian President Levits, Lithuanian President Nauseda, Polish President Duda, Romanian President Iohannis, Slovak Prime Minister Heger, and Biden focused on “the need for a united, ready, and resolute NATO stance” in response to Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine.

Fast-forwarding a few weeks to the new year, Biden and Zelensky held another call, once again coming only a few days after a call between Biden and Putin. In the 50-minute phone call between Biden and Putin on December 30, Biden urged Putin to take steps to reduce tensions on the Ukrainian border and once again, warned of unspecified ‘economic consequences.’ In response, Putin said that new sanctions against Russia could lead to a rupture in relations between the U.S. and Russia.

After pressing Putin to de-escalate the tensions building on Ukraine’s borders, Biden and Zelensky conducted their joint call on January 2. Biden stated that the US and its regional allies would “respond decisively if Russia further invades Ukraine.” In an announcement, Zelensky noted that the two discussed the prevention of further escalation, the coordination of joint actions, and noted Ukraine’s appreciation for “the unwavering support” of the United States.

On January 10, Russian and US officials will meet in Geneva, Switzerland, where negotiations will take place through the ‘Strategic Security Dialogue’ initiative, formed by Biden and Putin during a June 2020 summit. With Biden having spoken with Putin and Zelensky twice each, as well as a number of Western and Eastern European allies, it is clear that a platform for diplomacy is in place. What is not clear, however, is what may emerge from these talks.

Biden has been firm on supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, as well as the country’s sovereignty in making its own decisions. Putin has been steadfast in his claims that the militarization of Ukraine’s border is in response to the threat of NATO expansion in the region. With both leaders grounded in their beliefs, is it possible to force a de-escalation of the conflict?

Russia is reacting to the perceived threat of NATO expansion. Currently, this ‘ideological warfare’ seems worth it for Russia, but the best way to de-escalate the situation is to make the consequences of further militarization outweigh the benefits so significantly that there is no other option than to negotiate and make agreements.

Instead of threatening Putin with ‘severe consequences’ or ‘additional sanctions’ Biden and the rest of the US government should be more transparent on what the consequences of continued aggression against Ukraine would entail. Is the U.S. considering blocking trades between the Russian Ruble and U.S. Dollar? Has the U.S. garnered support from European allies to impose sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline? Providing Russia with visible consequences and enacting sanctions preemptively with the condition that these measures could be repealed if Russia reduces tensions would be one step in forcing Russia to evaluate its maneuvers.

Secondly, the U.S. needs to make it clear what it can and will provide to Ukraine. Following the first call with Zelensky, Biden said that sending U.S troops to Ukraine was “not on the table.” This was a smart statement to make, as stationing servicemembers in Ukraine would give credence to Putin’s narrative that NATO is increasing its military presence in Russia’s backyard. However, Biden can show military support for Ukraine without involving personnel. Currently, military equipment is coming from allied countries; for example, Lithuania has made announcements about its willingness to supply weapons to Ukraine. While the U.S. has since approved sales of Javelin missiles to Lithuania, which could possibly be forwarded to Ukraine in the future, the Biden administration should cut out the middleman and fulfill Ukraine’s requests directly. Russia has recently publicized the success of its Orion drone, shortly after Ukraine placed a sizeable order for Turkish made Bayraktar drones, ultimately balancing the playing field. Direct support from the US through arms supplies could once again tip the scales in Ukraine’s favor, increase the cost of initiating conflict for Russia, and ultimately deter further escalation.

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

On December 14, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met at a summit in Brussels hosted by European Council President Charles Michel. The trilateral meeting was arranged following the escalation of tensions on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, which arose between December 8-10. In a statement following the meeting, Michel confirmed that the President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia reaffirmed their commitments to the Moscow-brokered ceasefire deal agreed to in November 2020. While both leaders highlighted the progress in establishing communication between the defense departments, the European Council proposed to create a platform for the development of economic cooperation and strengthening of confidence between Yerevan and Baku.

Michel called for the “full and speedy resolution of all humanitarian issues”, including the “release of further detainees and addressing the fate of missing persons.” He pledged that the EU would “support humanitarian demining efforts” and would assist “conflict-affected populations, [and] rehabilitation and reconstruction [of Karabakh].” The European Council President also welcomed the release of Armenian detainees and the handover of “all remaining” mine-maps by Armenia and called for the release of the remaining captives being held by Azerbaijan. Although Baku has confirmed the continued detention of 45 Armenian prisoners, Armenian authorities have claimed that more than a hundred soldiers remain in Azerbaijani captivity.

During the summit, Pashinyan and Aliyev agreed to take “further tangible steps” to “reduce tensions on the ground to ensure a conducive environment” for talks on delimitation and demarcation of the state border. The EU committed to providing an expert consultative group to provide technical assistance in the delimitation and demarcation process. One of the highlights of the summit was the agreement between Pashinyan and Aliyev to “proceed with the restoration of railway lines, with appropriate arrangements for border customs and controls, based on the principle of reciprocity.” Strikingly, the two leaders also had a tête-à-tête conversation for the first time after the last year’s war.

Following the meeting, both Pashinyan and Aliyev reiterated their commitments to the Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement and agreed to unblock regional transportation and communication links. The issue of reopening the transport link between Azerbaijan proper and the exclave of Nakhchivan via Armenia; the so-called “Zangezur corridor” has long been a point of contention following the signing of the peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku. While the agreement does not specify any status given to such transport links, Baku has repeatedly demanded a “corridor” that would be under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction. On the day of the meeting in Brussels, Aliyev said that the Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan transport link should operate similarly to the Lachin corridor connecting Armenia and Karabakh. Russian peacekeepers have been deployed along the Lachin corridor since the signing of the November ceasefire agreement to guarantee secure passage between Armenia and Karabakh. 

While agreement from both leaders seems to be yet another positive sign in the reconciliation process between Yerevan and Baku, the disagreements between them showed that the issue of the status of the Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan transport link via Armenia is not yet solved. For instance, during a press conference following a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Brussels, Aliyev stated that there should be no border control or customs along the corridor and Azerbaijan “should be provided unrestricted access” to its exclave. In his response on Facebook, Pashinyan stated that the attempts by the president of Azerbaijan to “draw parallels between the opening of regional communications and the Lachin corridor have nothing to do with discussions held and statements signed on that topic to date.” He stated that Aliyev tried to “to come to a dead-end in the issue of opening regional communications.”

