When the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefire Agreement went into effect on November 10, 2020, several existing international laws were reaffirmed. Since the beginning of occupation in the early 1990s, international law has stated that Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven surrounding territories are an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. When Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed the agreement, they agreed to this simple fact: Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijan.

While some parts of Nagorno-Karabakh remain populated with ethnic Armenians, Azerbaijan has largely regained control of its territory. From the beginning of the signing of the peace agreement, one of the priorities has been to rebuild all of the infrastructure and property that has been destroyed. With the assistance of deployed Russian peacekeeping forces, the ninth clause of the agreement stipulates that Armenia must guarantee the safety of transportation links between Azerbaijan and its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. On the other hand, Azerbaijan became responsible for facilitating unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and cargo. 

As stated in the agreement, Russia’s role should be limited to monitoring the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Republic of Azerbaijan’s territory, maintaining a peacekeeping center for monitoring the ceasefire, including a center jointly-controlled with Turkey, and for maintaining the security of transport routes. 

Previously, it was announced that more than 50,000 ethnic-Armenians had returned from the Republic of Armenia to the Armenian held parts of Nagorno-Karabakh. The population of Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh before the 2020 war was approximately 150,000, with slightly more than 50,000 residents living in the capital city of Stepanakert (known as Khankendi, de-jure). 

After this large group of ethnic Armenians had migrated back to the lands where they were residing before the 2020 war, it was announced that Russia had taken on an additional responsibility. Beginning in early February, all visitors to Nagorno-Karabakh would have to receive permission from Russian peacekeepers before entering. On February 8, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the de-facto government existing within the region stated that this process was being introduced for ‘security purposes.’

Authorities of the regime occupying part of Nagorno-Karabakh attribute the need for this additional layer of security to a concept that was promoted during wartime: the use of mercenary soldiers. Armenia repeatedly reported that Azerbaijan, with the help of Turkey, employed Syrian and other mercenaries during the war, although no evidence has shown this to be the case. In an interview with Armenian Public Radio, David Babayan, the Foreign Minister of the de-facto regime of Nagorno-Karabakh, stated that control by Russian peacekeepers was part of the ‘new reality in Karabakh.’

Nagorno-Karabakh has always been part of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and this fact was solidified under the trilateral agreement. Any argument that Nagorno-Karabakh should be independent or a separate entity governed by ethnic Armenians was immediately quashed with the peace agreement, as the Prime Minister of Armenia himself agreed to the terms and conditions that negate all claims to the territory. 

Azerbaijan maintains a ‘blacklist’ of foreigners who traveled to the occupied territories without permission before the 2020 war. Azerbaijan views any visit to its territories by crossing the border from Armenia as a violation of its immigration law; if one’s name is added to the blacklist, one can be banned from entering Azerbaijan for life. 

That being said, before the 2020 war, Azerbaijan saw monitoring who entered and exited the occupied territories as an important measure of national security. Now that Azerbaijan has liberated much of the previously occupied lands, it would be logical to assume that the Azerbaijani government would have greater control over the affairs of these territories. Instead, Russia has been handed an additional role outside of the agreement, leading many to question why Russian forces are being given the authority to operate in this capacity outside of the borders of the Russian Federation. 

Despite having a peace agreement that confirms the ownership of the territories, many questions remain. This is particularly apparent in the territories that were not liberated or returned to the Azerbaijani government as there has been no concrete decision on how to determine the operating status of the territories still held by ethnic Armenians. 

The Ukrainian government bans the Russian Sputnik V vaccine in hopes to limit Russian geopolitical leverage over the region. Meanwhile, the EU’s slow vaccine roll-out, disinformation, and internal challenges leave Ukraine without a concrete vaccine supply. 

Ukrainian authorities prohibited the registration and production of the Russian Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine on February 10^th. Officials expressed concern that Russian jabs are a form of “hybrid weapon against Ukraine.” Ukraine enforced the official ban shortly after approving the special vaccine registration law, which can inhibit approval of an individual vaccine, on January 29th. 

The Russian vaccine, controversially the first success in the vaccination race, has the highest percent of skepticism among Russians. The Levada Center, a polling organization, concluded that only 38 percent of surveyed Russians claimed they will be vaccinated. Russia also has a disproportionally low vaccination rate of 2 percent of the 146 million population. 

However, the Kremlin began an intense international vaccination campaign, planning to administer its version to Mexico, Hungary, Belarus, and others. Russian importers offered the African Union up to 300,000 doses. The New York Times reported that over 50 countries in Asia and Latin America ordered more than a billion Russian doses. Despite high demand, Russia is incapable of high-volume production of vaccines for export even if it ignores domestic vaccination needs. The European Union officials frequently express their distrust for Russia’s readiness to distribute the vaccine while Russian COVID-19 infection numbers surpass 4.1 million.  

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said in a TV interview on January 12th that Ukraine will not obtain Sputnik V even if the vaccine is internationally approved, calling it a “propaganda factor.” Kuleba said by accepting vaccines from an aggressor-state, Ukraine will contribute to the Russian narrative that Western states did not provide adequate assistance to Ukraine in a time of need.  

In the evaluation of Russian donorship, the charitable organization Oxfam reported that Russia often overestimates the scale of their humanitarian help abroad, providing only 51.6 million dollars in 2012 compared to U.S.’s 3,922.1 million. Oxfam noted that the Russian humanitarian agenda is motivated by a goal of becoming a ‘great power,’ erasing the history of receiving humanitarian help from the West and forming a forced relationship with the aid recipients. The organization highlights that Russia seeks to publicly demean countries accepting their offer. 

Alliance for Securing Democracy researcher Thomas Morley wrote that since last spring, Russia was no stranger to “mask diplomacy” or donation of medical goods for combatting COVID-19. On March 22, Russia sent military ‘specialists’ and supplies to Italy to portray the EU’s response to the outbreak as weak in the media. Reportedly only 20 percent of medical goods were effective. 

Last April, Russia also sent an AN-124 Russian military plane to New York full of protective equipment and ventilators. The Kremlin’s propaganda deemed Russian humanitarian help as an act of kindness until the Foreign Ministry in Moscow announced that the U.S. paid for the supplies. The U.S. sent back the Russian ventilators due to reports of the machines catching on fire in Russia. The U.S. also sent over 200 ventilators to Russia in May when the country’s COVID-19 cases skyrocketed.  

Pavil Kovtoniuk, head of the Health Economics Center in Kyiv warns that accepting Russian vaccines will further define the geopolitical vector towards Russia or the West. Kovtoniuk said although Ukraine only secured eight million doses of Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, opting for a Russian vaccine could inhibit any other Western vaccine supply. Currently, 13 EU member-states in Central Europe and the Baltics urged for immediate allocation of vaccines to Ukraine. Similarly, Moldova was able to procure Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines via Romania.  

By banning Russian vaccines, Ukraine retains leverage to petition the EU for vaccinations. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal called on the EU to supply Ukraine with Western jabs to combat Russian political influence in the region. Although many publications claim that Ukraine will be left without Russian and EU vaccines, there is no guarantee that Ukraine would receive Sputnik V faster given its slow production and distribution rates. Furthermore, Russia’s COVID-19 humanitarian campaigns to Italy and the U.S. confirm propaganda and espionage objectives alongside poor medical quality records.  

Sputnik V already inherently violates Ukrainian nationhood as it is allegedly administered in non-government-controlled regions of Luhansk and Donetsk and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Although the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), a Sputnik V vaccine sponsor abroad, claims that Donbas did not receive any dosages, self-proclaimed leader of Donetsk Denis Pushilin said the region receives new supplies daily. Russian occupation officials did confirm that residents of Crimea will be vaccinated. Ukrainians in Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as well as Moldovans in Transnistria are deprived of an opportunity to attain European vaccinations. 