The Brussels Summit can be considered as a small but successful step towards reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, the meeting has once again shown that several issues remain unresolved. While both leaders verbally confirm their commitment to the ceasefire agreement, they need to take tangible steps with regard to border demarcation and delimitation, the status of the “Zangezur corridor” and the issue of Armenians detained in Azerbaijan. The role of Turkey, a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan is crucial in this regard. The talks held in Brussels coincided with moves to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey as Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Monday that Turkey and Armenia would name special envoys to discuss normalization. The foreign minister also stated that charter flights between Istanbul and Yerevan would be resumed. In response to Cavusoglu’s statement, the Armenian Foreign Ministry stated that “Armenia has always been and remains ready for the process of normalization of relations with Turkey without preconditions” and that they “assess positively” Turkish minister’s statements. 

Image Source: The Armenian Weekly

A mixture of military and economic measures will serve as an effective measure to prevent Russia imposing its vision on Ukraine. The policy should be subtle and swift, while the alternative risks bringing greater projection of Russian power.

It is clear that Ukraine is back on Russia’s agenda. Military moves near Ukraine’s eastern border have made many believe that Russia is about to invade Ukraine. This could be true or turn out to be a complete fallacy – either way Moscow has used these measures to manipulate the West, frighten Kyiv and extort additional benefits. Some have also suggested that Russia would abstain from military actions if rewarded properly – for instance, through the federalization of Ukraine. The problem with this understanding is that it misses a larger picture, where Russia has set the scene for greater pressure against Ukraine. Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev penned pieces where an overall approach to Ukraine is presented: Ukraine cannot act independently and essentially exist without Russia’s approval. There is also a sense of urgency in Russia’s actions. All factors point to the conclusion that even if the Kremlin is provided with meaningful concessions, in the longer run, Moscow is unlikely to reduce pressure on its Western neighbor. The demanded federalization will be used as a pretext for, if not dismantling Ukraine, certainly weakening it to the level of near complete inner inefficiency.

A much wider context is also important. Moscow is seeing a window of opportunity. Global shifts where a multipolar world order is on the rise and where the U.S. is increasingly centered on China presents the Kremlin with significant room for maneuver. If there is a potential China-Russia cooperation the collective West should be most worried about, it is Beijing and Moscow aligning their policies around Taiwan and Ukraine. Pressure on one front is likely to serve as a catalyst for tensions in another. Potential coordination could be deadly as the U.S. will be unable to contain the two powers simultaneously.

Ways to Diffuse Tensions

An all-out U.S. military commitment to Ukraine is considered risky and unlikely unless Washington does see Ukraine as a part of its defense perimeter. Echoing this thinking, Joe Biden’s recent statements have indicated that Ukraine would not be seeing American troops on the ground even if Russia invades.

What could be helpful then is a more nuanced policy. An effective deterrent should be based on what the U.S. pursues elsewhere in Eurasia. Washington could realistically help build a web of partnerships between the Black Sea states and potentially, perhaps, Poland to help Ukraine. The U.S. could act as an external anchor. It does this with AUKUS and the Quad, and is likely to increasingly rely upon allies and partners rather than direct military involvement. It would still require a considerable U.S. commitment, but it would nevertheless be smaller than what defending Ukraine unilaterally would involve.

The policy of deterring Russia should consist of several pillars. One of them is encouraging Turkey-Ukraine military and political cooperation. This in itself means Washington should be intent on improving its faltering ties with Ankara. It would give a freer access to the US military in the wider Black Sea region. Encouraging Turkey-Ukraine military cooperation with some elements of US involvement can be a cornerstone for building capabilities serving as blockage against Russia. The policy could be especially effective since Turkey and Ukraine have already entered a fruitful cooperation. The Turkish company Baykar Defense will build a plant for the production of Bayraktar TB2 drones in Ukraine. The cooperation also involves constructing a center for their testing, maintenance, and personnel training.

It could be more troublesome for Russia if Turkey and Ukraine decide to work on advancing naval cooperation as both loath Russian moves which overturned the balance of power in the Black Sea following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Though considered unrealistic several months ago, Turkey could indeed play a vital role in making Russia see graver military consequences in case a major military move is made by Russia. Indeed, as the recent use of Turkish drones in eastern Ukraine against Russian military technologies showed, Moscow fears seeing Turkish technologies used near its borders.

Yet ultimately without a certain U.S. military support it would be impossible to deter Russia. Ideally some sort of gradual increase of military cooperation with Ukraine should take place. This might not be as large as causing outright fears in Moscow about a prompt change in the balance of power. But rather a phased policy should be implemented where consistency will play a major role in gradually changing the military situation on the ground.

The U.S. could consider sending lightweight Stingers, air defense systems, or the Iron Dome defense system. Washington could also think about sending the military equipment which was initially earmarked for Afghanistan. But perhaps consistent efforts in providing training to Ukrainian forces is what matters most in the potential conflict in the plains of eastern Ukraine.

Yet even the suggested military measures and the creation of regional grouping might not be enough. The West should be utilizing a powerful economic tool too. The threat of imposing harsher sanctions on Russia is a powerful mean for limiting or even altogether deterring the Russian military moves.

Russia plays a long game around Ukraine and the West, and the U.S. in particular should be doing the same. Changing the military balance on the ground overnight in favor of Ukraine is both daunting and extremely risky. But a mixture of economic, low- to mid-level military measures and diplomatic support will make significant changes in the longer term. This is what Russia fears most, and the West should be playing this card.

Image Source: Eurasia Review

Since late October, Russia’s armed forces have been conducting movements and hardware transfers close to the border of Ukraine. At the beginning of November, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced that some 90,000 Russian troops equipped with thousands of tanks and armored vehicles had been deployed 160 miles (260km) away from the country’s northern border, which increased the “high probability” of military escalation. 

As Russian military movements have been taking place in different points, deep concerns have been raised in the West over a possible escalation of Russian aggression against Kyiv. While U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly warned Russia not to make a “serious mistake” by escalating its war against Ukraine, the United Kingdom announced that it would send its military forces to Ukraine. The Biden administration ramped up its efforts to de-escalate growing tensions between Moscow and Kyiv and sent CIA Director Bill Burns to Moscow, where he warned Kremlin security officials over Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine. 

Unusual movements

Moscow has been steadily expanding its military groupings in its western and southern regions following its initial invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent deterioration of relations with the West in 2014. The ‘Western encroachment’ – namely the gradual expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the east and Ukraine’s strife towards membership in the alliance – has long irritated the Kremlin. Moscow’s has ‘unfinished business’ in Ukraine as, despite the invasion of Crimea and occupation of Donbas, the country has maintained its pro-Western aspirations and has developed its economic and military capabilities.

While the previous large-scale deployment of the Russian armed forces near the Ukrainian border took place in spring 2021, the buildup involved the active use of Russian military training grounds near the Ukrainian border and in occupied Crimea. The activities were accompanied by a constant movement of troops between bases and training grounds. Nevertheless, Russia’s recent military movements have not been part of ‘normal’ military drills observed at Ukraine’s border since the start of the war in Donbas in 2014. 

Russia has increased its number of military assets in Crimea, and parts of the 1^st Guards Tank Army have been deployed to Maslovka close to the border with the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv in the country’s northeast. Additionally, Moscow has concentrated its military vehicles around Rostov, to the east of Ukraine. The most widely discussed movement has been the relocation of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) troops to the city of Yelnya, near the borders of Ukraine and Belarus. The 41^st CAA, with its headquarters in Siberia, was previously based in Russia’s Central Military District. However, in the spring, the army moved to Russia’s Western Military District, which encompasses regions from Finland down to the border with Ukraine.

The CAA had been initially deployed to the Pogonovo training grounds in the Voronezh region of Russia, next to Ukraine. But in October most of its assets were relocated to Yelnia, 250 kilometers away from the Ukrainian border. From these ‘unusual’ movements, it seems that Russia has been preparing, although for exactly what remains unclear, and widely open to interpretation. What is obvious is that Moscow has positioned itself to be able to target its military movements against Kyiv.

Moscow’s hybrid strategy

Over the past several years, Russia has established new military bases in the Russian regions adjacent to Ukraine in line with its ‘hybrid’ strategy. The Kremlin has been trying to pressure Kyiv, as well as the West, through its military leverage. The continuous military movements and conflict in Donbas have served nothing but the Kremlin’s interests. While Russia’s military presence undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it has been a reminder that renewed military aggression against Ukraine might be on the Kremlin’s agenda.

In the meantime, Moscow has been ramping up its aggressive rhetoric against Ukraine. On November 1, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Kyiv of trying to “drag Moscow into the conflict in eastern Ukraine” following an escalation in fighting between government forces and rebels in the breakaway region. Lavrov’s statement could have been a reference to Ukraine’s recent use of strike drones in Donbas. Ukraine’s actions in Donbas angered Kremlin officials, amid an increasing U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea.

Ukraine is ‘unfinished business’ for Russia, as it is the place where Moscow has witnessed many defeats since the Orange Revolution where Moscow’s influence was undermined by pro-Western movements. Since the 2013 Euromaidan protests, the Ukrainian government has further outcasted Russia by implementing pro-democratic measures and anti-corruption reforms and voicing their aspirations for membership in NATO. Russian coercive actions against Ukraine have ‘struck back’ and further solidified Ukraine’s pro-Western aspirations. Even though Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership prospects might be unrealistic for the time being, Ukraine’s growing military cooperation and dense economic and political ties with the West largely undermine Moscow’s interests. Kyiv has been actively involved in NATO exercises and in 2020 was even named as NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Partner. In April, Ukraine also became the first non-alliance nation to take part in the NATO Response Force.

The Kremlin’s primary goal is to undermine Ukraine’s prospects of joining NATO by maintaining conflict as candidates interested in joining the alliance are obliged to resolve all international and territorial disputes prior to membership. As Ukraine’s internationally recognized territories – the Crimean Peninsula, Luhansk and Donetsk – have been under Russian control since 2014, Ukraine’s prospects of membership remain minimal.

At the same time, Ukraine is an important part of Russia’s great power game. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long sought to restore Russia’s great power status, and he has tried to start this process by regaining dominance over key parts of Russia’s historic empire. For Putin, the restoration of the Russian-dominated neighborhood is not only geopolitical, but personal.  In 2005, the Russian president sincerely admitted that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” He has continuously returned to this theme in one form or another. In July, Putin published an article where he argues that a sovereign Ukraine has no right to exist as “it invented its borders” and that the West has “established an anti-Russian project to instil fear in Ukrainians.” Similarly, many Russian television channels have supported Putin’s statements. For instance, in February, Kremlin TV chief Margarita Simonyan was a headline-grabbing highlight of the recent Russian Donbas Forum, where she joined calls to annex occupied eastern Ukraine, saying “Mother Russia, take Donbas home.”

Ukraine serves as a buffer zone between Russia and the West and could play one of the decisive factors for Europe’s future as well. Ukraine’s success in integrating with Western institutions would lead to a more democratic and freer Europe, which would have a spillover effect on other post-Soviet states and even Russia per se. Such a wave of democratization would pose a threat to Putin’s authoritarian regime, and that is why it has remained the Kremlin’s major fear since the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in the early 2000s. Although Russia might not be willing and able to invade entire Ukraine, it will continue undermining its sovereignty and stability in the short term, pushing this scenario further away from reality.

Image Source: cnn.com

On November 26, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin gathered for a summit in the city of Sochi, Russia. The summit was the second meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders since the end of the 44-day Karabakh War in November 2020. Initially, the gathering, as announced by the Russian President’s Press-Secretary Dmitri Peskov, was planned to be held on November 9 to mark the first anniversary of the signing of the November trilateral agreement, which fixed the devastating defeat of Armenia in the war, but the summit’s date was later changed. 

The summit started with a bilateral meeting between Putin and Aliyev, even though Pashinyan had arrived in Sochi earlier than his Azerbaijani counterpart. Putin then hosted a trilateral meeting that lasted more than three hours, concluding with the leaders signing a special statement. The summit concluded with a bilateral meeting between Putin and Pashinyan and a meeting between President Putin and the permanent members of the Russian Security Council. 

The Sochi summit was preceded by rising tensions and heavy fighting between Baku and Yerevan, and as expected, its focus included major issues of the post-war agenda, notably the unblocking of regional transportation and communication channels and the delimitation and demarcation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan state borders.

Praising Russia’s role in regulating the conflict and the reconciliation process, both leaders expressed their interests in establishing sustainable peace. Aliyev said that Azerbaijan had offered a ‘peace agreement’ to Armenia, including the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, which it had refused to accept. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, on the other hand, stated that the situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan was not “as good as they would like it to be” and expressed his dissatisfaction with Azerbaijan still holding Armenian prisoners of war and allegedly having troops stationed on Armenian territory. 

Despite that, the two sides did not sign any official agreements regarding the delimitation and demarcation of the borders or on new transportation corridors connecting Azerbaijan’s with its exclave of Nakhchivan via Armenia. Even though both issues are reflected in the Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been interpreting them in different ways. The “interpretation problem” has not deterred but instead has contributed to occasionally rising tensions between the two sides.

Instead of an additional agreement, Aliyev and Pashinyan merely signed a one-page document in which they pledged to commit to “taking steps to increase the level of stability and security on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border.” In the document, the three sides expressed their intention “to work towards the creation of a bilateral commission on the delimitation of the state border” between Armenia and Azerbaijan “with its subsequent demarcation with the consultative assistance of the Russian Federation at the request of the parties.” They also pledged “to intensify joint efforts aimed at the earliest possible resolution” to establish economic and transport connections in the region. According to Putin, the commission would be established before the end of the year.