It is also important to note the credibility of Ukrainian officials in procuring the Russian shot. Russia-leaning opposition leader Viktor Medvechuk petitioned the Ukrainian government to approve Sputnik V in January. The Ukrainian government recently sanctioned Medvechuk, who financially supports the pharmaceutical company Biolik, for his role in the proliferation of Russian disinformation through three TV channels. That he allegedly owns. The National Security and Defense Council and Ukraine’s state security service (SBU) is investigating Medvechuk for the alleged illegal sale of coal from non-government-controlled regions in Luhansk and the supposed privatization of the state PrykarpatZakhidtrans oil product pipeline.  

Vaccines are becoming a geopolitical weapon separating countries into regional and economic blocks. For Ukraine, Sputnik V bares no effectiveness despite recent studies proving 91.6 percent success. Instead, it is a way to uphold Ukrainian dignity on the international level and remain consistent in its foreign policy towards aggressor-states.  

Image Source: Pharmaceutical Technology 

In the, November 2020 Moldovan presidential election, the pro-Western/EU and anti-corruption candidate Maia Sandu widely defeated the incumbent pro-Russian Socialist candidate President Igor Dodon. This political upset was hailed by European and American news as a victory for Western forces in Moldova, Europe’s poorest country, and the host of the continent’s oldest frozen conflict. 

Shortly before her inauguration on December 24, Moldova’s Prime Minister Ion Chicu and his cabinet resigned. The decision was made after a discussion between Mr. Chicu and President Dodon on December 23. At the time, a vote of no-confidence in the government, which would have triggered snap parliamentary elections, was scheduled for December 23. By resigning, Mr. Chicu delayed the vote, strengthening the Parliament where President Dodon’s Socialist Party (PSRM) held a one-seat majority in the 101-seat Parliament in an unofficial alliance with the Shor Party. The snap elections are widely predicted to President Sandu’s Party for Action and Solidarity (PAS) the greatest number of seats (though ten short of a majority), followed by the PSRM.

With Prime Minister Ion Chicu’s resignation, President Sandu was required to nominate an interim prime minister from the former cabinet until a new prime minister could be chosen. She could then provide her own nominee for prime minister. If the parliament then failed twice to select a new prime minister, snap elections would have to be held. President Sandu nominated on January 27 the deputy head of the PAS, Natalia Gavrilita, for prime minister. The PAS announced it would not vote for President Sandu’s (or any) nominee so that snap elections could be held. On February 11, the parliament rejected Ms Gavrilita, who did not receive a single vote. They then voted for former Ambassador Marianna Durlesteanu, who received 54 of the 101 votes.

President Sandu renominated Ms Gavrilita hours after rejecting Ambassador Durlesteanu. While President Sandu’s decision was made in order to force another rejection of her candidate and thus trigger snap parliamentary elections to clear the path for her anti-corruption agenda, it may backfire. The PSRM, under Igor Dodon’s leadership, is now appealing her rejection of Ms Durlesteanu as prime minister to the Constitutional Court. This could lead the way for a parliamentary vote to suspend President Sandu from office and initiate a referendum regarding to revoke her mandate.

The PSRM has worked to create controversy for President Sandu, obstructing her efforts to govern. Prior to her inauguration, they with President Dodon, passed a package of eleventh-hour bills to transfer control of the Information and Security Service from the president to the parliament. The organization is responsible for state security, but also is the main government organ dedicated to fighting corruption, a key promise of President Sandu. The PSRM also blocked aid from the International Monetary Fund. 

Additionally, the PSRM voted for a bill to make Russian a state language. The official status of Russian is fraught with history in the majority-Romanian country. Only 14 percent of the population (excluding separatist Transnistria) speak Russian as their primary language, primarily in Gagauzia and Comrat, respectively home to the Turkish-speaking Christian Gagauz and Bulgarians. This Constitutional Court overturned the bill. 

All of the PSRM’s meddling comes amid Mr. Dodon’s recent family trip to Moscow, paid for by the Russian Embassy in Chisinau. While Mr. Dodon has said that he needed an official invitation to Moscow under current Covid-related restrictions (which was untrue), he failed to explain why the embassy paid for the trip. 

This trip seemed to confirm for analysts that the pro-Russian Dodon is in the pocket of Kremlin benefactors. Anatol Taranu, Moldova’s ambassador to Russia from 1993-1994, said that he “find[s] this gesture of the Russian Embassy in Chisinau as indicating that Moscow financially insures Dodon. It is not normal for a foreign state to buy plane tickets for a ruling party leader.” The timing of Mr. Dodon’s visit to Moscow, coinciding with the PSRM’s political offensive against President Sandu, seems to indicate Russia is behind efforts to overturn the 2020 Moldovan election.

The situation in Moldova is precarious, it’s recent pro-Western steps at risk of being erased by pro-Russian forces. The PSRM is calculating it can return to power and restore anti-Western, pro-Russian policies by blaming President Sandu for the problems they themselves created. The West cannot tolerate such anti-democratic behavior on its frontier. The Western countries should thus expand Russian and Romanian language broadcasting in Moldova to demonstrate the PSRM’s culpability in the current political crisis. Should the Kremlin succeed in ousting President Sandu, it is doubtful we will see another pro-Western government again in Moldova. 

On February 3rd, the non-profit All-Tatar Public Center’s chairman Farit Zakiyev began a hunger strike after Russian prosecutors labeled his cultural organization as extremist. On February 9th, a Russian court in Tatarstan’s city of Naberezhnye Chelny charged the Tatar writer and activist, Fauzia Bairamova, with inciting secession in a speech and ordered her to pay a fine of 30,000 rubles, or 400 dollars. Ms. Bairamova said her speech, written in Tatar, was mistranslated into Russian and pled not guilty. These actions are the Kremlin’s latest attacks on Tatar, and minority rights in Russia. 

Tatarstan, with its complex imperial history and, presents a special interest for Russian authorities. Kazan, Tatarstan’s capital, was the last seat of the Golden Horde which ruled Russia from the 13^th to 15^th centuries. Prosperous in the latter days of the Russian Empire, the Soviets sought to dilute their autonomy by drawing borders of making Tatars a minority in their eponymous republic. The Tatars, numbering 5.3 million (four percent of the Russian population) and the second largest ethnic group in Russia today, only gained a majority in Tatarstan in 2002. 

However, the Tatars were able to gain significant autonomy during the breakup of the Soviet Union when Moscow held a significantly weaker hand than it does today. At the time, a referendum revealed 61.4 percent of the population agreed Tatarstan was a sovereign state. While Chechnya chose secession and war, Tatarstan opted for greater autonomy within the new Russian Federation by signing a treaty with Moscow in 1994. The result was the Tatar Republic within the Russian Federation, which had jurisdiction over management of its natural resources, tax collection, judiciary, and even foreign economic relations. 

The power dynamic shifted when Russian President Vladimir Putin came to power. In 2002, President Putin signed a law enforcing the usage of the Cyrillic over the Latin alphabet (Tatarstan switched to the Latin script in 1999). While Kremlin renewed the 1994 treaty in 2005, Moscow also eliminated Tatar laws that contradicted federal law, and the ethnic composition of the Tatarstan legislature was changed at the expense of the Tatars. 

After the treaty renewal, President Putin continued to promote Russian culture over local ethnicities. In 2008, the Duma required high school exams to be conducted in Russian, leading to minority languages, like Tatar, being replaced by Russian as the language of instruction. In 2017, President Putin let lapse the treaty between Moscow and Kazan. This coincided with his declaration that it is “unacceptable to force a man to learn a language not his own,” or rather, to make a Russian learn a minority language. While previously ethnic mandated education to be conducted in the local language, the Russian federal government started pressuring local governments to abolish the local language requirements in the ethnic republics.

In October 2017, government prosecutors investigated Tatar schools to see if compulsory Tatar lessons had indeed been abolished. Prior to this, Tatar law required schools to teach in Tatar for six hours a week. The government followed the assault in February 2020, when they ordered school officials to halve the hours of optional lessons in Tatar from four hours a week to two. 