The document signed in Sochi is an important step forward in the relations between Yerevan and Baku as they have recognized interstate borders and agreed to peacefully resolve the ongoing disputes, a factor that has largely undermined post-war peace and reconciliation processes. Hence, the agreement between Pashinyan and Aliyev has the potential to eventually help settle the border disputes between the two countries and prevent armed escalations that have plagued both sides since the ceasefire agreement.

Some agreements reached between the two sides have not been stated in the joint statement and will be summarized by the deputy prime ministers under the Armenian-Azerbaijani-Russian trilateral working group. The group, which was formed at the beginning of this year and gathered the deputy prime ministers from each country, has been actively meeting since its establishment and has been working on action plans for regional transportation links, including the Zangezur corridor.

Additionally, during the summit, the Armenian side did not raise the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s future status as it previously insisted on. On November 23, the Armenian Prime Minister even stated that ‘Karabakh’ had nothing to do “with the territory” and was “a matter of law” underlining that Armenia had recognized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity “under the documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991.”

While Pashinyan’s statement somewhat contrasted Armenia’s previous rhetoric for “remedial secession” of “Artsakh” (Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh), the outcome of the Sochi summit seems to have been a constructive step in the post-war peace process between the Baku and Yerevan. Pashinyan’s apparently divergent stance and the adopted statement demonstrate the potential for peace and reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a concept that has often come under question in light of disputes that have emerged since the signing of the trilateral agreement ending the 2020 war.

Image source: kremlin.ru

It has been almost a year since the European Union and the United States enacted sanctions against Belarus due to the government’s crackdown on the protests following the country’s presidential elections. However, Western measures have not had any efficient impact as they have fallen short in ending the authoritarian regime.

Lukashenko has long played Russia and the West against each other in a manner that provided him with a degree of international respect. However, the Western ostracization of Belarus has pushed Lukashenko unprecedentedly closer to Moscow. Russia has been steadily expanding its leverage over Minsk since the 2020 protests, most notably when the Kremlin sent Belarus a 1.5 billion USD loan and agreed to deepen trade linkages. However, Moscow’s support has come with strings attached, and the patron-client relationship which the two countries have entered has become a new opportunity for the Kremlin to garner political and economic control over Minsk and to turn Belarus into its military place d’armes.

Belarus in the Russian orbit

Russia has always been a powerful economic and political partner for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, supporting the current authoritarian regime for 27 years. However, the relationship between the two countries has always been unstable. Belarus was never interested in being part of ‘Ruskiy Mir’ (the Russian World) and even “flirted” with the West to antagonize Moscow. The Belarusian government has even removed pro-Russian figures from the country’s security apparatus.

In 2014, when Russia started its military campaign against Ukraine, Lukashenko remained neutral and refused to recognize Russian claims on the Crimean Peninsula. The Belarusian president emphasized that he would not permit any attacks against Ukraine from Belarus proper. Lukashenko also showed readiness to act as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine and to host peace negotiations in Minsk aimed at diffusing the conflict. The position of neutrality in the conflict paid off, as it boosted Lukashenko’s international image, with Minsk becoming a hub for Ukraine-Russia air traffic following the 2015 ban of all direct flights between Moscow and Kyiv.

August 2020, however, marked the dawn of a new period, in which Lukashenko violently cracked down on nationwide protests over a rigged presidential election. The Kremlin directly assisted Lukashenko to effectively overcome months of street rallies and weather sanctions. Putin also promised the Belarusian leader military assistance if things went “out of control.” Despite such guarantees, Russian aid to Lukashenko has not come without a price. Having been isolated by the West, the Belarusian dictator has no choice but to remain within the Russian orbit and play the game according to the Kremlin’s rules.

While Lukashenko has sided with Russia, Ukraine has broadly aligned itself with the West. Over the past year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has become increasingly critical of Lukashenko. In July, Kyiv joined the West in restricting flights from entering the Belarusian airspace following the forced-landing of a Ryanair plane in May, an incident that has been branded as an act of “state-sponsored piracy”. In the meantime, Lukashenko stated that Belarusian national airline Belavia would launch flights to Crimea, a statement that indicated Minsk’s readiness to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of the Ukrainian territory. Lukashenko has also accused Kyiv of being involved in “foreign plots” aimed at destabilizing Belarus through the use of militants that had been trained in Ukraine.

Russia’s new military district

An invasion via Belarus has always been part of Ukraine’s fears. Nevertheless, the threat has become more real as isolated Minsk’s dependence on Moscow has skyrocketed. Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin have conducted five rounds of negotiations on the so-called Union State, a project aimed to deepen political and economic integration between Russia and Belarus. On September 9, after meeting with Putin for the fifth time in 2021, a 28-point road map was introduced with the goal to bind the two countries closer together. Lukashenko expressed his interest in closer integration with Russia, even though it is apparent that the integration project will limit Minsk’s independence.

Belarus has emerged as a new security threat to Ukraine as Russia has been effectively cementing a permanent military presence in the country. So far, Moscow and Minsk have conducted a record number of joint military drills in 2021. Additionally, in August, a new joint training base was established in the town of Grodno near the border with Poland and Lithuania.

On September 12, Lukashenka has announced plans to deploy Russian S-400 air defense systems near northern districts of Ukraine “to protect his country’s border with Ukraine.” The statement came after Moscow held one of its largest joint exercises with Belarus on Ukraine’s northern flank in September, involving around 200,000 troops. The Belarusian dictator also highlighted that the defense system was part of a $1 billion arms package agreed upon during the September summit in Moscow.

The announcement on the relocation of the defense system raised fears in Ukraine, as it can be interpreted as an indicator of the Kremlin’s pre-war preparations. The defense systems would be needed for protecting Russian troops in the case of a sudden invasion from Belarus. Russia has already annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in the south and occupied the Donetsk and Luhansk districts in the east. With little progress towards conflict resolution, the prospect of a possible hybrid war from the north represents a major challenge to the Ukrainian government.

Lukashenko’s recent statement on the deployment of Russian defense systems to the Ukrainian border suggests progress has been made in Russia’s stealth takeover of Minsk, but the fact that Belarus might be turning into a new front in Putin’s ongoing hybrid warfare against Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A week after the first anniversary of the signing of the trilateral peace agreement ending the hostilities of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war – signed by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Russian President Vladimir Putin – a new set of clashes broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While brief, especially compared to the previous 44 days of fighting, the hostilities were not only destructive in that they claimed several lives and wounded many others, but they also undermined the limited diplomatic progress that had been made in the last year. Although little had been achieved in the post-war period, the outbreak of hostilities certainly does not encourage Armenia and Azerbaijan to make any agreements on regional development.

There were multiple causes for the recent escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On one front, it was reported that Azerbaijani forces killed an Armenian civilian and wounded three others near Shusha on November 8. In retaliation for this, a civilian from Nagorno-Karabakh threw an unspecified explosive device at an Azerbaijani military checkpoint near the Lachin corridor, injuring one Azerbaijani serviceman. By November 14, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan announced that a “concentration of a group of personnel and equipment of the Armenian Armed Forces” had been observed as well as “preparation for provocation.” According to Azerbaijani officials, the situation was diffused and Armenian forces withdrew from the area.

Another facet contributing to the increase in tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan relates back to connectivity and transportation linkages in the post-war environment. For several months, Azerbaijan has been protesting Iranian trucks entering Nagorno-Karabakh via Azerbaijani territories, as well as the lack of a response from Russian peacekeepers on this issue. In response to this, Azerbaijan established several checkpoints along roadways, including the Goris-Kapan road, which restricted the movement of Armenians living in this area.

Azerbaijan has also expressed growing frustration over the lack of progress in developing a transportation corridor between Azerbaijan proper and its exclave of Nakhchivan. Rumors circulated that an agreement on this issue would be signed by Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev near the anniversary date of the signing of the trilateral agreement, but no action materialized. It has been speculated that Armenia possibly withdrew from an agreement on this issue, citing concerns over the control and management of any routes passing through its sovereign territory, angering Azerbaijan.

Full fighting broke out between the two countries on November 15. Armenian officials state that the fighting took place near Sev Lake in the Syunik Province, which is clearly recognized as territory of the Republic of Armenia. Azerbaijani officials, however, state that the recent skirmishes were located in the area near Kelbajar and Lachin, which would be within the borders of Azerbaijan. Russian sources indicate that the ‘situation’ occurred near Mount Kilisali, located in Kelbajar, Azerbaijan.

Although there are differences in the reporting of where the fighting actually took place, it is important to note that Armenia called upon Russia for support, but Russia did not respond militarily. This likely indicates that the fighting did not take place in the territory of Armenia, as Russia would have been obliged to intervene to support the territorial integrity of Armenia. However, it could also be another example of Russia acting aloof in defending the state in which it has signed several defense treaties with.

On November 16, the fighting was said to have ‘stabilized’ after Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu held a phone meeting with the Ministers of Defense of Armenia and Azerbaijan. With Russia’s mediation, a new ceasefire was agreed upon and went into effect at 18:30 (local time) on November 16.

As of the time of writing, the Armenian Ministry of Defense is reporting that 1 soldier was killed, 13 were captured by Azerbaijani forces, and the location of 24 other servicemen is unknown. Eduard Aghajanian, Chairman of the Armenian Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Relations, stated that 15 Armenian soldiers had been killed, contradicting the official announcement of the Ministry of Defense. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense has stated that 7 servicemen were killed and another 10 were injured.

One day later, the newly brokered ceasefire is holding, and Armenia and Azerbaijan are facing new pressure from the international community to refrain from fighting. The United States State Department issued a statement urging both sides to reduce tensions and avoid further escalation. The State Department reiterated the need for both sides to abide by the statement of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, which also calls for “direct dialogue aimed at contributing to security, stability, and prosperity in the region.”

Very little was achieved during the past year between Armenia and Azerbaijan diplomatically. One year is simply not enough to restore confidence after 30 years of conflict, however, this two-day skirmish sets both parties back. Negotiations will stall even further, delaying the prospects of any further development, ultimately negatively impacting the people of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Recent escalations between Armenia and Azerbaijan diminish the real willingness of both sides to find a long-lasting solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, blaming solely Baku and Yerevan might not be entirely correct. Russia is lurking behind the overall process. Moscow’s illiberal peacemaking agenda undermines what leaders saw possible following the 2020 second Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Armenia and Azerbaijan were about to sign a range of agreements in November under Russian mediation. It followed seemingly positive statements made by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on October 15, who agreed to the opening of a railway from Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave and further on to Turkey via Armenia’s southernmost region of Syunik. In exchange, Armenia would have a railway link to Russia and Iran through Azerbaijan’s territory. This seemed to be a good bargain for Baku and especially beneficial to Armenia, which could end its notorious geo-economic isolation. Sandwiched between its two historical rivals, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and with open borders only with Georgia and Iran, the opening could be a historical development in Armenia’s post-Soviet period.

Yet again, something went wrong, and Russia’s position has been decisive. With the collective West sidelined, Moscow is now a sole arbiter of the conflict. But building a long-term, peaceful solution is easier said than done. Lack of actual military and economic tools could be a significant hindrance. In Russia’s case, however, it is the geopolitical component of its peace-building initiative which ruins the prospects. Indeed, constructing a long-term peace requires genuine political willingness, prestige, and a record of unblemished leadership. When Russia negotiated a ceasefire agreement in November 2020 following the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, optimism rose that a revival of former transportation links and economic cooperation might decrease tensions and ultimately lead to sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This, in turn, should have led to a more prosperous South Caucasus. However, continual skirmishes, as the latest round which led to a high number of deaths, work against this expectation.

This further lessens the declining level of trust between the two warring sides and creates a more chaotic security environment in the region overall. The net result is yet another postponement of the railroad revival project. Moreover, even if meaningful progress (actual opening of the railways) on the issue is eventually reached, a smooth operation of the new connectivity routes will be doubtful.

This lack of trust highlights deeper deficiencies related to the attempted conflict resolution. Russia’s illiberal peacebuilding methods fail to produce real security, largely because the Kremlin is suspected to have little or no interest at all in real peace and instead, prioritizes its own geopolitical interests.

Adherence to a peace agreement would negate the instability Russia wants to operationalize. The continuous tensions between the two countries make Russia the winner. For instance, unable to resist the Azerbaijani army, the Armenian government has approached the Russian side to increase the military and security cooperation, and even extend the Russian military presence in several other points beyond where Russian troops are located at.

The lack of genuine peacebuilding intentions also generates the troubles in Russia-Azerbaijan relations. Although victorious in the war, Azerbaijan’s political elites fear a continuous Russian military presence on Azeri soil beyond 2025, when the first term of the peacekeeping mission officially ends. Indeed, the likely extension of Russia’s military presence would drive Azerbaijan further into Turkey’s embrace. Both countries have been allies for decades, but this reached a qualitatively new level with the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war when Turkish military assistance was considered key. To offset Russian influence, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed the Shusha Declaration in June 2021. The two sides pledged to defend each other in case of an attack on either party. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan even mooted a possible future Turkish base in the country.