Religion may now be the last bastion of Tatar culture. Mosques have begun teaching courses on Tatar language and culture, even switching their services from Russian to Tatar. Kamil Samigullin, the Chief Mufti of Tatarstan, noted that while religion is indeed separate from the state, it is tied to the soul of the Tatar people. 

This synergy of Tatar culture and Islam is not new. In the 19^th century, the Volga Tatars entered a cultural renaissance in which the elites embraced a trade-oriented version of Islam, creating a merchant class and intellectual movement similar to the Jewish Bund. The Tsars even sent these merchants out to the empire’s Muslim provinces to spread their interpretation of Islam. With this history, it is reasonable to expect a peaceful interaction between culture and faith in Tatarstan.

Moscow’s attack on ethnic minorities has been seen before; it has attempted forcible assimilation for centuries, stopping when it met local resistance. And the further centralization of the Russian center over the ethnic others by Putin fits with his psychology, given his fear of another fragmentation along ethnic lines like that of the Soviet Union. However, the center will only find instability, not security, if it continues pushing russification on Tatarstan and the other ethnic territories.  

Image Source: TSAR Voyages

Europe’s frozen conflicts have two common factors: they are sustained by Russia and fall within the greater Black Sea region. The frozen conflicts’ nominal purpose is to prevent the countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova – from pursuing policies that would distance them from Moscow. Beyond this, Russia uses the conflicts to destabilize the Black Sea; and by exerting stress on the Black Sea, Russia can threaten the Balkan states, the European Union through Bulgaria and Romania. Additionally, Russia can challenge the United States by pressuring the NATO members on the Black Sea littoral. More importantly, the frozen conflicts themselves and their impact on the Black Sea assists Russia in its own self-definition as a Great Power. 

Russia’s encroachment on the Black Sea littoral began in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War when Russia gained control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s Black Sea advance reached its apogee in 2014 when Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, placing Russian forces in the heart of the Black Sea. While Russia has reinserted itself into the Black Sea, its naval capabilities remain limited. Following the Soviet collapse in 1991, Russia received a truncated Black Sea Navy.

The navy was largely neglected for the next 25 years until Moscow prioritized revitalizing the Black Sea Fleet in the State Armaments Program for 2011-2020 following its poor performance in the Russo-Georgian War, receiving six new diesel attack submarines, three frigates, and other smaller surface vessels (with delays). This has continued for the State Armaments Program for 2027, which calls for five corvettes and up to 12 small missile-ships. 

Crimea is key to Russia’s Black Sea security framework and its A2/AD systems. While Russia no longer possesses the means to effectively control the Black Sea, the Crimean annexation allowed Russia to cover the entirety of the Black Sea with A2/AD systems. Russia placed its Bastion and Bal coastal missile defense systems in Crimea, with the Bastion system able to hit targets in the Dardanelles Strait and in Ukrainian, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Turkish ports. Additionally, Russia has deployed nuclear-capable Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers capable of reaching all of Western Europe with their cruise missiles. 

The seizure of Crimea also enabled Russia to turn the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake. Following the annexation, Russia built a bridge across the Kerch Strait at a height preventing Ukrainian commercial ships from passing through to the Black Sea. Beyond this, Russia has harassed and captured Ukrainian navy ships operating in Ukrainian waters in the Kerch Strait. This fits Russia’s strategy of using the frozen conflicts to pressure Ukraine and create instability in the Black Sea – in 2017, GRU operatives were found to be recruiting fighters from the Moldovan region of Gagauzia to fight in the Donbas.

The other Black Sea states have not sat idly while Russia bolsters its position. Romania, once an allied fleet to the USSR, is a leading voice prioritizing the Black Sea within NATO; its recent 2020 national security strategy focusing on Black Sea stability. Romania has called for naval exercises in the Black Sea and purchased seven Patriot missile defense systems in 2017, and bought an additional three in 2018. The United States has established an air base in Romania, with Deveselu hosting an Aegis Ashore Ballistic Defense system. 

Turkey has started to actively support Ukraine. In a February 2020 visit to Ukraine, Turkish President Erdogan declared that Turkey would not and does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea. Additionally, Turkey would assist in funding Ukraine’s military to the tune of 33.4 million U.S. dollars. Turkey has also sold to Ukraine its Bayraktar TB2 unmanned armed drones – Azerbaijan used these drones, in conjunction with Israeli Harop suicide drones, to destroy Russian-made Armenian tanks, trucks, artillery, and S-300 SAM systems. In 2019, Ukraine purchased six Bayraktars and announced in September 2020 its decision to purchase an additional 48 for use in the Donbas. 

Russia has used the frozen conflicts in Ukraine, Moldova, and in the South Caucasus to sow instability and expand its power in the Black Sea region. The frozen conflicts are not just Russian violations of the norms of state sovereignty but constitute security threats against the European Union and NATO. While the United States has deployed navy vessels into the Black Sea, cooperation with local partners is necessary. The United States should work Romania in its efforts to integrate Moldova into the European Union, while assisting Romania in developing hard power capabilities in the Black Sea. Similarly, the United States should work with Turkey in providing Ukraine the assistance it needs to continue standing against Russian aggression.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy issued a five-year ban on three pro-Russian channels on February 2nd. Although the United States embassy and Ukrainian journalists welcomed this move, the ban carries greater domestic and geopolitical implications.

Zelenskyy sanctioned channels 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and Zik TV following a decision made by the National Security and Defense Council. The Council advised the termination of broadcasting licensing for three channels legally belonging to Taras Kozak, a member of the pro-Russian Opposition Platform For Life (OPZZh) party. Kozak, who owns two houses in annexed Crimea, is linked to the alleged owner of the three channels, Viktor Medvedchuk. Medvedchuk is a Ukrainian oligarch, the head OPZZh’s political council, and has personal ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The pro-Kremlin politician denies any media ownership in Ukraine.

The Minister of Culture and Information Policy, Oleksandr Tkachenko further called on YouTube to remove the joint “Stop Censorship of 112 Ukraine, NewsOne and ZIK TV” channel. Roman Lozinsky, a member of the Holos party pushed for the exclusion of politicians, journalists, and cameramen affiliated with the banned channels. 

112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK TV continue to have a large online presence, where they equate Zelenskyy’s decision to ban them with the kind of media censorship seen in North Korea. The channels accused the Ukrainian government of restricting freedom of the press and violating journalists’ constitutional rights. Russian Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe Ivan Soltanovsky criticized Ukrainians and Latvians, the latter banning five Russian channels back on February 1st, for “mass human rights violations.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described the Ukrainian decision, and the West’s subsequent support, as hypocritical, and in contradiction with international norms regarding freedom of press.

European Union Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell expressed concern for Ukraine’s abrupt termination of the channels. He noted that although Ukraine is defending its “territorial integrity and national security” against Russian “manipulation,” the act might have negative repercussions on freedom in Ukrainian media.

In a joint statement, Ukrainian civil society organizations said Ukraine did not violate press rights, citing the Office of the President of Ukraine’s information about the foreign financing of the channels. The press release accused the channels of using anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western rhetoric, supporting Russian aggression in Donbas, unlawfully firing journalists with different political views, and being a political platform for OPZZh.

Unlike the EU, the U.S. Embassy publicly backed Ukraine stating that those efforts are justified given “Russia’s malign influence” over Ukrainian media.

Starting in 2014, Ukraine has embraced a “cultural revival” trajectory as a form of national security. For example, radio stations adopted a Ukrainian-language quota, which boosted the Ukrainian music industry. In August 2014, Ukraine banned 14 Russian television channels such as Russia Today and Life News. The Russian Foreign Ministry also has issued a statement noting that the West and Ukraine blatantly support censorship. Furthermore, Ukraine terminated the broadcast of Russian opposition channel Dozhd (TV Rain) following their remarks on Russian legal possession of Crimea.