As Russia increases its influence, Turkey will increase its willingness to support Azerbaijan. The age of exclusive Russian geopolitical domination in the South Caucasus is coming to an end, and this could explain why the revival of the railways has failed so far and is likely to in the future. Opening the region up does not really advance Russian geopolitical goals, which are better served with Armenia solely connected to Russia via Georgia, while denying Azerbaijan a direct line with Turkey.

For Russia, a pure geopolitical calculus could be a real motivator behind Russia’s present policies in the South Caucasus. Indeed, neutralizing the blocking potential of the Caucasus mountains has been at the heart of Russia’s military efforts. But the geopolitical component brings about troubles in Russia’s overall strategic calculus. It generates tensions not only with Azerbaijan, which is increasingly fearful of Moscow’s intentions, but even with its close ally, Armenia. When the latest flare-up between Armenia and Azerbaijan took place, Yerevan once again witnessed a rather distanced Moscow. For the latter, the allied ties with Armenia take no precedence over Azerbaijan-Russia relations. Thus, the geopolitical ingredient helps Russia navigate the conflict, be a major powerbroker, but it in no way secures a long-term peace in the South Caucasus.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University.

October 30 marked the beginning of a gas crisis in Moldova, shortly after the government declared a state of emergency. Moldova failed to secure a new deal with Gazprom, a Russian state-owned gas company, which has long been the main energy supplier for a small post-Soviet country of 2.6 million people. The energy crisis Moldova started after the Russian company raised its rate from 250 USD to 800 USD per thousand cubic meters, a rate Moldova would not be able to afford to pay. Even though Moldova tried to extend the energy contract under the previous terms, Russia showed reluctance to prolong the contract due to Chisinau’s ‘historical debt’ to Gazprom, which, as Gazprom claims, is nearly 710 million USD. With the previous contract having expired and Chisinau having to pay back the debt, the country found itself stranded ahead of a cold winter.

Leveraging energy

Moldova’s gas crisis followed the Kremlin’s generous energy deals with countries it considers its ‘friends.’ On November 4, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko succeed in securing prices 7-10 times lower than any country across Europe. Similarly, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has been expecting ‘advantageous rates’ from Moscow. In this situation, Moscow’s attempt to increase pressure on Moldova through its gas supply, for the most part, is politically motivated.

Moldova has been led by Maia Sandu since November 2020, after she won the presidential race against the pro-Russian candidate, Igor Dodon. Since then, the country’s first-ever female president has been eager to deepen Moldova’s integration with the European Union (EU). Moreover, Chisinau further irritated the Kremlin, after Sandu’s reformist Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) won a healthy majority in Moldova’s general election, defeating Igor Dodon’s Socialist Party. Russia had never hesitated to issue cheap energy deals with Chisinau during Dodon’s incumbency between 2016 and 2020, but Moscow has recently shown greater hesitance to do so.

Russia’s political motivations are clear as Moldova’s new government has made European integration the country’s main foreign policy goal. Moscow has emphasized that a new gas contract deal was not issued to Moldova merely due to ‘exclusively commercial’ reasons; it denied the involvement of any political pressure. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that Moscow has been taking advantage of its energy exports for the sake of extracting political concessions. There are myriad instances when Moscow used its energy as a tool for ‘political blackmailing.’ In 2014, Moscow decided to drop pro-Western Ukraine’s energy deal agreed upon in the previous year due to the country’s debt to Gazprom.

No alternatives but Russia

Moldova is overdependent on Russian energy, which gives the advantage to the latter in price negotiations. Moldova’s national gas company Moldovagaz is controlled by Gazprom, and the country lacks alternatives for its energy supply. At the same time, approximately 80 per cent of the country’s electricity comes from a Russian-owned power plant in the breakaway region of Transnistria, over which the government in Chisinau has no control. These factors significantly boost Russian leverage over Moldova’s energy security.

At the same time, the Kremlin might have attempted to undermine Moldova’s energy sector reforms through the framework of the Third Energy Package and challenge the country’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the European Union. It has been confirmed by members of the Moldovan legislature that Chisinau was asked to “put the free-trade agreement on the table” in order to secure a cheaper gas price. Moldova undertook the Third Energy Package in 2011 to unbundle MoldovaGaz, whose main shareholder is Gazprom, into three separate companies dealing with the purchase, transmission and distribution of gas in the country. Russia, not wishing to lose its influence in the Moldovan energy sector, has consistently opposed these measures. 

Similarly, the DCFTA, which was signed by the EU and Moldova in 2014, has played an essential role in Moldova’s close linkages with the Union, and as a result, Moldova’s 70 per cent of export products, including electrical machinery and wine, have been sold to the European market. Apart from that, Moscow may have aimed to prompt disappointment in Moldovans towards the pro-EU incumbent party, which “failed to secure a cheap gas deal.” This would create momentum for the weakened pro-Russian Socialist Party to undermine the image of the government’s management of the energy crisis in the eyes of Moldovans and once again emerge as considerable political forces.

The Moldovan government tried to look for alternatives and has asked the EU for assistance. Romania, Ukraine, and Poland have been the first to deliver gas supplied to Chisinau. This has been the first time Moldova purchased gas from a state other than Russia. At the end of October, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced that the EU would grant Moldova 60 million EUR to purchase natural gas. Even though the assistance from the EU and Moldova’s neighbors and has been helpful, it could not fulfil the high demand for gas in the country.

An alternative that could substitute the Russian gas did not emerge either, and eventually, Moldova’s pro-western government was left with no option but to reach a new deal once again with Gazprom. At the beginning of November, the two sides managed to agree on “mutually beneficial terms” and Moldova secured a new five-year contract. Moldova has tried to diversify its energy, but it failed to set itself free from Russia’s monopoly. The recent energy crisis in Moldova is a clear manifestation that Russia’s still enjoys extensive energy leverage in the region and can direct it against pro-Western governments.

This November marks one year since the end of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. Since the signing of the trilateral agreement, which ended the hostilities in 2020, the pace of geopolitical change in the South Caucasus has been staggering. The post-war period initiated several major geopolitical trends and accentuated others which had been long emerging in the region.

The Changing Western Stance

First, the war highlighted a regression in Western peacekeeping standards. The Western approach to conflict resolution based on equality rather than geopolitical interests has been decidedly trumped by the Russian alternative. Moscow is suspected of not looking to resolve (it rarely, if ever, pursued peace efforts in other territorial conflicts) the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Instead, the Kremlin is seeking to freeze it under its close watch in an attempt to retain tools of influence over Armenia and increasingly Turkey-leaning Azerbaijan.