Atlantic Council Nonresident Fellow Taras Kuzio highlights that the ban of three channels was significant for Ukrainian national sovereignty as OPZZh has growing ratings. Kuzio notes that Zelenskyy’s ban came at a perfect time when the U.S. President Joe Biden began to shape his foreign policies. Appealing to the U.S. could secure more financial or military support for Ukraine.  

Moldova is a prime example of why Russian channels pose a political threat in Eastern European countries. Moldova’s ex-President Igor Dodon, like Ukrainian Taras Kozak, was allegedly closely affiliated with Accent TV. The television network allowed for broadcasting Russia’s main channel, Perviy Kanal. Russian channels are preferred among 31 percent of Moldovans, which imposes foreign influence over Moldovan elections.

112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and Zik TV censor anti-Kremlin news making them not a reliable source of information. The Institute of Mass Media in Ukraine (IMI) found that alleged Medvedchuk channels refrained from covering Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s investigation into his poisoners. A similar approach was echoed by Kremlin-sponsored channels. 

112 Ukraine could be potentially destabilizing for Ukrainian image in the West. The channel’s website is among the first English-language news outlets that appear when searching for “Ukraine news.” Therefore, their narratives can affect both eastern regions of Ukraine and the public abroad. 

112 Ukraine online publication also has a limited number of ads and no subscriptions. Its ad-free platform may signify that the channel obtains financial support from other sources. Ukraine will have to prove that the channels received Russian funding from abroad to invalidate claims of censorship and violations of freedom of the press.

Many publications claim that the termination of the three channels in addition to Zelenskyy’s recent Axios interview, where he rhetorically asks Biden why Ukraine is still not part of NATO, signifies a bold move towards the West. His traditionally centrist position, interested in normalizing relations with Russia, has won him overwhelming support across the country. However, it is important to note that “nationalist” ex-President Petro Poroshenko did not ban these TV stations, perhaps fearing the damage to his presidential ratings. Presidential elections in 2024 may reflect what Zelensky’s recent switch in alignment might imply for his reelection.

Image Source: DW

Andriy Yermak, the head of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s office announced on January 28 that Ukraine has begun a criminal investigation into attempts to interfere with the American 2020 presidential election. The announcement comes following the State Department’s January 11 sanctions on Ukrainian individuals and organizations; among them Ukrainian Parliamentarian (and member of President Zelensky’s ruling Servant of the People Party) Oleksandr Dubinsky. The targeted individuals and organizations were sanctioned for their roles in interfering with the 2020 U.S. presidential election, especially in attempting to find or create compromising material, kompromat, on Hunter Biden, son of President Biden. While Mr. Dubinsky denies wrongdoing, the Servant of the People Party voted on February 2 to expel Mr. Dubinsky from its ranks.

The investigation launched by Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation is the latest chapter of Russia’s disinformation campaign against the United States and Europe; a saga in which Ukraine features prominently. The narrative that Ukraine, not Russia, is responsible for the disinformation campaign and election interference is itself a goal of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy. 

Former senior White House official Dr. Fiona Hill testified to this in November 2019 during the House Impeachment hearings. The U.S. intelligence community has largely agreed with Dr. Hill’s assessment, stating that Russia has engaged in a years-long attempt to frame Ukraine for its hacking of the 2016 elections and subsequent disinformation and election interference. This strategy of falsely accusing other groups and countries of doing what it itself had done fits within Russia’s history, dating from the earliest days of the Soviet Union. 

While Russia is the primary disinformation peddler, Ukrainians too have been involved in the disinformation campaigns against the West. But those who did, like the Ukrainian-born oligarch Oleg Deripaska, almost always have close ties to Russian President Putin and the Kremlin. Beyond Mr. Deripaska (who held close ties with Paul Manafort) and Mr. Dubinsky, the other major Ukrainian figure involved in U.S. election interference is Andrii Derkach, a close associate of Rudy Giuliani. In September 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Mr. Derkach for attempting to interfere with the 2020 election, describing him as a decade-long Russian agent within Ukraine. Like Mr. Dubinsky, Mr. Derkach also attempted to find kompromat on Hunter Biden.

The majority of Russian social and regular media disinformation comes from Russia in the guise of Moscow-based think tanks such as Katehon and news organizations like RT and Tass. However, Russia has used the conflicts it created in Ukraine to create additional fake news proxies. Among the most prominent organizations was News Front, which according to the U.S. State Department is a Crimea-based disinformation outlet that had ties to the Kremlin and Russian security services. The organization was registered with Roskomnadzor (Russia’s governmental body that oversees mass media) in June 2015. Operating with multiple languages, the organization trafficked disinformation and conspiracy theories ranging from the Covid-19 pandemic being a U.S. bioweapon to Ukraine becoming a colony of the International Monetary Fund. Due to widespread disinformation practices, Twitter banned the organization’s accounts and Facebook took down all but three of its pages. 

Russia only gains from U.S. officials and Western populations seeing Ukraine as the source of the disinformation campaign. The most obvious benefit is that the blame is deflected from Russia onto Ukraine, with Kyiv appearing at best as unable to control nefarious oligarchic forces within its borders and at worst as an enemy of the West. 

Another benefit is cultural. President Putin and other Russian nationalists have long argued that there is no such thing as a Ukrainian (or, for that matter, Belarusian) people distinct from the Russian nation. For the Russian nationalists both in and out of the Russian government, Ukraine belongs to the ‘Russian World.’ From the Kremlin towers, they see the dispute with Kyiv as a domestic, not an international, matter. By clothing Russian disinformation in Ukrainian garb, Moscow subtly influences Western audiences into believing this ‘Russian World’ narrative, where Ukraine aligns with Moscow, instead of pursuing a path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. 

As Kyiv investigates Ukrainian sources of interference in the U.S. 2020 presidential election, it is important to guard against Russian attempts to use this investigation to deflect blame. But even more importantly, the United States needs to bolster its own defenses against misinformation and resecure the election process.

Image Source: NBC News

Following the outbreak of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war on September 27, ethnic Armenians residing inside of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh region mobilized. In a few short weeks, Nagorno-Karabakh’s capitol Khankendi, referred to as Stepanakert by ethnic Armenians, transformed from a city of more than 50,000 to a ghost town.  

Approximately 150,000 ethnic Armenians lived in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding occupied regions before the beginning of the war. By October 7, the Nagorno-Karabakh regime’s Ombudsman Artak Beglaryan estimated that 70,000-75,000 ethnic Armenians had been displaced, and many were being evacuated to Yerevan, the capitol of the Republic of Armenia.  

After the signing of the November trilateral peace agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, a clear procedure was established for ethnic Armenians to vacate the territories liberated by Azerbaijan during the war. Under the Sixth Article of the agreement, Armenia was to return the Kalbajar District to Azerbaijan by November 15 (later extended to November 25) and the Lachin District by December 1.  

International media provided widespread coverage of the return of the Kalbajar district to Azerbaijan. In this handoff, ethnic Armenians burned down their homes, slaughtered livestock, and razed entire plots of forests before beginning their exodus to Armenia. With the return of Kalbajar and Lachin to Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan cooperated with Russian peacekeepers and ensured the safety and security of ethnic Armenians.  

While international media was focused on the departure of ethnic Armenians from lands internationally recognized as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan has demonstrated full compliance with additional aspects of the trilateral agreement as well. By late December, approximately 43,000 Armenians had returned to the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh retained by ethnic Armenians with the signing of the peace agreement. By late January 2021, this number surpassed 50,000 civilians.  

While the population of ethnic Armenians within the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan are still not at their pre-war levels, approximately one-third of the population has returned in less than three months since the settlement of the conflict.  

The same cannot be said for the Azerbaijani IDPs (internally displaced people). After thirty years of Armenian occupation, the future remains uncertain for the displaced Azerbaijanis and their families. According to a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Azerbaijan has one of the highest populations of IDPs globally, with an estimated one million individuals displaced by conflict during the early 1990s.  

Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 war gave a sense of hope to the refugees who have been unable to return home for the past thirty years. The resolution of the conflict and partial restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is only the first step, and for many reasons, the refugees’ displacement will unfortunately continue for many years to come.  