The West’s inability to play a proactive role toward fluid geopolitical circumstances in the South Caucasus also raises questions about its long-term commitment to engage the region and help resolve the separatist conflicts. The second Nagorno-Karabakh war was, in a way, an upshot of the West’s declining engagement in the region which started from 2010s, but accelerated in the past several years. The US has been looking elsewhere – the Indo-Pacific region is now a primary theater of activity with Washington. The EU has been hobbled by internal differences, and the fear of troubling already tense ties with Russia weigh significantly upon policymakers in Brussels.

Growing Western unwillingness to engage the region more extensively is also reflective of the troubles within the liberal order. In a way, the Russian peacemaking tradition and the West’s inadequate position in the South Caucasus tell crucial details of the changing the global system where such formats as the Minsk Group gradually lose relevance. Instead, the age of great power competition has returned to the region.

Indeed, Turkey and Russia’s recent push (together with Iran’s blessing) to create a six-nation pact bringing together the South Caucasus states, plus Russia, Turkey and Iran highlights the changes in the international system. The application of balance of power ideas is back in the game and the Eurasian trio is thus trying to build a new order, which I called elsewhere as the hierarchical order. Iran, Russia, and Turkey will try to build a closed regional cooperation model from the Black Sea to the Caspian basin. If implemented, the West will be absent from this arrangement and the tools of leverage it still holds could be further eroded.

Yet another critical change which followed the 2020 war is that the collective West can no longer treat the South Caucasus as a monolithic entity. Rather, a diversified foreign policy should be applied reflecting the existing realities on the ground. The EU, for instance, should be more geopolitical in its approach to adjust to the ever-more fractured nature of the South Caucasus.

The lack of Western resolve in the region and the Black Sea could propel the local, small, and geopolitically weak actors toward diversifying their foreign ties – one could call it a “rebalancing.” For instance, Georgia’s inability to ascend to the EU and NATO could be complemented with constructing closer ties with Eurasia’s emerging economic and geopolitical powers. This nuanced foreign policy change could be reflective of similar processes which take place in Ukraine and even Turkey, both of which are seeking closer ties with China.

The war also solidified that the Caspian basin and South Caucasus are inextricably linked to the greater Middle East. Russia and Turkey are basing their strategies in the region on developments in the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Not since the end of the Soviet Union has the South Caucasus been such a critical point for the powers around it. In a way, this re-emergence of close contacts between the South Caucasus and the Middle East is a return to normalcy which was disrupted in early 19^th century by Russian annexation of the South Caucasus. Indeed, in pure geographic terms the region is better connected to Turkey and Iran than to Russia with which it shares an impassable Caucasus range.

Iran Battling to Retain its Role

It is true that Iran was never a dominant power in the South Caucasus. Unlike Russia or Turkey, the traditional power brokers, it has not had a true ally. Iran was certainly part of the calculus for states in the region, but it was not feared, like Ankara or Moscow. And yet, the South Caucasus represents an area of key influence for Tehran, based on millennia of close political and cultural contacts various Persian empires had with the South Caucasus.

The second Nagorno-Karabakh war changed Iran’s calculus in the region. The results showed Tehran’s interests were unheeded, while Turkish influence grew exponentially. Thus, Iran now has to adjust to the radically changed geopolitical landscape. Perhaps its recent escalation with Azerbaijan betrays the Islamic Republic’s concerns about its weakening position in the South Caucasus.

Yet there is little Iran can realistically do to meaningfully boost its position in the region. The South Caucasus will certainly feature higher in Tehran’s foreign policy agenda than before. Perhaps closer cooperation with Russia will also follow as both countries loath growing Turkish influence. Iran can also support Armenia in its efforts to contain the triumphant Azerbaijan.

Strategic changes on the ground bring about the necessity in Tehran to adopt a different foreign policy outlook. A more robust foreign policy toward the South Caucasus would nevertheless require greater financial and military attention to the region – resources a cash-stripped and sanctioned Islamic Republic lacks.

Armenia’s Unfavorable Position

The period since the end of the war also highlighted the undercutting of democratic ideals and achievements of the region’s democratic states. Take Armenia: its young democracy had high hopes following the 2018 revolution, but now it will be even more dependent on Russia, which augurs badly for an aspiring liberal democracy.

With incompatibility between an aspiring democracy with a powerful illiberal country such as Russia, the Armenian leadership will now have to make extensive concessions to Moscow to shore up its military, backtracking on its democratic values. Building a fair political system cannot go hand in hand with the Russian political model.

The war also put an end to any real hopes of Armenia implementing a multi-vector foreign policy. Even prior to 2020, Armenia’s multiaxial foreign policy efforts gradually deteriorated, with the 2016 fighting showing the limits. Armenian politicians attempted to develop ties with other regional powers, but Russian influence had begun to increase.

The 2020 war obliterated Yerevan’s multiaxial policy efforts for years to come. Now, Armenia’s dependence on Russia will be even more pronounced with no viable geopolitical alternatives. With no practical foreign policy diversification options, the three South Caucasus states are now further divided by larger regional powers, accelerating the fracturing of the region.

Looking Ahead

Much of how the things will shape up in the future around the South Caucasus will depend on Iran, Russia, and Turkey, but how the US approaches the region will be no less crucial. The collective West will have to come to a certain understanding with Turkey, even if it be limited, to salvage its deteriorating position in the region. After all, the South Caucasus has always been the only theater where Turkish and Western interests have always coincided.

Delay in reconsideration of the US policy could spell disaster for remaining Western influence in the South Caucasus. Georgia, which serves for the West as a door to the Caspian basin and on to Central Asia, could be the biggest loser if Washington shifts its foreign policy away from the region. A deeper engagement in economic and security cooperation is preferable, which would be an effective tool for preventing an alternative, Russian model of dominating the region.

Along with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan too will face the lack of foreign policy options if the West’s unwillingness to commit to the region continues to grow. The reality could be the closing off of the region, the development of a 3+3 platform, decline of democratic principles, and the eventual spread of illiberalism.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University.

During past decades, many initiatives have been proposed for regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, mainly coming from Georga and Turkey. In 1999, then-Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze proposed the creation of the “Peaceful Caucasus Initiative” which was followed by Suleyman Demirel’s “Stability Pact for the Caucasus.” Later in 2008, then-Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, proposed the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” while then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili promoted the idea of “United Caucasus.” Despite many ambitious plans, none of the initiatives ever came into force.

In December 2020, after the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War, bolstered by Turkey’s growing influence in the South Caucasus, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again made a proposition on a new regional cooperation platform. However, this time he suggested creating a new format, the Six Country Regional Cooperation Platform, which would encompass the three states of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) together with the greater states surrounding the region (Turkey, Russia, and Iran). During his speech at the victory celebration in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, Erdogan underlined the need for regional cooperation in the Caucasus region, as it could be a win-win game for all participating sides and could even “turn a new page in Turkey-Armenia ties”.