During the thirty years of occupation, entire cities were leveled by ethnic Armenians. A prime example of this destruction is the city of Ağdam. What was once a city home to approximately 40,000 Azerbaijanis and countless cultural sites, including the Ağdam mosque and Soviet-era Bread Museum, became known as the ‘Hiroshima of the Caucasus’ due to its complete obliteration. 

Ağdam is only one example of this annihilation. The liberated territories are in no condition to support the refugees who once called this home. Agricultural lands have been plundered and infrastructure is in disrepair. Lands that appear to be usable are often times not; due to extensive mining efforts, the Azerbaijani army faces an uphill battle with demining operations. In consideration of all of these factors, the Azerbaijani government is currently conducting a series of inventories on the extent of the damages in order to calculate the amount of money needed for reconstruction efforts.  

Although a timeline for permanent resettlement is still unavailable, the Azerbaijani government is taking steps to provide a sense of resolve for its IDPs. The inventories of damages will lay the foundation for the Azerbaijani to seek investment from the international community in reconstruction efforts. It will also give the government of Azerbaijan a valid and legitimate platform to seek restitution from the Armenian government in the international legal system, especially since the Armenian Prime Minister signed the agreement which implicates Armenia as an occupying force in the internationally-recognized territories of Azerbaijan. 

Diplomatic actions and lawsuits may prove successful in the long term for restoring rights and properties to the displaced, but the Azerbaijani government has also recognized the importance of offering short-term guarantees as well. After the cessation of hostilities, Azerbaijan’s Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Fuad Huseynov affirmed that refugees would not lose their protections. According to Huseynov, the Azerbaijani government will continue to provide social assistance and social protection for IDPs until three years after they return to their native lands.  

Azerbaijani IDPs may not see tangible results immediately and it will likely be many years before families are able to return to territories with restored infrastructure, demined lands, and quality housing. However, in the past three months since the end of the conflict, the Azerbaijani government has taken a number of steps to establish a foundation for refugees to return home. Moving forward, the international community should provide support to Azerbaijan, not only financially, but within the rule of law, to ensure that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is secure and to reduce the chances of any further displacement.  

Image Source: Azerbaijani Refugees from Karabakh  

After a globally known incident of the poisoning of Russia’s opposition leader Alexei Navalny in August of 2020 with the nerve agent Novichok and his survival, Navalny has been in the center of attention. He has blamed the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin along with Russia’s FSB for his poisoning. Upon his arrival in Russia on January 17^th he was detained at the border and placed in a detention center in Moscow. A few days later his team published a YouTube video on his channel titled “A Palace for Putin: The Story of the Biggest Bribe” which caused mass protests across Russia in support of Navalny’s investigation. 

Belarus, Russia’s Soviet brother has been in turmoil since August, when President Alexander Lukashenko, who’s been claimed as a dictator for being in power for 26 years held another round of unfair elections that kept his regime alive. The protests became of international recognition because of OMON’s (Belarus’ riot police) ill-treatment of protestors by torture and detention at. The protests have continued for about five months but have reduced in size due to winter conditions and the brutal oppression of the riot police. 

It is widely known the Lukashenko and Putin have been very close allies with occasional disagreements that are always quickly forgotten about. But in terms of leadership many people compare them to be alike. Both have been in power for many years, both have held unfair elections, and both have opposition that has been scared to speak out or has been silenced by oppression. This was both the case with Navalny and Tsikhanouskaya.

Tsikhanouskaya was put out as an opposition leader soon after her husband, Sergei , a Belarusian activist, spoke out against Lukashenko and was arrested due to his announcement of wanting to partake in the 2020 Presidential Elections. After his arrest, Tsikhanouskaya decided to run in the elections in order to bring the people of Belarus closer together and have a voice against the regime. This ended with her having to flee the country after falsified election results in favor of Lukashenko. The European Union and the United States have both supported Tsikhanouskaya and have not recognized these results. In result, Belarus broke out in protests, citing that Tsikhanouskaya is their rightfully chosen leader. 

Navalny, who was poisoned using a chemical weapon that Russia has claimed it no longer has, has blamed Putin and the FSB for this doing. Investigations have been opened, but no verdict has been reached. After the failed assassination attempt and his recovery in Germany, Navalny still wanted to return to Russia. He was detained at passport control upon entry to Russia. The basis of his arrest was leaving the country on a previous probation, even though he was in a coma when he was transported to Germany and did not have a say. A few days after the arrest, his team released a documentary about Putin and a castle he built with bribes on the Black Sea near Gelendzhik. The video has accumulated about 80 million views on YouTube and has caused mass protests around Russia at the end of January. 

Russia and Belarus have been so close in their regimes over the last twenty years and have recently seen the largest protestions in the 21^st century. Navalny and Tsikhanouskaya are both trying to lead their countries to a democracy. Even with Navalny’s detention, his non-governmental organization, Anti-Corruption Foundation, have managed to lead theseprotests through-out the country. Tsikhanouskaya, who is in exile in Europe, still leads and organizes protests from outside the borders of Belarus. Both protests have grasped much attention due to  OMON, the riot police, that exists in both Russia and Belarus, and has demonstrated brutality and torture towards the citizens. The leaders of the two countries have also stated that both Navalny and Tsikhanouskaya are funded by the Western leaders in order to spread the west’s influence in a form of propaganda. Both leaders are denying that their citizens have any basis for negativity towards their regimes and wanting change. 

The similarity that both situations face is credited towards the opposition leaders: Navalny and Tsikhanouskaya. The citizens have found a unification of their countries in the form of these people. When the citizens see that these leaders are there and they place this information for the whole world to see, the people are no longer scared to go out and make their mind be heard. The people found faces that represent themselves, but also have the platform to make their voices heard at the governmental and regime levels. It is because of these two leaders that the countries were able to mobilize such large protests. 

Image Source: Atlantic Council

Ukrainian and Hungarian Foreign Ministers, Dmytro Kuleba and Peter Szijjarto will meet on February 3^rd to normalize the situation in the Transcarpathian region. 

Kuebla and Szijjiarto will discuss the minority and education rights of 150,000 ethnic Hungarians residing in the Ukrainian Zakarpattia oblast. The region formally belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire until its collapse following the end of World War I. The area on the Ukrainian-Hungarian border inherited Hungarian primary and secondary schools, where Hungarian remains the dominant language of instruction. As a result, the Jamestown Foundation reports that Transcarpathian students perform the lowest on Ukrainian state examinations.  

Szijjarto said Ukrainian “patriots” allegedly threatened Hungarian diplomats aiming to prevent the upcoming diplomatic discussions in Kyiv. Kuebla stated that Ukrainian police are investigating the incident but alleged that foreign actors are responsible for threats against the Hungarian delegation. 

The relationship between Kyiv and Budapest originally soured in 2017 when President Petro Poroshenko’s administration introduced the controversial language law prohibiting school instruction in minority languages such as Russian, Hungarian, Belarusian, and Polish. Although the law was targeted at the widely-used Russian language, Budapest responded by blocking Ukrainian aspirations to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Hungarian officials also extended Hungarian passports to Zakarpattia region, violating the Ukrainian prohibition of dual citizenship. Shortly after, alleged Ukrainian nationalists vandalized the Hungarian Culture Center. Without any proof, Poroshenko claimed Russian involvement in the incident.

In 2020, the Siurte United Territorial Community played the Hungarian national anthem during elections for the Ukrainian local government. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) launched an investigation under suspicion of Hungarian agitation for the Party of Hungarians in the Ukrainian election. On November 30^th, SBU raided the Hungarian Cultural Association in Transcarpathia and other foundations investigating foreign sponsorship and potential damage to Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. 

Szijjarto criticized Ukrainian raids, undermining Kyiv’s intentions to join NATO. Hungarian diplomats also requested the immediate presence of the Ukrainian ambassador. On December 12^th, Hungary requested expansion of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine to Zakarpatiia. 