In the meantime, Iran also proposed the creation of a similar six-party cooperation union in the region referred to as the 3+3 platform. To introduce the initiative and discuss how to cooperate and “make coordination on regional issues” Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif made trips to the other five countries envisaged in the proposed platform. Nevertheless, to date, no practical steps have been taken in implementing the project, as it has been mainly part of diplomatic discussions. Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan have been enthusiastic about the project, and Russia has approved of the initiative as well. Nevertheless, the initiative has not been met with the same enthusiasm by Georgia and Armenia.

A new opening for influence

Russian President Vladimir Putin, who recently increased Russia’s military presence in the South Caucasus by stationing Russian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, has been “keen” on the idea, according to Erdoğan. On October 6, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov even made an announcement that Moscow was committed to the establishment of a new 3+3 format to “address the issues of security [and] unblocking economic and transport ties.”

This comes as no surprise as the Kremlin has long sought to increase its leverage on its post-Soviet neighbors to undermine the Western encroachment in the region of its “special interests”. Russia has been on the lookout to make it difficult for the Biden Administration to reiterate America’s role in the former Soviet space and strengthen cooperation in the region, especially with its strategic partner, Georgia. The second Karabakh war has been an opening for the Kremlin to reassert its influence in the South Caucasus region. 

In the meantime, Turkey has been set on expanding its regional influence as well. The Turkish government has realized Russia’s importance in the region and despite a competitive relationship with Moscow, it has sought to work with Russia to achieve its own regional ambitions. For instance, since the end of the war, Turkey, alongside Azerbaijan, has been pushing for the construction of a transport link between Azerbaijan and Turkey via southern Armenia that could solidify Ankara’s transport connection with the South Caucasus and, at the same time, boost the region’s geo-economic importance, something that largely attracts Azerbaijan as well.

Iran could gain more than any side of the initiative. Tehran was largely absent in the war and did not gain a new footing in the South Caucasus like Turkey and Russia. Iran, however, remains the only country that has maintained regular diplomatic relations with all three countries in the South Caucasus. Armenian-Turkish relations have not yet been restored, and relations between Georgia and Russia have been tense since 2008. Hence, Iran would be the only participating country to obtain a leading position in the platform and host high-level meetings.

Moreover, Iran sits astride two important trans-continental transportation corridors: the North-South Corridor and the Persian Gulf–Black Sea Transit Corridor. The South Caucasus is a gateway for Iran, as a land route via Armenia and Georgia plays an essential role for Tehran’s economy, facilitating the main transport gateway for Iran to the Black Sea and on to Europe. In the aftermath of the 2020 Karabakh war, Baku took control of the territory critical for Iran’s land transportation routes. The Azerbaijani government has imposed a tough policy on entries into the territory via Armenia, furthering recent tensions that have developed between Tehran and Baku. In this situation, Tehran’s 3+3 cooperation plan for the South Caucasus region could combine these two important and strategic transit corridors. Tehran would warm tensions with Azerbaijan and guarantee safe passage of its trucks headed towards Armenia. Through developing trans-border rail networks under the framework of a six-state initiative, Iran could boost its importance as one of the major regional players.

Cautious Georgia and Armenia

Although Azerbaijan has expressed support for the proposed initiatives put forth by Iran and Turkey, Georgia and Armenia have shown reluctance. Both initiatives are similar in their form and content, especially when it comes to members states and major areas of cooperation: economy and transport.

Armenia has serious concerns due to the unfavourable outcome of the Karabakh conflict and its difficulty to absorb a new reality. The peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been fragile since the end of the war. Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has recognized that cooperating with Azerbaijan and Turkey would benefit Yerevan and even showed preparedness to normalize relations with Turkey, no tangible results have been achieved in this regard yet. On the contrary, post-war border tensions between Baku and Yerevan have further undermined peace prospects between the two countries, deepening the sense of insecurity in Yerevan. Concerns in Yerevan have been exacerbated by the continued refusal of Azerbaijan to release Armenian prisoners, and reports of the torture and death of Armenians while in Azeri custody.

A substantial issue for Yerevan is the interpretation of Article 9 of the November 2020 Karabakh war ceasefire agreement. The Azerbaijani side believes the document gives it the right to establish an overland transit corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via southern Armenia’s Syunik province, what Azerbaijan refers to as the Zangezur corridor. Nevertheless, the Armenian side interprets the reference to the term ‘corridor’ as referring only to the Lachin corridor, a narrow strip which connects Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the situation has become even more strained after several comments from Azerbaijani officials that southern regions of Armenia used to be the “ancestral land” of Azerbaijanis, which have slowed down the peacebuilding processes.

The initiative is even more concerning for Georgia as it is inherently incompatible with the country’s national interests. Russia, which is envisaged as one of the members of the platform, still occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia, accounting for 20 percent of Georgia’s internationally recognised territory. For more than a decade, Russian occupying forces have demarcated along, and allegedly beyond, the administrative lines between Georgia and occupied territories, which is referred to as ‘illegal borderization’. Hence, it is implausible that Georgia would join a platform that includes Russia as a member. Georgian government officials have stated it would be difficult to take part in any regional body with Russia unless Moscow ends its occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “We have reiterated our position that it would be hard to cooperate with the occupier [Russia] in this framework, as we do not see any progress with regard to de-occupation. It is hard to talk about any kind of infrastructure projects,” stated Georgian Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani. Strikingly, he also underlined the importance of Georgia’s participation in regional initiatives to “not to fall behind the developing processes in the region” and to maintain the country’s important role in the region. However, considering the public outrage that followed the Foreign Minister’s announcement, it is dubious that Georgia would consider becoming a member of the initiative.

Tbilisi could also take concern over new transport corridors that could bypass Georgia. The construction and restoration of railway and land routes across the region as provided for by the January trilateral agreement between Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan has envisioned a new transit reality for the South Caucasus. Armenia could acquire a new transit function, while Azerbaijan would have the opportunity to further diversify its transport connections with global markets. Some Georgian experts believe that new transit routes could downgrade Georgia’s regional transit role.

In the meantime, concerns in Georgia grow as the European Union and United States continue to maintain a minimal presence in the South Caucasus. Tbilisi is eager to deepen its integration in European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially following the 2008 war with Russia. Since then, around 80 percent of Georgia’s population has expressed support for Georgia’s integration into the European Union and NATO; Russia has been considered the biggest threat by the majority of the population. In light of these realities, it is unlikely that Georgia would seek to join an alliance that could detract from its prior ambitions.