Hungarian officials assure that Hungary will not disturb the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine or stain its relations with NATO. They demand a provision for the national minority law under the advisory of the Council of Europe. Additionally, they seek to invest 56.5 million dollars into Transcarpathian infrastructure. In turn, Ukraine reinstates that it will not push assimilation onto ethnic Hungarians but seeks to supplement Hungarian education with the Ukrainian language necessary for college and career development.

However, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban contradicts the official state position. In 2014, Orban called for Transcarpathian autonomy while pro-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk compromised the Ukrainian national sovereignty. Orban opposes EU sanctions against Russia, supporting purchases of Russian gas, oil, and supply of controversial Sputnik V vaccine. He stated that Hungary will join the Russian TurkStream gas pipeline. Russia also assists Orban’s government in developing a nuclear power plant.

Additionally, Hungarian passport distribution to Ukrainian citizens resembles Russia’s “passportization” policy, a term coined by Toru Nagashima. In the early 2000s, Russia administered passports to residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As a result, Russians were able to claim that they were defending Russian citizens and intervene in Georgian affairs. A similar “passportization” strategy encompasses residents of Transnistria, Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk.

Unlike Russia, Hungary does not occupy Ukrainian territory and operates by EU and NATO principles. However, “passportization” could lead to separatism or influence local governance. With the most recent language law requiring all services to be provided in Ukrainian unless otherwise asked, the law was scrutinized by Russian media outlets for “discrimination” against minority languages. Similar disinformation could reach ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia. Most importantly, it can lead to brain drain. Ukraine ranks 129 out of 137 countries in its ability to keep talented citizens from leaving the country.

Kuleba noted that both sides must rid themselves of suspicions to achieve a successful discussion next Wednesday. Ukrainian FM said at a press conference, “There is no reason to believe that Ukrainian Hungarians are prone to separatism, just as there is no reason to believe that the Ukrainian state wants to cause any harm to the Ukrainian Hungarians of Zakarpattia.”

Image Source: UNIAN

On August 20, 2020, Alexei Navalny, known by many as an anti-corruption activist, became violently ill during a flight from Tomsk to Moscow. He was taken to a hospital in Omsk after an emergency landing, put into a coma, and evacuated to a hospital in Berlin, Germany for treatment. Several laboratories, including facilities in Sweden and France, confirmed that Navalny had been poisoned with a Novichok nerve agent. 

After spending several months recovering in Germany, Navalny launched an Internet-expose of his alleged poisoners by calling one of the FSB operatives. Soon after, Navalny returned to Moscow where he was detained upon arrival at the Sheremetyevo International Airport. Navalny was charged in absentia for having broken the terms of a prior suspended prison sentence, which he describes as politically motivated. 

Six days after Navalny’s most recent arrests, thousands of protesters across 11 time zones took to the street to show their support. State media warned of heavy police presence and advised protesters to stay away. Protests were organized in the Far East, across Siberia, and in Russia’s most populous cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg. By the end of the day on January 23, more than 3,000 arrests were made in more than 100 cities across Russia, according to OVD-Info activist group, making the demonstrations the largest public display of opposition to authorities in several years. 

Navalny began his political career by joining the liberal opposition party Yabloko. The party dismissed him for his participation in the anti-Putin Russian March in 2007 and for controversial anti-immigration views. Navalny also unexpectedly secured 27 percent of the vote in the 2013 Moscow mayor elections against a pro-Kremlin candidate equipt with the backing of state media. He founded the Anti-Corruption Foundation and launched several journalistic investigations on the Russian government. The opposition leader is largely present online as he is deplatformed on all traditional media outlets.

While Navalny is widely referred to as an opposition leader in Russia and hailed by the West for his dedication to anti-corruption efforts against Kremlin authorities, his stance does not equate to a pro-western outlook.

Neighboring Ukrainians are hesitant to take the streets in defense of Navalny. The opposition leader often undermined cultural differences between Russians and Ukrainians, referring to two nations as “one people.” Following Putin’s annexation of Crimea, in an interview where he was asked what he would do as President, Navalny announced that he would not return the peninsula to Ukraine. When the Ukrainian Orthodox Church separated from the Russian Orthodox Church, Navalny criticized Putin for not preserving the 300-year-old Russian history, rather than praising Ukraine for exercising its national rights. Beyond Ukraine, Navalny has expressed support for the breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 War. 

The Institute of Mass Media in Ukraine (IMI) also found that many large Ukrainian outlets such as 112.ua, 5.ua, and Intefax refrained from reporting on Navalny’s poisoning investigation. IMI alleges that Russia-backed channels in Ukraine were prohibited from airing Putin’s involvement in the attempted murder. IMI interprets the silence on independent and nationalist Ukrainian channels regarding Navalny as news about “just another Kremlin opponent.” In other words, Ukrainians are either too accustomed to bad news about Russian opposition leaders or Navalny’s figure is not as significant to Ukraine’s struggle against Russian interference and occupation of Crimea.

Some Ukrainian officials warn that Navalny’s poisoning and imprisonment can distract the international community from his backing of Russian imperialist approach in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. However, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba encouraged the international community to take a harsh stance against Putin’s regimes. 

On January 26th, the U.S. President Joe Biden discussed Navalny’s poisoning and subsequent arrest in his first phone call with the Kremlin. Although no details of the conversation are available to the public, White House press secretary Jen Psaki reaffirmed Biden’s interest in holding a firm stance against Russia.

Similarly, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell will meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to discuss the Navalny incident of February 4-6. On top of Navalny’s detainment, Borrell seeks to discuss Russia’s actions against Ukraine. Navalny’s case, alongside the change in the American administration, could bring further exposure to the issue of Ukrainian national sovereignty, despite Ukraine’s silence on the politics of Navalny’s detainment.

On August 11, 2008, one day prior to the signing of a ceasefire agreement ending the hostilities between Russia and Georgia in the 2008 Russo-Georgia war, the Georgian government submitted a lawsuit to the European Court of Human Rights. After more than a decade of consideration, the ECHR announced its ruling.  

While the Georgian government submitted its case to the ECHR in 2008, it was not accepted by the Court for consideration until December 2013. Following several years of deliberation, the Court released the judgement on January 21, 2021: Russia violated numerous articles of the European Convention on Human Rights during the 2008 conflict.  

In addition to not cooperating with the ECHR and its investigation, the Court ruled that Russia violated six articles of the European Convention on Human Rights: the right to life (Article 2); prohibition of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3); the right to liberty and security (Article 5); the right to protection of private and family life (Article 8); protection of property (Article 1, Additional Protocol 1); and freedom of movement (Article 2, Protocol 4). The court also concluded that Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (South Ossetia) are integral parts of Georgia, and that in controlling these regions, Russia is responsible for the violation of human rights of Georgian citizens.  

Because of this ruling, Georgia is entitled to compensation from Russia. Russia and Georgia now have one year to present their proposals for settlement. Although the ruling was in favor of Georgia, the Georgian government should not expect a quick and easy settlement process. In January 2019, the ECHR ruled in favor of Georgia in another case and ordered Russia to pay Georgia 10 million Euros for damages suffered by more than 1,500 Georgian nationals. Russia has yet to pay the settlement determined by the Court.  

While Georgian officials consider the ruling of the case to be an ‘enormous victory’ the results did not sit well with the other side of the lawsuit. After the ruling was announced, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stated that “Russia proactively supports South Ossetia in its efforts to build a modern democratic state.” Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova also issued a tweet, stating that, “the friendly relations between Russia and South Ossetia are based on the principles of alliance and integration and are not subject to momentary considerations.” 

The authorities of South Ossetia, Georgia’s occupied Tskhinvali region, also did not react well to the verdict. Anatoly Bibilov, the President of South Ossetia, called the ruling “biased, politicized and has nothing to do with real facts.” One day after the ruling, Bibilov conducted an extensive interview with local reporters. According to Bibilov, the ECHR’s ruling was one-sided and “had little in common with true events and facts, dictated by the anti-Russian political course of the collective West, which has not for a moment thought about condemning the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and the crimes of the Georgian military.” 

Georgia’s victory in this case did not bode well for Russia and Russia-backed South Ossetia, possibly hindering communications between officials in a context in which many diplomatic efforts have already been postponed as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Despite the potential setbacks, in terms of cross-border communication, the ruling lays the foundation for further successes for Georgia in international courts.  

Following the recent decision, Georgian Public Defender Nino Lomjaria stated that the ECHR ruling ‘is of great legal and historic importance for Georgia’ and added that the court’s decision will likely influence the International Criminal Court’s investigation of the 2008 war.  

According to a statement released by the Ombudsman of Georgia, since 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has been investigating alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the August 2008 war. The Ombudsman’s office indicated that the ECHR ruling will likely have an impact on the ICC ruling, especially because of the ECHR’s conclusions on the torture of Georgian prisoners of war.  The Office of the Public Defender of Georgia stated that the International Criminal Court should make the identification of high-ranking officials responsible for the torture of Georgian prisoners a priority.  

Despite the slow-moving nature of the international arbitration system and the possible hindering of communications between Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia as a result of the ruling, the decision was a key action in affirming Georgia’s territorial integrity, and that the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (South Ossetia) are in fact Georgian territory. 

Image Source: Agenda.GE  

On January 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a Presidential Decree on the topic of demarcation of the state border between Russia and its neighboring states. The decree focuses on establishing borders between Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, reigniting frustration from the Georgian side on Russia’s continued involvement in supporting de-facto states that fall within Georgia’s internationally-recognized borders.  

In the decree, Russia named Mikhail Petrakov as the new Special Envoy for Demarcation and Delimitation of Borders. Petrakov also serves as the head of a Russian delegation responsible for engaging in multilateral talks with countries of the Caspian region. The post was previously manned by Igor Bratchikov, who entered the role under a Presidential Decree that took effect on August 25, 2012.   

The January 2021 decree states that Petrakov “will be tasked with delimiting and demarcating the state border of the Russian Federation with Abkhazia, Georgia, and South Ossetia.” The announcement of Petrakov’s appointment immediately incited a response from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Georgia affirmed that any demarcation of state borders will not be considered until Russia de-occupies Georgian territory and reverses its recognition of the ‘independence’ of the occupied territories that was announced in 2008.   

On January 4, Nikoloz Samkharadze, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, echoed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement that Georgia will not establish any borders until Georgian authorities regain control over Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Samkharadze also stated that “international law is on our side.”  

Due to the coronavirus pandemic that emerged in the South Caucasus region in early 2020, the lines of communication used by Russia and Georgia to discuss the issues of territorial occupation were interrupted. The Geneva International Discussions, launched in October 2008, are the only platform for the parties of the Russo-Georgia war to discuss humanitarian and security issues. 

The 51st session of the Geneva International Discussions was originally scheduled to take place on March 31 and April 1, 2020. In light of the global health crisis, the talks were initially postponed to October 6-7, 2020. However, the Russian delegation backed out the discussions, citing concerns over face-to-face meetings during a pandemic. The 51st session ultimately took place on December 10-11, 2020, marking the first and only round of discussions in 2020.  

With a full year elapsing between the 50th and 51st sessions of the discussions, the consequences of a lack of dialogue could be clearly observed.  

Historically, freedom of movement between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia has been affected by sporadic border closures and frequent changes in policy. In the context of the coronavirus pandemic, movement has faced further restrictions. 

On March 11, 2020, Abkhaz officials announced that beginning on March 14, the Enguri Bridge Crossing Point, the only link between Georgia and Abkhazia, would be closed indefinitely to curb the spread of COVID-19. After more than two months, Abkhaz authorities opened the Enguri Bridge crossing for one day on May 26 with the purpose of allowing residents of Abkhazia who traveled to the Tbilisi-controlled areas for medical treatment to return.  

By June 21, Abkhaz authorities announced another temporary opening of the Enguri Bridge. The opening was planned for June 22-24 to serve as a ‘humanitarian corridor’ to allow Abkhaz residents to return from Georgia proper. Following this three-day window, the only linkage between Abkhazia and territory controlled by Tbilisi was once again severed. Two additional ‘humanitarian corridors’ were opened from August 5-9 and December 3-10. The December opening faced widespread criticism from Abkhaz residents. Residents were only permitted to exit Abkhazia, and residents seeking to visit relatives in Georgia proper or seek medical care were unsure if they would be able to return to their homes after exiting Abkhazia.  

The situation in South Ossetia, Georgia’s other region occupied by Russian-backed forces, was even more dire. In early 2020 amidst the initial spread of the coronavirus, South Ossetia closed its borders with both Georgia and Russia. Initially, the only connection between South Ossetia and the outside world was through freight transportation between North and South Ossetia. Despite the attempts to isolate itself, South Ossetia’s hospitals quickly became overwhelmed, and authorities were forced to call upon Russia to establish a mobile military field hospital. By December, the Russian Armed Forces closed the temporary hospital facility and withdrew from Tskhinvali.  

Limitations on the freedom of movement between Georgia and its occupied territories as well as the repeated postponing of dialogues between Tbilisi and occupying forces led to heightened tensions on border issues in 2020. Russia’s announcement of a new Special Envoy for border demarcation does not positively contribute to the situation, both at the diplomatic level and with the on-the-ground situation.  

It has been recommended that Georgia could promote further engagement with the occupied regions by offering additional medical assistance during the pandemic, but it is uncertain how this would be perceived by occupying authorities. In December 2020, the Georgian government delivered 10,000 doses of surplus flu vaccines to Abkhazia for use by high risk groups. However, earlier this month, as wildfires raged across western Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgian authorities volunteered to provide support, including the use of helicopters, to extinguish the fires, but Abkhaz authorities rejected the offer.   

With the signing of the trilateral agreement ending the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, clear deadlines for the deoccupation of Azerbaijani territories were established. In the days after the announcement, homes were set on fire, trees felled, and livestock slaughtered by ethnic Armenians leaving territories that had been returned to Azerbaijan. These scenes garnered attention from international media, but destruction on a much wider and deeper scale began nearly thirty years earlier as occupying forces sought to wipe out any and all cultural and historical traces related to Azerbaijan.

On November 17, one of the world’s most famous museums released a press release on the importance of preserving cultural heritage. The statement, made by the Metropolitan Museum of New York, called for the preservation of Armenian cultural sites. “The recent bloodshed and destruction in the Nagorno-Karabakh region is a global tragedy of grave concern to us all,” read the official statement. Museum officials added that, “we implore all those involved to respect these international cultural sites [of Armenians], which enrich our world and have survived for thousands of years.”

The Met, which hosted an exhibit titled Armenia! in 2018, made no mention of Azerbaijani culture or historical sites. Funding for this exhibition primarily came from the Hagop Kevorkian Fund, the Hirar and Anna Hovanian Foundation, and the Armenian General Benevolent Union. The Hagop Kevorkian Fund has provided more than $650,000 in donations to the Met in recent years.

Beginning in 1994 when Azerbaijan lost control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, Armenian forces and Nagorno-Karabakh authorities pushed for the destruction of Azerbaijani cultural and historical sites in order to erase Azerbaijani history in the region, justify their actions, and complicate the possibility of Azerbaijan reclaiming its lost territories.

As Karabakh is the cultural center of Azerbaijan, these efforts were widespread and comprehensive. According to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions led to the destruction of 927 libraries, 22 museums, 808 recreational venues, 4 theaters, 2 concert halls, 8 cultural parks, 4 art galleries, and 85 schools of music, and more.

Religious sites were also a common target of the de-facto authorities. Many mosques were simply destroyed but those that survived were neglected, used as animal shelters, or modified to erase Azerbaijani elements. Examples include the mosque of the Alkhanli village in Fizuli, which was graffitied and converted to be used as a cowshed. More widely known is the Juma Mosque in Aghdam. As the only building still standing in Aghdam, a city referred to as the Hiroshima of the Caucasus, the mosque has fallen into disrepair and served as a barn for cows and pigs under Armenian occupation.

Some religious sites escaped total destruction during Armenian occupation, but were instead defaced in an attempt to change their identity and provide an alternative history for the region. In 2019, after five years of restoration efforts, authorities of the regime occupying Nagorno-Karabakh announced the completion of restoration efforts on the Govhar Agha Upper Mosque in Shusha. After its restoration, the mosque was referred to as “Persian” in an attempt to erase evidence showing Azerbaijan’s historical ties to the region.

Other sites, including the Khudavang Monastery Complex near Kalbajar, had traditional, Caucasian-Albanian motifs destroyed and replaced with Armenian designs. The monastery, which was constructed in the 15^th century, previously held many oil paintings and inscriptions on the walls of the building. The Albanian crosses were replaced with Armenian crosses, and Armenian paintings covered the previous designs and inscriptions.

In 2011, Armenian and Karabakh authorities began to ‘renovate’ the walls of the Ganjasar Monastery Complex, which was constructed in the 12^th century. With the financial backing of Armenian businessman Levon Hayrapetyan, work to cover the exterior walls of the complex with marble stones began. Armenians themselves protested this action, stating that it would destroy the historical and cultural value of the structure. Azerbaijanis claim that this ‘renovation’ was used to make the site more Armenian, masking more significant changes to the structure and design.

In addition to religious centers, historical sites and museums became easy targets for deliberate destruction of the Azerbaijani legacy. In the Khojavend district, the Azykh Cave is an archaeological site where bones and relics of ancient people have been discovered. As a result of Armenian occupation, many illegal excavations were allegedly carried out, and until liberation, the cave served as a storage facility for Armenian military equipment.

In Shusha, the Museum Mausoleum Complex of Molla Panah Vagif fell into disrepair. The complex and permanent exhibits were destroyed, and any transportable artifacts were taken to Armenia. Khurshudbanu Natavan’s house, a historical monument, music school, and later the site of the National Museum of Azerbaijani Literature was pillaged in 1992, and hundreds of pieces of arts, carpets, miniatures, and archaeological samples were destroyed and seized by Armenian forces.

In surrounding areas, the Museums of History in Kalbajar, Lachin, and Aghdam were all destroyed and plundered as well. Historical pieces have often made their way to markets where valuable artifacts have been sold for scrap metal or auctioned off. Bronze statues of the poet Natavan, the composer Uzeyir Hajybayov, and singer Bulbul were being sold as scrap metal in Georgia, but the Azeri government purchased these pieces and took them to Baku for safekeeping. In another instance, a silver handbag from the Lachin Museum of History was sold at Sotheby’s in London for $80,000.

As members of UNESCO, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to uphold international cultural conventions, including the 1954 Hague Convention, which states that attackers have an obligation to not only protect cultural property, but to take steps to prevent the theft of property in occupied territories. In the nearly thirty years of occupation of Azerbaijani territory, Armenia failed to honor its pledge to the international community. Not only did much of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions turn into a desolate wasteland, Armenian authorities actively encouraged destroying and defacing cultural and historical monuments. On top of this, they sought to profit from this destruction by selling valuable artifacts and incorporating relics into their own museums.

While little attention has been given to the widespread destruction and vandalism of Azerbaijani property, international organizations, museums such as the Met, and international media have all called upon Azerbaijan to ensure the security of Armenian historical and cultural heritage. Even Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern over historical Christian sites in the territories being returned to Azerbaijan. In response to this, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has affirmed that Azerbaijan will work towards these goals.

During the entire 44 days of warfare, Azerbaijan was guided by international law and the legal framework that supported the country’s territorial integrity. It is in Azerbaijan’s best interest to uphold the obligations of the 1954 Hague Convention, and to set an example for the importance of preserving history. Azerbaijan has a longstanding reputation of tolerance and diversity in culture and religion. These principles should be adhered to in the reconstruction efforts in the recently liberated lands by preserving all historical and cultural sites, even those built during the years of occupation.  

Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Ara Ayvazyan | Source: Arm.info

Less than one month after the signing of a trilateral peace agreement to end the hostilities of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the Armenian government is hinting at a new position on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.

A political crisis rift erupted in Armenia following the signing of the agreement with Azerbaijan and Russia. Several government ministers and members of the Prime Minister’s own political party have stated that they were not informed of Nikol Pashinyan’s decision to capitulate to Azerbaijan. A statement issued by the Office of Armen Sarkissian, the President of the Republic of Armenia, supported this claim, as Sarkissian noted that he had not participated in any negotiations. “I learned about the conditions for ending the war from the press as well,” he added.

Another high-level resignation was that of Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan. Mnatsakanyan played an active role in Armenia’s diplomacy during the war, participating in numerous international meetings including with the United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Following his resignation, Ara Ayvazian, a career diplomat, was appointed to the position.

Within a few weeks of signing the ceasefire, the Ministerial Council of the OSCE, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the 57 OSCE member countries, gathered in Tirana, Albania for annual dialogue on security issues within the OSCE area. As the new Foreign Minister, Ayvazian provided Armenia’s address in the session.

In his remarks, Ayvazian made numerous allegations and hinted at a shift in the viewpoint of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh from what Armenia had agreed to in the agreement of November 9. The Foreign Minister echoed criticisms from France, accusing Azerbaijan of recruiting foreign fighters with the assistance of Turkey. However, there are numerous documented cases of diaspora Armenians from other countries fighting on the side of Armenia. According to International Humanitarian Law, “foreign fighters may fulfil ‘mercenary’ definitions contained in national legislations prohibiting mercenarism.”

Ayvazian also announced several claims that are contrary to the norms and laws established by international organizations. For example, the Foreign Minister referred to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories as ‘occupied by Azerbaijan’ when in fact, four United Nations Security Council resolutions established that these territories are part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Adding onto this, Ayvazian provided an explanation on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which many have since interpreted as conflicting with the recently signed agreement. Speaking before the OSCE member countries, the Foreign Minister claimed that, “reality clearly attests to the fact that Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be placed under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan.”

Ayvazian continued, stating that a comprehensive resolution of the conflict that would lead to lasting peace must include, “status of Artsakh [the name of the de facto state within the internationally-recognized territory of Azerbaijan] based on realization of the right of self-determination,” “de-occupation by Azerbaijan of the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh,” “safe and dignified return to their homes of the recently displaced population of Artsakh” , and “preservation of Armenian cultural and religious heritage on the territories.”

This list of requirements indicates that Armenia should have control over all of Nagorno-Karabakh, or the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast during Soviet times. The sixth clause of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefire Agreement states that Azerbaijan will retain control of Shusha. Based on Ayvazian’s claims, Shusha would need to be in the hands of Armenia, thus directly countering what was settled with the agreement from November 9.

It is also important to note that regarding the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has affirmed that there will no special status for the region, as indicated in a national address held on November 10. Aliyev repeated this message in an address on November 17, adding that, “there is a single Azerbaijan: multinational and multi-confessional.”

The support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was echoed by Russian officials. Dmitry Peskov, the Press Secretary for Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently stated that, “the belonging of this territory is determined by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,” adding that “President Putin said that Karabakh itself was not recognized.”

With protesters calling for Prime Minister Pashinyan to step down, it’s unclear if these assertions by Ayvazian are in line with the government’s official stance, or if this rhetoric is being used to quell discontent and preserve Pashinyan’s position instead.

Widespread public discontent signals that the war isn’t over. From the Armenian perspective, the peace agreement is seen as unjust. The peace agreement itself has several critical omissions, so it is certainly possible for Armenia to use these weaknesses or lack of clear terms in conjunction with its close relations with Moscow to advocate for changes in the implementation of the solution.